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Operationeel onderzoek is de wetenschap die wiskundige modellen en algoritmen gebruikt
om processen binnen bedrijven en organisaties te verbeteren. Deze scriptie behandelt
een specifiek domein binnen deze onderzoekstak: het beheer van projecten. Traditioneel
werd binnen dit domein voornamelijk de nadruk gelegd op het optimaliseren van project-
planningen. De laatste jaren is binnen dit domein echter een steeds breder perspectief
toegepast. Dit resulteerde in verschillende nieuwe technieken die beslissingsnemers beter
in staat stellen om in te spelen op risico’s, alsook om de voortgang van een project ef-
fectiever en efficie¨nter te gaan monitoren. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt twee subdomeinen
die tot op heden niet of onvolledig werden behandeld in de literatuur. Hieronder wordt
de inhoud van deze scriptie zeer kort samengevat, voor een uitgebreide inleiding tot de
verschillende subdomeinen en de gebruikte technieken wordt verwezen naar de introductie
in hoofdstuk 1.
Het eerste subdomein onderzoekt het gebruik van incentive contracten tussen de
eigenaar van een project en de uitvoerende partij. Hierover gebeurt de laatste jaren steeds
meer onderzoek, maar het merendeel van dit onderzoek legt hierbij de nadruk op een kwa-
litatieve en beschrijvende analyse. Het doel van dit onderzoek is om deze problematiek
kwantitatief te modelleren om op deze manier ook een prescriptieve analyse te bekomen.
Deze analyse wordt gemaakt vanuit het perspectief van zowel de eigenaar van het project
alsook dat van de uitvoerende partij. Hieronder worden de doelstellingen van de verschil-
lende hoofdstukken in dit eerste deel van het proefschrift kort samengevat.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een uitgebreid overzicht van de academische literatuur die is ver-
schenen over het gebruik van incentives in project management. Op basis van dit overzicht
kon worden vastgesteld dat een meer kwantitatieve analyse van het gebruik van incentives
in projecten tot op vandaag nog ontbrak. Vervolgens wordt de informatie die werd verza-
meld gebruikt in hoofdstuk 3, waar een wiskundig model wordt voorgesteld om de inter-
actie tussen de eigenaar en de uitvoerende partij te modelleren. Gebruikmakend van dit
model wordt een computationeel experiment uitgevoerd waaruit enkele duidelijke manage-
ment richtlijnen voor het ontwerpen van goede incentive contracten worden gedestilleerd.
Hierop wordt verder gebouwd in hoofdstuk 4, waar een heuristische oplossingsmethode
v
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voor het ontwerpen van contracten wordt voorgesteld. Het verschil met de eerdere analyse
is dat hier voor een specifiek scenario een oplossing kan worden aangereikt, eerder dan het
stellen van een aantal globale vuistregels. Vervolgens verandert het perspectief van dat
van de eigenaar van het project naar dat van de partij die het project uitvoert. Voor deze
partij wordt in hoofdstuk 5 een lineair model ontworpen die hem/haar in staat stelt om
de planning van een project correct te balanceren om op die manier de hoogst mogelijke
totale winst te bekomen. Naast het maken van een solide planning wordt in hoofdstuk 6
een nieuwe methode voorgesteld die de opvolging verbetert van projecten die onderworpen
zijn aan incentive contracten.
Het tweede subdomein van dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe weermodellen gebruikt
kunnen worden om de prestaties van weergevoelige projecten te verbeteren. Tijdens de
laatste decennia is er veel klimatologisch en meteorologisch onderzoek gedaan om de kwa-
liteit van weermodellen en weervoorspellingen te verbeteren. Daarenboven is er steeds
meer data beschikbaar doordat er meer meetpunten zijn. Deze trends openen deuren
voor het verbeteren van operationele beslissingsmodellen. Ondanks het bestaan van deze
weermodellen en de beschikbaarheid van data zijn toepassingen binnen het domein van
operationeel onderzoek nog steeds een zeldzaamheid (Regnier, 2008). Bijgevolg is het doel
van het tweede deel van dit proefschrift om deze modellen te gaan gebruiken binnen een
project management context. Specifiek wordt er gefocust op offshore activiteiten die sterk
onderhevig zijn aan golfslag en windsterkte. Hieronder worden de doelstellingen van de
verschillende hoofdstukken in het tweede deel van het proefschrift kort samengevat.
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een overzicht van de recente vernieuwingen in het domein van
weermodellering. Op basis hiervan wordt een nieuw operationeel weermodel gebouwd dat
in staat is om realistisch gecorreleerde windsnelheden en golfhoogtes te simuleren. Het
doel van dit model is het simuleren van realistische weerpatronen op lange termijn, eerder
dan het maken van weersvoorspellingen op korte termijn. Dit weermodel wordt vervolgens
gebruikt voor twee operationele toepassingen in de twee daaropvolgende hoofdstukken. In
hoofdstuk 8 wordt een nieuwe methode voorgesteld om de planning van offshore construc-
tie projecten te optimaliseren door rekening te houden met de impact van windsnelheid
en golfhoogte. Deze methode gebruikt meta-heuristische oplossingstechnieken om verschil-
lende strategiee¨n te testen. Het testen van een dergelijke strategie gebeurt door middel
van een simulatiemodel. De voorgestelde techniek maakt eveneens gebruik van informatie
over de klimatologische condities om de oplossingsruimte op een intelligente manier in te
perken en op die manier een betere dekking van de meest interessante zones van de op-
lossingsruimte te kunnen garanderen. Vervolgens wordt in hoofdstuk 9 het weermodel
gebruikt voor het optimaliseren van het onderhoud van offshore wind turbines. De pro-
ductiviteit van een windturbine neemt toe naarmate de windsnelheid stijgt. Bijgevolg is
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het interessanter om onderhoud uit te voeren wanneer de windsnelheden laag zijn. Na-
tuurlijk valt op voorhand niet te voorspellen hoe het weer zich zal gedragen (althans niet
op lange termijn), bijgevolg is het complex om een goede bovengrens voor de windsnelheid
vast te leggen voor onderhoudsactiviteiten. Dit hoofdstuk gebruikt het nieuwe weermodel
alsook een aantal technieken uit het domein van artificie¨le intelligentie om dit proces te
verbeteren.
Tot slot worden al de voornaamste bevindingen alsook de mogelijkheden voor toekom-
stig onderzoek samengevat in hoofdstuk 10.
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1.1 General Introduction
The field of project management has originated from the domain of operational research,
which focuses on the mathematical optimization of operational problems. However, in
recent decades an increasingly broad perspective has been applied to the field of project
management. As such, project management has spawned a number of very active sub-
domains, which focus not solely on the scheduling of the project’s baseline, but also on
the analysis of risk, as well as the controlling of project execution.
This dissertation focuses on two areas where existing literature is still lacking. The first
area is the use of incentivised contractual agreements between the owner of a project, and
the contractor who is hired to execute the project. Whereas this area has received growing
attention in recent years, the majority of studies remained strongly descriptive. Hence,
the aim of the first part of this dissertation is to develop a more prescriptive approach
from both the owner’s and the contractor’s perspective. A brief introduction to the first
part of this dissertation is given in section 1.2.
The second part of this dissertation investigates the use of dedicated weather models
to improve operational performance of weather-sensitive projects. During recent decades,
significant effort has been made to improve the quality of weather simulation models.
Moreover, the amount of available weather data has been steadily increasing. This opens
up a lot of new possibilities for using more precise weather models in order to support
operational decision making. In spite of this, the number of applications of these weather
models in operational research has remained rather limited (Regnier, 2008). As such,
the aim of the second part of this dissertation is to leverage these weather models to
improve the scheduling of offshore construction projects, as well as preventive maintenance
of offshore wind turbines. A brief introduction to the second part of this dissertation is
given in section 1.3.
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1.2 Incentive Contracts for Projects
The main research objective of the first part of this dissertation is the creation a com-
prehensive decision support system to guide the use of incentive contracts in a project
management context, from both the project owner’s and the contractor’s perspective.
The adoption of increasingly complex incentive contracts in recent years has sparked prac-
titioner’s interest, and consequently more academic research has been conducted on this
subject. However, research on the subject has mainly focused on very specific cases, which
implies that findings are hard to generalize. Through the design of a comprehensive sys-
tem, and the execution of extensive computational experiments which test the strategies
of the owner as well as the contractor in a multitude of project situations, the quality of
the decision making process will be improved.
Contractual agreements are made in order to govern the relationship between economic
actors. This governance is especially important in situations such as project contracting,
where both parties’ profit maximization objectives result in a naturally adversarial rela-
tionship (Turner, 2004). To alleviate this situation and the potential agency problems
it may cause, contractual agreements often include incentive clauses. These clauses are
intended to align the contractor’s objectives with those of the project owner.
This alignment is highly important since the manner in which the contract is executed
is fully controlled by the contractor. The method of execution chosen by the contractor can
be modelled as a trade-off decision which envelops the traditional iron triangle (Marques
et al., 2011). This implies that the outcome of a project can be seen as a combination of
cost, duration and scope. Given the interrelation of these dimensions, it is impossible to
improve the performance in one of these dimensions without negatively affecting one or
both of the other dimensions.
Two research domains are highly relevant to the design of incentivised contracts in a
project context. The first is the literature on contracting itself which deals explicitly with
the negotiation, implementation and perceived effectiveness of contracts. The second is the
literature on trade-offs in project management. This is a subdomain of project management
literature that aims to quantify the trade-offs present in projects. This includes modelling
and optimization of projects using a wide array of techniques.
1.2.1 Core Concepts
(Project) Owner: The economic actor who desires the completion of a project, but
lacks certain resources (knowledge, manpower, time...) needed to execute the project.
Hence, the project owner enters a relationship with a contractor who executes the
project in exchange for a financial compensation. The properties of this relation-
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ship are defined in a formal contractual agreement, which may or may not include
incentive clauses.
Contractor: The economic actor who agrees to execute a project in exchange for finan-
cial compensation. The magnitude of this compensation depends on the degree to
which the project outcome corresponds to the outcome specified in the contractual
agreement.
Project outcome: The cost, duration and scope of a project as measured upon its
completion, from the perspective of the project owner. The scope of the project
encompasses all types of performance measures other than time and cost, such as
the amount of work performed and the quality of said work. The value of the finished
project to the owner is a function of these dimensions.
Incentive: A monetary reward received by the contractor in return for behaving a cer-
tain way (i.e. the manner in which (s)he has executed the project). The magnitude
of this incentive depends on the way in which the project owner perceives and values
the project outcome. Hence it is linked to one or more of the outcome dimensions:
cost, duration and scope.
Project scheduling: Constructing a timetable for the activities of the project to indi-
cate when they should start and finish. One of the methods of doing this is through
the selection of activity execution modes, which represent certain combinations of
outcome dimensions at the activity level. An example of this is the multi-mode
resource-constrained project scheduling problem, where the duration of activities
can be changed by changing their renewable resource assignments.
Project risk analysis: Analysing a project schedule in order to identify critical activi-
ties and/or resources in order to discover the key risks during a project’s execution.
Project control: Once the project is in progress, the deviations between the schedule
and reality should be monitored using control systems. These control systems should
provide timely warnings, which allow project mangers to take action and get the
project back on track (Vanhoucke, 2010a).
1.2.2 Dynamics Between Owner and Subcontractor
Incentivised contractual agreements are analysed from the perspective of both the project
owner and the contractor. The goal of the owner is to design the contract in a way that
aligns the awarded incentives with the project outcomes, in order to maximize his expected
utility and minimize the risk of conflicting objectives. From the contractor’s perspective,
the objective is to optimize the way in which the project is scheduled and controlled, given
that (s)he is subjected to a specific set of incentive clauses.
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1.2.2.1 Trade-offs
Much has been written on the trade-offs encountered when managing projects and ac-
tivities. The most traditional trade-off problem being the time/cost trade-off, which was
first introduced as a linear relationship (Kelley and Walker, 1959), but is assumed to
be convex in more recent literature (Choi and Kwak, 2012; Shr and Chen, 2003). This
two-dimensional trade-off can be extended by adding the scope of a project as a third di-
mension. Again, the relationship between project scope and the other project dimensions
is generally assumed to be convex (El-Rayes and Kandil, 2005).
These three dimensions (cost, duration and scope) are used to reflect the outcome
of the project as perceived by the project owner. However, these three dimensions are
insufficient in order to fully represent the manner in which the project will be (or has
been) executed, since parts of the execution strategy - which is decided by the contractor
- cannot be directly perceived by the owner.
Cost
Duration
Scope
Effort
Outcome dimensions
perceived by owner Contractor’s leverage
Figure 1.1: Project trade-off dimensions
The introduction of ‘contractor effort’ as a fourth dimension (see figure 1.1) to this
trade-off makes a comprehensive representation of the subcontracted project possible. Con-
tractor effort can be defined as investments made by the contractor in order to enhance one
or more of the three outcome dimensions of the project, but to which (s)he is not contrac-
tually obliged. Naturally, the contractor hopes to earn a return on these investments by
receiving a higher incentive payment. Although some authors use another nomenclature
for the concept, contractor effort has already been touched upon several times in project
trade-off literature.
The most basic example of contractor effort is the attention given to the project by the
contractor’s management team (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989; Arditi and Yasamis, 1998).
This is dubbed managerial attention and can be seen as a scarce resource since only
a limited amount is available to be distributed among the contractor’s project portfolio.
Other examples of contractor effort include insurance policies (Chapman and Ward, 1994),
the allocation of more or better skilled personnel (El-Rayes, 2001b; El-Rayes and Kandil,
2005) and hiring project specific equipment to resolve potential issues (Lee and Thomas,
6 Chapter 1
2007). In line with the other dimensions, the relationship of this dimension with the other
dimensions can be assumed to be convex (Bayiz and Corbett, 2005).
1.2.2.2 Incentive Contracts
The incentive clauses present in contractual agreements are always linked to one of the
three outcome dimensions (cost, duration and scope) perceived by the project owner.
Naturally, a single contract can include multiple incentive clauses. A distinction between
contracts can also be made based on the way in which the incentive amounts are calculated.
Traditionally this was done using simple linear equations, but recently piecewise linear and
non-linear incentive agreements have gained popularity.
A simple example of this is a cost sharing agreement between the owner and the
contractor where any deviations from the target cost are shared according to an agreed
upon sharing ratio. Supposing that this ratio is equal to 50%, half of the cost overrun is
to be paid for by the contractor. Inversely, should the final cost be less than the targeted
amount, the owner is required to transfer half of these savings to the contractor as a reward
for his/her better than expected performance.
The current literature on incentive contracts can be divided into three categories. A
first body of literature examines the negotiation phase between the client and the contrac-
tor. The second provides descriptive analyses of the types of contracts used in practice,
often focussing on cost incentives. Finally, a third body of research empirically evaluates
the effectiveness of incentive contracts, often using surveys as a measurement tool. A
detailed overview of this literature is presented in section 2.3.
This literature forms a solid base on which a quantitative model to analyse incentive
contract structures can be built. As of now no such model exists, which makes an objective
comparison of many contracting approaches difficult, and subjective at best. Through the
creation of a more comprehensive model a solid foundation is provided, which can be used
by both project owner and contractor to make informed decisions on how to manage such
projects.
1.2.3 Research Objectives
Whereas the available literature clearly showcases academic and professional interest in
the subject, there are still a substantial number of gaps in the literature. Specifically, the
following challenges have been identified:
• Studies on contracts are highly fragmented and usually focus on one or a few contract
types. There is a clear need for a more comprehensive comparison of the performance
of incentive contracts.
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• Current literature on the design of contracts is mainly descriptive, in that it de-
scribes which types of contracts are being used in practice and how effective these
are perceived to be. However, no attempt has been made to move towards a more
quantitative perspective, which is a prerequisite to providing proactive design guide-
lines given the properties of a project.
• The implications of incentivized objectives on the scheduling and controlling of
projects have not been investigated to date.
These opportunities have been translated into a number of specific studies, which
represent the chapters in the first part of this dissertation. The nature of these specific
chapters can be visualised in a two-dimensional space. The first dimension being the
perspective used, which can be either that of the owner or that of the contractor. The
second dimension expresses the ‘level’ of the analysis. Specifically, whether the goal of the
chapter is to provide strategic guidelines or to provide operational solutions for dealing
with incentive contracts.
Owner Contractor
Strategic
Operational
Contract Design 
Methodology 
Chapter 3
Contract Design 
Heuristics  
Chapter 4
Project Scheduling 
Chapter 5
Project Control 
Chapter 6
Figure 1.2: Visualisation of the chapters in the first part of this dissertation.
1.2.3.1 A Framework for the Owner’s Contract Design Decision
The aim of the first study (chapter 3) is to provide a quantitative framework for incentive
contract design in projects, which can be used by the project owner to select the most ad-
equate contract for any given project environment. This quantitative framework consists
of three components: a trade-off model describing the nature of the project, an evalua-
tion model describing the valuation of the different outcomes of the project for both the
owner and contractor, and a contract model which is capable of representing the majority
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of (incentivised) contractual agreements used in practice. The key hypotheses that are
investigated using this model are the following:
1. Some types of contract clauses are more effective than others.
2. Specific combinations of contract clauses are likely to be more effective than others.
3. The performance of specific contracts may be influenced by the nature of the project.
By answering these research questions several generalisable strategic guidelines can
be provided for incentive contract design. Hence, this study is located in the upper left
quadrant of figure 1.2
1.2.3.2 Designing Optimization Techniques for Contract Design
The objective of the second study (chapter 4) is to create a dedicated optimization method
which is capable of constructing robust contracts for a given project. This research ques-
tion also takes the project owner’s perspective, but moves towards a more operational
application area (i.e. dealing with a specific project rather than specifying general rules
of thumb). This is done by designing optimization techniques that provide answers to
specific cases, rather than providing broad managerial guidelines. Specifically, a parallel
multi-objective scatter search meta-heuristic has been developed to optimise the contract
structure.
1.2.3.3 Scheduling Techniques for Incentivized Projects
Next, the perspective of the contractor rather than that of the owner is analysed. The
first study (chapter 5) that takes the perspective of the contractor investigates how the
scheduling of a project subjected to an incentive contract can be optimized. To do this, the
traditional multi-mode project scheduling problem is extended in order to accommodate
the four-dimensional trade-off associated with the incentivized environment.
1.2.3.4 Controlling Incentivized Projects
Another key task of the contractor which succeeds the scheduling phase is monitoring the
project execution. The key goal of chapter 6 is to adjust existing project control techniques
in order to enhance the relevance of the signals they produce for an incentivized project
context. This is especially important since the profit margin of the contractor, and hereby
also the objectives of the contractor, are inextricably linked to the incentive structure of
the projects.
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1.2.4 Methodology
This section presents a very brief introduction of the methodology used in this disserta-
tion. A distinction is made between the high-level model used to represent the project
owner’s contract design problem, and the more operational models used to represent the
contractor’s decision space. The former is summarised in section 1.2.4.1, and an overview
of the latter is given in section 1.2.4.2.
1.2.4.1 The Owner’s Perspective
The foundation of the analysis is the high-level model that represents a quantitative re-
lation between the elements of the incentivized contracting problem. This model consists
of three components: the contract model, the trade-off model and the evaluation model.
Each of these models is thoroughly based on existing literature, but an integrated approach
as presented by this research is still lacking. An overview of this model is presented in
figure 1.3.
Trade-off Model Evaluation Model
Contract Model
C, D, S & E
C, D & S Incentive (Itot)
Cost Incentive Duration Incentive Scope Incentive
Project Environment
Expected profit
Alignment of 
motivations
Outcome
Contractor
Owner
Determines 
Execution
Designs Contract
Figure 1.3: Strategic model of the contract design problem.
The nature of the project itself is captured by the trade-off model, which represents
all possible ways in which a specific project can be executed. These execution modes are
described as a combination of the four trade-off dimensions: cost (C), duration (D), scope
(S) and effort (E) (see figure 1.1). As indicated on figure 1.3, it is the contractor who
controls the manner in which this trade-off decision is made. The trade-off point chosen
by the contractor is then passed on to the other model components: the contract model
and the evaluation model.
The contract model uses the dimensions of the trade-off that can be perceived by
the project owner (cost, duration and scope - see figure 1.3), in order to calculate the
magnitude of the incentive. The contract model is designed to be capable of representing
all types of incentive clauses (again for cost, duration or scope) used in practice, while
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using a limited set of parameters. As shown on figure 1.3, the value of these parameters
is controlled by the owner of the project.
The information on the four outcome dimensions together with the incentive calculated
by the contract model forms the input for the evaluation model. The purpose of this model
is to calculate the actual monetary value of the way in which the project is executed -
including the awarded incentive amounts - from the perspective of both the owner and the
contractor. These outcomes can then be summarized along two outcome dimensions: the
expected profit and the alignment of the objectives, the latter being a measure for the risk
of the project.
This model is the basis for chapters 3 and 4, which represent the perspective of the
owner. As indicated in figure 1.3, the objective of the owner is twofold: maximization
of expected profit, and the minimization of objective misalignment. The latter of these
two can be viewed as a minimization of risk, since misalignment of objectives will cause
a greater volatility in the project outcomes. The fact that two objectives have to be
considered complicates the comparison of different solutions (i.e. contracts for a specific
project). Hence, in order to optimize the contract multi-objective and multi-population
meta-heuristics will be developed in order to determine the Pareto-fronts for the problems
under study.
1.2.4.2 The Contractor’s Perspective
The contractor’s objective is the maximization of her/his profits through the optimization
of both project scheduling and controlling strategies, which are the subjects of chapters
5 and 6 respectively. Section 1.2.4.2.1 introduces the methodology used to reflect the
contractor’s scheduling problem, and section 1.2.4.2.2 gives a brief overview of the project
control problem faced by the contractor.
1.2.4.2.1 Project scheduling Creating a detailed schedule for the project execution
requires analysing the project at an operational level. This implies that the analysis is made
at the level of the individual activities rather than viewing the project as an aggregated
whole (as was done when taking the owners perspective, see section 1.2.4.1).
Practically, this is done by defining a set of execution modes for every activity in
the project, as shown in figure 1.4. Similarly to the trade-offs for the aggregated model,
an activity mode is characterized by four trade-off dimensions: cost (C), duration (D),
scope (S) and effort (E). Hence, the manner in which a project is executed can be fully
determined by selecting an execution mode for every activity of the project. (e.g. selecting
the first mode for activity A and the second mode for activity B results in a total project
duration (D) of 13, with a cost (C) of 250, and a total scope (S) of 15 with 15 total effort
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S A B F
Mode C D S E
1 100 10 5 0
2 80 9 6 10
Mode C D S E
1 200 5 8 0
2 250 3 10 15
Figure 1.4: Principle of multi-mode project scheduling.
(E) invested by the contractor).
When interpreting the activity modes in figure 1.4, it is important to keep in mind that
the cost of an activity only reflects the cost perceived by the project owner (see section
1.2.2.1). As such, the values associated with the second activity mode of activity A could
be viewed as the contractor allocating a more experienced staff member to this activity.
Because of this staff member’s higher skill level this staff member is more expensive to
the contractor since this person earns a higher wage, but this cost is carried by the con-
tractor and not the project owner1. However, by allocating this person to the activity the
performance in the other dimensions that are perceived by the owner will improve. For
example, there may be less waste of materials in a construction project, decreasing the
cost of the activity. The activity follow-up may be more thorough causing the activity to
be performed faster than it otherwise would have been, or the final product may be of a
higher quality level due to a higher level of attention to detail (e.g. better welds by a more
experienced welder).
1.2.4.2.2 Project control A second goal of the contractor is to optimise the moni-
toring of an incentivised project once it is being executed. The key objective here is the
creation of systems that are effective at providing control signals, while limiting the effort
needed to monitor the progress of project components. These control signals enable the
contractor to take adequate corrective action. The design of these techniques is based on
existing techniques such as earned schedule and earned value management.
1This is of course only an example and there are of course projects where this cost is paid directly by
the project owner. However, as stated earlier (section 1.2.2.1), contractor effort may take a number of
other forms.
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1.3 Weather sensitive projects
The second part of this dissertation deals with the use of weather models within the
context of operational research. Recent advances have yielded substantial improvements
in both the quality of weather models, as well as the available weather data on which
these models are based. In spite of this, the number of applications of these weather
models in operational research has remained rather limited (Regnier, 2008). As such, the
aim of the second part of this dissertation is to leverage these weather models to improve
the scheduling of offshore construction projects, as well as maintenance of offshore wind
turbines.
1.3.1 Research Objectives
1.3.1.1 Operationally Relevant Weather Model
The first objective of the second part of this dissertation was the creation of an adequate
weather simulation model. Importantly, this weather simulation model should be able to
simulate weather conditions that are relevant within an operational context. This implies
that the weather model should be able to generate weather patterns using operationally
relevant time intervals. Moreover, the focus has to lie on the correct weather elements.
For instance, a lot of weather models focus on the precipitation, since this is often highly
relevant for agriculture. However, this is not necessarily relevant from an operational point
of view.
One of the key areas where operational weather models can provide substantial benefits
are offshore projects. For this type of project, there are two main risk factors: the wind
speed and the wave height. Naturally, these two variables are significantly (yet imperfectly)
correlated. Hence, in order to improve the quality of operational decision making for this
type of project, a weather model that is capable of simulating realistically correlated wave
heights and wind speeds has been created.
Chapter 7 starts by giving an overview of relevant literature regarding this topic, prior
to introducing a novel weather model specifically tailored for use in offshore operations.
The model itself generates a realistic sequence of wind speeds and wave heights, taking
into account long term seasonality. As such, the model can be used to optimise projects
that last a significant amount of time (multiple months to multiple years). To do this, the
model uses a combination of higher-order Markov chains as well as Weibull distributions
to account for sparsely populated regions of the data. The specific model has been trained
on data gathered off the Belgian shoreline, but can of course be applied to other datasets.
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1.3.1.2 Optimised Scheduling for Offshore Construction
The objective of chapter 8 is to improve the planning of the construction of offshore wind
turbines. This is done by employing the new weather model proposed in chapter 7 to
make better predictions regarding the outcome of different scheduling strategies. The
scheduling of projects is optimised by designing a number of novel chromosome encodings
that represent different levels of abstraction in the scheduling of offshore construction
projects. These encodings are then optimised using meta-heuristic solution techniques.
1.3.1.3 Weather-Based Maintenance Strategies
Maintenance is a frequently overlooked aspect of the total lifetime cost for wind turbines.
In spite of this, the operating and maintenance cost represent approximately 40% of the
total cost associated with operating a wind farm. Recently, this topic has received more
attention, but literature has mainly focussed on high-level capacity decisions and corrective
maintenance (i.e. repairing breakdowns.) Chapter 9 extends the literature by investigating
the operational go/no-go decision for preventive rather than corrective maintenance. The
key consideration here being that preventive maintenance is best executed at times when
wind speeds, and therefore energy production, are low. Again leveraging the capabilities
of the weather simulation model presented in section 7, several strategies for making this
decision are compared in a computational experiment. Specifically the performance of a
static threshold, a workload dependent threshold, support vector machines and an artificial
neural networks is compared.
1.3.2 Methodology
Several quantitative techniques are employed to perform the analysis in the second part
of this dissertation. The most important of these are briefly summarised in this section.
1.3.2.1 Markov Chains
The weather model presented in chapter 7 uses second-order Markov chains as one of its
major components. A Markov chain can be used to represent a memoryless transition
probability between specific states. This implies that the likelihood of moving to a specific
state only depends on the current state. Higher-order Markov chains simply include slightly
more history, i.e. the transition probabilities of a n-th order Markov chain depend on
the preceding n states. The second order Markovian model presented in this research is
somewhat different in that it depends on the preceding wave state as well as the simulated
wind state in order to simulate realistically correlated wave states.
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1.3.2.2 Discrete Event Based Simulation
The studies in chapters 8 and 9 both use discrete event based simulation to determine the
implications of different scheduling and maintenance strategies. This type of simulation
uses an event list to determine the next significant occurrence in the system under study.
This type of simulation contrasts with continuous simulation which continually tracks the
status of the studied system, at higher computational expense.
1.3.2.3 Solution Heuristics
Because simulation is required to determine the outcome of various strategies, heuristic
rather than exact solution strategies are employed in this research. Specifically local-
search based meta-heuristics are preferred (see section 1.3.2.4). This includes both meta-
heuristics such as simulated annealing, as well as dedicated heuristics which exploit the
specific nature of the studied problem to find interesting regions in the solution space.
1.3.2.4 Common Random Numbers
Local search heuristics generally compare the performance of two solutions, the ‘current
best’ and the ‘candidate’ solution. However, when these two solutions are evaluated by
means of simulation, it is important that the differences between these two candidates
are statistically significant and not simply due to random chance. Hence, the common
random numbers technique was used to reduce the variance of the difference between
these techniques, effectively reducing the computation time required to compare two solu-
tions. Doing so effectively increases the total number of solutions that can be considered,
improving the coverage of the solution space by the heuristic.
1.3.2.5 Support Vector Machines
In recent years support vector machines have become one of the key staples in machine
learning. The main objective of these support vector machines is to find a hyperplane that
is capable of separating observations in their respective classes. Because of their nature as
categorical classifiers they are highly suited to taking the operational go/no-go decisions
investigated in chapter 9.
1.3.2.6 Artificial Neural Networks
Like support vector machines, artificial neural networks are a staple in the domain of
machine learning. Similarly to many techniques in the domain of operational research, this
technique is inspired by biology - specifically by the central nervous system. Practically, the
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central nervous system is modelled as an interconnected set of ‘neurons’ that are activated
when they are stimulated through these connections. The nature of these connections is
governed by ‘weights’ that are trained by exposing the network to specific output and
input data in the training data set. Again, this technique can be used to make operational
go/no-go decisions, similarly to the support vector machine technique.
1.3.3 Publications
1.3.3.1 International Peer-Reviewed Publications
Kerkhove, L.-P. and Vanhoucke, M. 2016, “Optimised scheduling for weather sensitive
offshore construction projects” Omega, Article in Press. (doi:10.1016/j.omega.2016.01.011)
1.3.3.2 Working Papers
Kerkhove, L.-P. and Vanhoucke, M. 2016, “Weather-Based Maintenance Strategies for
Offshore Wind Farms” Working paper.
Part I
A Quantitative Analysis of
Incentive Contracts for Projects
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2
A Review of Literature on Incentives for Projects
This chapter presents an extensive review of relevant literature for dealing with incentives
in a project context. This includes the literature on the nature of the incentive contracts,
as well as literature describing the way in which the execution of a project can be modelled.
Specifically, the relationship between project cost, scope, duration and effort invested by
the contractor.
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2.1 Introduction
Literature relevant to incentive contract design for projects can be divided into two main
categories: literature dealing with the trade-offs in project management, and literature
concerned with the design and implications of incentive contracts.
Project management literature dictates that the properties of a project can be described
along three dimensions: the costs associated with the project, the duration of the project
and the scope of a project (also known as the iron triangle, Marques et al. (2011)). These
three dimensions are viewed as an interrelated trade-off mechanism. Ceteris paribus,
decreasing the cost of a project will be accompanied by an increase in duration and/or a
decrease in scope. Similar statements are also true for the duration and scope dimensions.
Within the context of this chapter, these three dimensions are viewed as the outcomes
of the project, as perceived by the project owner. The cost reflects the financial payment
the owner has to make to the contractor to compensate for the work performed by the
latter, as well as the resources used in the project (insofar as this amount is variable). The
duration represents the time needed by the contractor to complete the project. The scope
of the project is a very general term which encompasses the amount of work performed as
well as the quality level of the performance.
When a project is expedited to a contractor, it is the latter who controls the precise
way in which the project is carried out. Depending on the way in which the contractor
decides to execute the project, (s)he effectively selects one of the possible trade-off points
on the cost-duration-scope spectrum.
Due to the fact that the contractor is introduced as a second party, a fourth dimension
has to be introduced to extend the traditional cost-duration-scope trade-off: contractor
effort. The reason for this is that not all actions of the contractor can be directly controlled
or perceived by the owner. This concept has already appeared widely in the literature (see
section 2.2), albeit sometimes under other aliases. Contractor effort can be defined as an
investment in the project by the contractor, which enhances the outcome of one or more
of the three traditional dimensions, but is not directly perceived by the owner. Effectively,
an increased effort from the contractor increases the total utility which can be derived
from the project by the owner. Naturally, an increase in contractor effort comes at a cost
to the contractor, which (s)he will wish to compensate by earning a larger incentive fee
(see section 2.2 for more information on contractor effort).
The second body of literature studies the design and implementation of incentive con-
tracts, as well as their (perceived) effectiveness. A project owner can have several reasons
for including incentive clauses, such as encouraging more innovative solutions (Chan et al.,
2010b), efficiently allocating risk, (Chapman and Ward, 2008), improving communication
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between both parties (Mu¨ller and Turner, 2005), or creating a more cooperative mindset
(Rose and Manley, 2011). This research focuses on the two most prominently used and
quantifiable measures: the owner’s expected profit, and the degree to which the motives
of the owner and contractor are aligned. The owner’s profit is viewed as an objective
measure for the performance of the project (Bower et al., 2002; Chan et al., 2010b; Rose
and Manley, 2011; Van Weele and van der Puil, 2013), assuming that all relevant elements
have been quantified. A second quantifiable motivation for the implementation of con-
tracts is the degree to which the contract succeeds in transferring risks and motivations to
the contractor (Bower et al., 2002). The primary motivation for this is the removal of the
risk associated with agency-conflicts (Gibbons, 2005; Sacks and Harel, 2006). Moreover,
the degree to which this is done also heavily influences other beneficial effects such as the
cooperative atmosphere between the two parties (Bower et al., 2002; Chan et al., 2010b).
Hence, the implementation of an incentive agreement can be viewed as being related to
economic portfolio theory, maximising the return (i.e. owner profit) for a given level of
risk (i.e. objective alignment) (Chapman and Ward, 2008; Markowitz, 1952).
Practically, the owner’s (expected) profit can be determined by assuming that the
contractor is a profit maximising economic actor (Van Weele and van der Puil, 2013).
Under this assumption, the manner in which the project is executed will guarantee maximal
attainable profits for the contractor. Hence, the expected profit for the owner is equal to
the profit associated with this scenario. Measuring the alignment of motivations is done
by comparing the relative outcomes for both parties across the possible project outcomes.
The most relevant works in both domains are listed in table 2.1, where the “Dimen-
sions” columns indicate whether the paper deals with incentive contracts (I) for a specific
dimension, or the trade-off problem (T ) related to a specific dimension.
The trade-off between the cost, duration, scope, and effort levels which is controlled
by the contractor should not be confused with the balancing of the different dimensions of
the incentive contract, which are linked to the former three dimensions of the contractor’s
trade-off. The difference between these concepts is shown by figure 3.1, which indicates
that the trade-off is a representation of the nature of the project as perceived and controlled
by the contractor. The same illustration also shows that the contract uses the outcomes
of the project (i.e. the trade-offs) as an input, but the structure of the contract itself
is a separate decision controlled by the owner rather than the contractor. To prevent
any confusion regarding these concepts, the remainder of this manuscript will only use
‘trade-off’ when referring to the trade-off decision of the contractor.
22 Chapter 2
2.2 Trade-off Literature
The most traditional trade-off problem in project management is the one between the
cost and duration of a project. The earliest authors modelled this problem using a simple
linear relationship (Kelley and Walker, 1959), but recent authors generally agree that the
most realistic model for this trade-off is a convex curve (Choi and Kwak, 2012; Shr and
Chen, 2003). This trade-off can be extended by considering the scope of the project, thus
forming the well-known concept of the iron triangle (Marques et al., 2011). Again the
nature of the trade-offs between scope and cost or time are generally assumed to be of
convex nature (El-Rayes and Kandil, 2005).
The scope concept is used in a broad sense, encompassing not only the amount of work
performed, but also the quality of this work and any other area of performance which is
valued by the owner (Bower et al., 2002; Rose and Manley, 2011). Hence, it can also be
considered to encompass concepts such as occupational health and safety, environmental
impact and coordination which have received increasing amounts of attention in recent
years (Gangwar and Goodrum, 2005; Meng and Gallagher, 2012; Tang et al., 2008). Nev-
ertheless since it is possible to incentivise these components separately, a disaggregation
of the scope concept could be interesting for future research.
As stated above, modelling the owner-contractor relationship requires a fourth dimen-
sion to be added to the trade-off: contractor effort. Though the nomenclature differs
between authors, several examples of this dimension can be found in the literature, as
shown by the “E”-Dimension column in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Overview of literature on incentive contracting and associated trade-offs.
Author(s) Dimensions
1
Contract Nature2 Cost Contract Types3 A + B4 Validation5C D S E
Meinhart and Delionback (1968) I I I - L FPI/TCC, CPIF - -
McCall (1970) I - - - L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPFF - -
Cukierman and Shiffer (1976) - I - - L - - -
Hiller and Tollison (1978) I - - - L FPI/TCC, CPFF, CPPF - CS
Weitzman (1980) I - - - L FFP, CPIF, CPFF - TE
Stukhart (1984) I I I - L FFP, GMP, FPI/TCC, CPFF, CPPF - -
Herten and Peeters (1986) I I I - P/L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - CS, Sur
McAfee and McMillan (1986) I - - - L FFP, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - CS
Ryan et al. (1986) I - - - L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPFF - -
William and Ashley (1987) I I I - - FFP, CPFF, CPPF - Sur
Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs (1989) I I I T P/L FFP, GMP, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - CS
Veld and Peeters (1989) I I I - P/L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - Sur
Rosenfeld and Geltner (1991) I - - - L FFP, GMP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - TE
Chapman and Ward (1994) I - - T L FFP, CPFF, CPPF - -
Herbsman (1995) - I - - L - x Sur
Jaraiedi et al. (1995) I I I - L FPI/TCC, CPIF x -
Ward and Chapman (1995) I - - - P/L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF - -
Jaafari (1996) I I T - P/L FFP, FPI/TCC - CS, Sim
Al-Subhi Al-Harbi (1998) I - - - L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - -
Arditi and Yasamis (1998) I I T T L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF x Sur
Khang and Myint (1999) T T T - - - - CS
Berends (2000) I - - - P/L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF - CS
Paquin et al. (2000) - - T - - - - TE
Perry and Barnes (2000) I - - - L FPI/TCC - TE
Boukendour and Bah (2001) I - - - P/L GMP - -
Dayanand and Padman (2001) - I - - - - - TE
El-Rayes (2001a) - I - T L - x TE
Bower et al. (2002) I I I - P/L FFP, CPIF - CS
Broome and Perry (2002) I T T - P/L FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF - CS
Bubshait (2003) I I I - L FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - Sur
Shr and Chen (2003) T I - - L, N - x CS
Shr and Chen (2004) - I - - L - x CS
Shr et al. (2004) T I - - L - x CS
Turner (2004) I - - - L FFP, GMP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - -
Bayiz and Corbett (2005) - I - T L FFP - TE
El-Rayes and Kandil (2005) T T T T - - x TE
Gangwar and Goodrum (2005) - - T - - - - Sur
Kandil and El-Rayes (2006) I I - T - - - -
Pollack-johnson and Liberatore (2006) T T T - - - - TE
Tang et al. (2006) I I I - - - - Sur
Tareghian and Taheri (2006) T T T - - - - TE
Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama (2006) I - T - L FFP, CPIF - -
Afshar et al. (2007) T T T - - - - TE
Lee and Thomas (2007) - I T T L - x CS
Rosandich (2007) I I I - L FPI/TCC - TE, Sim
Sillars (2007) T I - T L - x CS
Chapman and Ward (2008) T T - - L FPI/TCC, CPFF - CS
Rose (2008) I I I - P/L FFP, CPIF - CS
Stenbeck (2008) T - I - L - - CS
Tang et al. (2008) I I I - L - - CS, Sur
Iranmanesh et al. (2008) T T T - - - - -
Rahimi and Iranmanesh (2008) T T T - - - - -
Ghodsi et al. (2009) T T T - - - - TE
Ramo´n and Cristo´bal (2009) T T T - - - - CS
Bajari and Lewis (2009) T I - - L - x Sur
Anvuur and Kumaraswamy (2010) I I I - L GMP - CS
Chan et al. (2010b) I - - - P/L FFP, FPI/TCC - CS, Sur
Chan et al. (2010a) I - - - L GMP, FPI/TCC - Sur
Choi et al. (2010) T I - - L - - CS
Love et al. (2010) I I I - P/L - - Sur
Mihm (2010) I - - - L FPI/TCC - -
Rose and Manley (2010) I I I - L CPIF - CS
Shahsavari Pour et al. (2010) T T T - - - - TE
Zhang and Xing (2010) T T T - - - - CS
Pour et al. (2010) T T T - - - - -
Chan et al. (2011a) I T T - L FFP, GMP, FPI/TCC - Sur
Chan et al. (2011b) I - - - L GMP, FPI/TCC - Sur
Rose and Manley (2011) I I I - L - - CS
Chan et al. (2012) I - - - L FFP, GMP, FPI/TCC - Sur
Choi and Kwak (2012) T I - T L - - CS
Mackley (2012) T I - - P/L - - CS
Meng and Gallagher (2012) I I I - L FFP, FPI/TCC, CPIF, CPFF - CS, Sur
Keren and Cohen (2012) T T T - - - - TE
Zhang et al. (2012) T T T - - - - TE
Lippman et al. (2013) I - - T L FFP, CPIF, CPFF, CPPF - -
Tavana et al. (2013) T T T - - - - -
Cohen and Iluz (2014) T T T - - - - Sur
Hu and He (2014) T T T - - - - CS
Chen et al. (2015) T I - - P - - -
Tang et al. (2015a) T I - - L - x -
Gupta et al. (2015) T I - - P/L - x -
1 Indicates if the authors cover incentive contracting (I) or the trade-offs (T ) associated with the cost (C), duration (D), scope (S) and effort (E) dimensions.
2 Incentive contracts can be linear (L), piecewise linear (P ) or non-linear (N).
3 Indicates which of the traditional cost contract types are treated, these include: firm fixed price (FFP ), guaranteed maximum price (GMP ), fixed price
incentive/target cost contract (TCC), cost plus incentive fee (CPIF ) and cost plus fixed fee (CPFF ) contracts.
4 Shows if the publication deals with A + B contracting, a frequently used bidding technique which is often used in combination with time incentives.
5 The type of empiric or experimental validation used in the paper, a distinction is made between the following categories: case study (CS), theoretical
example (TE), survey (Sur) and simulation (Sim).
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The simplest example of contractor effort is managerial attention from the contrac-
tor (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989; Arditi and Yasamis, 1998), which can improve project
performance, at a cost to the contractor. Another example is the proactive reduction of
uncertainty through the development of contingency plans and by taking out insurance
policies (Chapman and Ward, 1994). For contracts where the personnel costs are not
included in the project cost dimension, but assumed to be included in the basic fee of the
contractor, the allocation of additional staff can also be considered to be contractor effort
(El-Rayes, 2001a; El-Rayes and Kandil, 2005). Another very specific example is presented
by Lee and Thomas (2007), who considered a road refurbishment project where the con-
tractor hired an on-site towing service to prevent delays due to uncleared accidents. Bayiz
and Corbett (2005) also use a similar dimension which they define as an unobservable
element to the project owner, which comes at a certain cost to the contractor. Moreover,
they also assume the trade-off relationship to be convex, something which also returns in
the axioms used to construct the trade-off model in section 3.4.1.
2.3 Incentives Literature
Incentive contracts for projects can be categorised along two dimensions. The first di-
mension being the trade-offs which are covered by the specific contract. An incentive
contract can be linked to any of the three trade-off dimensions which are perceived by the
owner: cost (C), duration (D) and scope (S). Naturally, an incentive contract can include
multiple dimensions. Moreover, an important decision in incentive contract design can be
finding the right balance between these different dimensions (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989).
The second dimension is the nature of the equations used to calculate the incentive
amount earned, based on the value of the relevant outcome dimension. These equations
can be linear (L), piecewise linear (P ), or non-linear (N). The Dimensions and Contract
Nature columns of table 2.1 show how the existing literature on incentive contracts can be
categorised along these two dimensions.
2.3.1 Literature on Cost Incentive Contracts.
Cost incentives are the most researched incentive category, as can easily be seen from
table 2.1. The most basic form of these cost incentives is a simple linear equation. The
properties of such a contract can be described using two simple equations, representing
the total amount paid by the project owner (P ) and the yield for the subcontractor (Y ).
The latter does not include the overheads of the subcontractor, but solely represents the
cash inflow (s)he receives from the project. These equations can be expressed as follows
(based on the notation used by Perry and Barnes (2000)):
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P = C + F + s · (Ct − C) (2.1)
Y = F + s · (Ct − C) (2.2)
In equations 2.1 and 2.2, C represents the actual direct cost incurred (excluding the
fee for the contractor), and Ct represents the a priori cost target set by the project owner.
The contractor’s fee is represented by F . Note that in this case the fee of the contractor is
assumed to be fixed (independent from the actual cost incurred), for some contracts this
fee is expressed as a fraction of the actual costs incurred. The contractor’s share of the
cost savings or overrun is expressed by s ∈ [0, 1].
As shown in table 2.1, cost contracts can frequently be categorised as one of six basic
contract types (Weitzman, 1980): Firm Fixed Price (FFP ), Guaranteed Maximum Price
(GMP ), Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) (or Target Cost (TCC)), Cost Plus Incentive Fee
(CPIF ), Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF ) and Cost Plus Percentage Fee (CPPF ) contracts.
This set of cost contract types forms a risk-transfer spectrum, where the FFP contract
represents the situation where all the risk is carried by the contractor, and the CPPF is the
situation where all the risk is carried by the owner (Al-Subhi Al-Harbi, 1998). Variations
on these archetypes are also often used to manage cost performance in production environ-
ments (Wang et al., 2015). These contract types all use a single sharing ratio, sometimes
extended with a safeguard preventing excessive disincentives to be allocated to contractors
(Turner, 2004). The basic properties of these contract types can be summarised as follows:
Firm Fixed Price (FFP): The contractor and the client agree on a fixed price for the
contract. Regardless of the actual costs incurred during the project this is the amount
which will be paid. This contract effectively transfers all the risk from the client to
the contractor, the latter will of course charge a risk premium for this service. The
equations expressing the owner’s payment and contractor’s yield can be written as:
P = F (2.3)
Y = F − C (2.4)
Often the contractor will be reluctant to agree to this type of contract unless his
financial situation is stable enough to cope with potential losses and he has a good
control over the costs. This contract also reduces the project owner’s willingness to
invest ongoing effort to reduce the cost, since this no longer affects his profits.
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Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP): This contract sets an upper limit on the pay-
ment of the client to the contractor. If this cost is exceeded the contractor bears
all the remaining costs. For outcomes where the final costs are below the threshold
a sharing ratio is usually proposed to encourage cost saving by the subcontractor.
Note that in case this sharing ratio would not be present there would be no incentive
for the subcontractor to spend less than the agreed upon maximum amount. No-
tably, if the fee paid to the contractor is a percentage of the total incurred costs - as
is regularly the case - there is actually an incentive for the subcontractor to match
these costs as closely as possible to the guaranteed upon maximum. The equations
expressing the owner’s payment and contractor’s yield can be written as (where MP
represents the maximum price agreed upon in the contract):
P = min(MP,C + F + s(Ct − C)) (2.5)
Y = min(MP,C + F + s(Ct − C))− C (2.6)
These equations make it clear that the FFP is nothing more than the standard
incentive contracting equations 2.1 and 2.2, with added guarantees for the project
owner.
Effectively this contract improves upon the FFP contract because the client is now
also motivated to cooperate with the contractor to decrease the costs. Nevertheless
the contractor still bears the downside risk in this contract. Moreover, the upside
potential of the contract is reduced in this contract, since the subcontractor has to
share a fraction of the cost savings with the project owner.
Another important remark when comparing this contract to the firm fixed price is
that the administrative effort is greatly increased. Whereas the FFP contract did not
need any open accounting principles or measurement, objective cost measurement
will be important in this type of contract. This is a downside which is encountered
in the majority of incentive contract structures.
Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) / Target Cost Contract (TCC): The client and the
contractor agree upon a certain target cost as well as a sharing percentage for the cost
over- or under-runs. The payment for the contractor then consists of the redeemable
costs plus his basic fee plus the incentive or disincentive amount. The equations are
simply the basic equations which were presented at the start of this section.
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P = C + F + s · (Ct − C) (2.7)
Y = F + s · (Ct − C) (2.8)
This type of contract is often used when the client and contractor have cooperated
on the cost estimate of the project and potential deviations are not the fault of either
party. This type of contract provides both parties with a substantial incentive to
keep the costs down.
Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF): This contract sets a target cost and a sharing ratio
of the cost savings when the costs incurred are below their target cost. No disincen-
tive is included when the costs exceed this amount and the client carries the risk of
potential cost overruns. This contract is the mirror image of the GMP where the
contractor carried the risk of costs overruns. The equations expressing the payment
and yield are now the following:
P = max(C + F + s · (Ct − C), C + F ) (2.9)
Y = max(C + F + s · (Ct − C), C + F )− C (2.10)
When the contractor has a relatively weak financial position compared to the mag-
nitude of the project this type of contract is often used to avoid bankruptcy risk for
the contractor. The contractor will of course have to lower his fees to accommodate
for the client bearing the majority of the cost risk. Variations on this contract type
can also include a small disincentive never exceeding a minimal profit margin for the
subcontractor, such as the scheme proposed by Love et al. (2010).
Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF): This contract does not include any incentive structure,
the project owner pays the direct costs associated with the contract, plus a fixed fee.
Effectively even more risk is transferred to the owner this way, no longer including
any incentive for the contractor to limit the costs. The equations expressing the
payment and yield are now the following:
P = C + F (2.11)
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Y = F (2.12)
An advantage of this type of contract is that the fee of the contractor will be sub-
stantially lower since there is no longer a need to include a risk premium.
Cost Plus Percentage Fee (CPPF): This contract is identical to the previous except
that the fee is no longer fixed but a percentage of the actual cost. The equations
representing the pay-offs now become as follows, with f representing the fraction of
the actual costs being paid as a fee to the subcontractor.
P = C + f · C (2.13)
Y = f · C (2.14)
When contracts of this form are used it is very important for the project owner to
retain substantial control during the execution of the project since the subcontractor
has an implicit incentive to spend as much as possible. Hence, the rationality of
employing this contract form can rightfully be called in to question, nevertheless
literature shows that this type of contract is still in common use (see table 2.1).
Piecewise linear equations are often used in practice in order to improve upon the
incentive schemes presented above (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989; Berends, 2000; Boukendour
and Bah, 2001; Bower et al., 2002; Broome and Perry, 2002; Herten and Peeters, 1986;
Jaafari, 1996; Love et al., 2010; McCall, 1970; Rose, 2008; Veld and Peeters, 1989; Ward
and Chapman, 1995). The main goal of these incentive schemes is to provide a better
match to the specific risks of a project. Several practical examples of such incentive
schemes are given by Broome and Perry (2002). The basic principle of such contracts is
the use of multiple sharing ratios for different ranges of cost outcomes. By doing so, a
better alignment of motivations is obtained, while also giving the possibility to cap the
upside or downside risk for either party. The basic principle of such a piecewise linear
contract is illustrated by equation 2.15.
IC(C) =

sC1 · (Ct −BC2 ) + sC2 · (BC2 − C) if C > BC2
sC1 · (Ct − C) if BC1 ≤ C ≤ BC2
sC1 · (Ct −BC1 ) + sC0 · (BC1 − C) if C < BC1
(2.15)
In this equation IC is the cost incentive amount paid to the contractor which is a
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Figure 2.1: Visualisation of a piecewise linear incentive contract.
function of the final cost of the project C, Ct is the target cost specified in the contract,
BCr is the lower bound of the r-th cost region specified in the contract, and sCr is the
sharing ratio for the r-th region.
Figure 2.1 visualises this piecewise linear incentive contract. For this specific example,
the contractor carries a lower fraction of extreme upside and downside risk when the costs
are significantly higher or lower than expected. Such a contract can be used to take into
account that the contractor may not be held accountable if the original estimate of the
cost turned out to be unrealistic.
2.3.2 Literature on Duration Incentive Contracts
Since no open accounting standards are required to agree upon the outcomes of the time
dimension, the duration incentive is arguably the easiest incentive to implement (Abu-
Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989). A very fruitful area of research related to time incentive contracting
is the research done on the A+B contracting method employed by the US government in
highway contracting (see column “A + B” in table 2.1). This is a bidding method where
the contractors have to submit a bid for both the expected cost and the expected duration
of a project, where after the road user cost (i.e. the economic damage of closing the road
for a day) is used to evaluate the total cost of all offers. The implementation of such
contracts is then often accompanied by a per diem time incentive. Moreover, this type of
bidding allows the owner to get a better perspective on the nature of the trade-offs from
the perspective of the contractor (Choi et al., 2010), thus aiding the owner in estimating
the possible reaction of a contractor to a given incentive contract more accurately.
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Piecewise linear contracts for the duration dimension are discussed less frequently than
piecewise linear contracts for the cost trade-off dimensions. Nevertheless piecewise linear
contracts for time are used (Love et al., 2010) and even non-linear contracts using a
quadratic formula have been discussed in the literature (Shr and Chen, 2003).
2.3.3 Literature on Scope Incentive Contracts
Scope incentives are the least commonly used of all incentive contracts, however in cases
where they are used, they are often considered the most influential incentive dimension
of the contract (Tang et al., 2008). Table 2.1 shows that scope incentives are rarely used
when cost and time incentives are not already in place. This is most likely due to the
added complexity of the valuation of the performance along this dimension. Nevertheless,
several authors have proposed methods to facilitate the evaluation of scope performance.
Most of these methods use key performance indicators (Rose, 2008) or balanced scorecard
techniques (Tang et al., 2008). Along the same lines, Pollack-johnson and Liberatore
(2006) use the analytic hierarchy method to link these techniques to the work breakdown
structure of a typical project environment.
Although they are the least commonly used incentive category, the adoption of scope
incentives is not novel, Herten and Peeters (1986) discuss an interesting example of a scope-
based incentive contract from 1908 when the Wright brothers were awarded an incentive
based on the airspeed attained by the plane.
2.3.4 Multi-dimensional contracts
One of the key challenges of the project owner is the integration of incentive clauses
related to the cost, duration and scope dimensions into a single multi-dimensional contract.
Creating a correct balance between the various incentive dimensions is paramount to the
quality of the contract. This balance it attained only when the relative strength of the
incentives succeed in aligning the motivations of the contractor with those of the project
owner (Bower et al., 2002). The use of an unbalanced contract can result in unfavourable
gaming by the contractor, who sacrifices the owner’s return on investment in favour of
his own. One such example is discussed by Stukhart (1984), where a contractor who was
unable to meet the cost target decided to over-invest in speeding up the project in order
to earn a substantial time incentive. In spite of this risk, the use of contracts containing
multiple incentive clauses has increased in recent years (Meng and Gallagher, 2012).
Literature on these multi-dimensional incentive contracts is mainly limited to specific
cases, as well as surveys investigating the use and perceived effectiveness of these contract.
Hence, one of the key research opportunities is the design of more prescriptive models that
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can aid the project owner in his contract design process.
2.4 Conclusion
The literature review on incentive contracts for projects presented in this chapter clearly
shows that there is substantial academic and professional interest in this subject. A key
research opportunity in this respect is the design of more quantitative and prescriptive
models which can guide project owners and contractors in their interactions with such
incentive contracts. Existing literature on trade-offs in projects offers interesting oppor-
tunities for cross-fertilisation, enabling the elements underlying the contract structures to
be quantified.
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3
The Owner’s Perspective on Incentive Contract
Design
The aim of this chapter is to provide a quantitative framework for incentive contract design
in projects, which can be used by the project owner to select the most adequate contract for
any given project environment. This quantitative framework consists of three components:
a trade-off model describing the nature of the project, an evaluation model describing the
valuation of the different outcomes of the project for both the owner and contractor, and a
contract model which is capable of representing the majority of (incentivised) contractual
agreements used in practice.
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3.1 Introduction
The project owner and the contractor executing the project are two separated economic
actors, each with their own set of potentially conflicting objectives (Mu¨ller and Turner,
2005; Turner, 2004). Hence, when the owner expedites work to a contractor, a relationship
must be established. The nature of this relationship can be plotted on a spectrum between
an explicitly negotiated contract and an alliance in which both parties are formally unified
into a single economic actor for the duration of the project. For projects where complexity
is limited, an explicit contract which specifies the deliverables can suffice (Van Weele and
van der Puil, 2013). For complex projects on the other hand, it may be more favourable
to unify both actors in an alliance structure, effectively forming a single economic entity
(Walker et al., 2002). Although valuable arguments can be made in favour of such alliance
structures (Rose and Manley, 2011), the implementation of such a structure is often highly
complex (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) and expensive (MacCormack and Mishra, 2015).
Hence, the inclusion of incentive clauses, which form the middle ground in the relational
spectrum between explicit contracts and alliances, can provide a more workable alternative
(Bower et al., 2002). Performance related pay in general (Dayanand and Padman, 2001;
Ederer and Manso, 2013; Zhang et al., 2015), and the design of incentivised agreements
for projects in particular (see table 2.1) have been widely studied in academic literature
over the last decades. Notwithstanding these recent advances, little guidance is available
for project owners on how to identify the best contract for a specific project environment.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a quantitative framework for incentive contract
design in projects, which can be used by the project owner to select the most adequate
contract for any given project environment. This quantitative framework consists of three
components: a trade-off model describing the nature of the project, an evaluation model
describing the valuation of the different outcomes of the project for both the owner and
contractor, and a contract model which is capable of representing the majority of (incen-
tivised) contractual agreements used in practice.
Using these models, computational experiments have been carried out to investigate
the impact of different project environments on the performance of contract types. These
experiments take an economical rather than psychological perspective on the problem,
and therefore assume that the contractor is a risk neutral profit-maximising actor. This
risk-neutrality can be assumed since economic actors rather than individuals are consid-
ered (Gibbons, 2005). The desirability of different types of contracts is judged by taking
into account both the expected profit of the owner, as well as the degree to which the
motivations of the owner and contractor are aligned.
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Figure 3.1: Visualisation of the modelling approach, and the interrelations between models.
3.2 Modelling the Problem
The contract design problem faced by the contractor is quantified using a combination of
three models: the contract model, trade-off model, and the evaluation model (see figure
3.1). The underlying assumptions for each of these models are based on existing literature.
The contract model represents the structure of the incentive contract and is based
on contracting literature. This model was designed to be capable of representing the
majority of incentive contracts used in practice, thus allowing for a comprehensive search
of the solution space.
The trade-off model model describes the nature of the project on which the incentive
contract is to be used. The foundations for this second model originate from project man-
agement literature, from which six basic axioms have been derived. These six axioms fully
describe the relationship between the four discernible trade-off dimensions of the contrac-
tor: direct cost, duration, scope and contractor effort. Because the contractor is assumed
to be a risk-neutral profit-maximiser it suffices to define the trade-offs deterministically.
Nevertheless, relaxing this assumption and working with a stochastic definition of the
project is an interesting topic for future research1.
The goal of the evaluation model is simply the valuation of a project and contract
combination. The model itself uses financial valuations, rather than utility theory, since
the latter is often much harder to apply in practical situations (Broome and Perry, 2002).
This model quantifies the evaluations of both parties, as well as their alignment in a way
which allows for an objective evaluation of the adequacy of a contract.
In any project these three building blocks can be defined: there is always a contract,
1An interesting approach to stochasticity and incentives has been presented by Sommer and Loch (2009).
Future research could potentially combine this approach with the models presented in this chapter.
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there are always different ways of executing a project2, and both the contractor and owner
always associate certain costs and profits with different outcomes. For this paper the
models have been designed in order to cover as much practical cases as possible, but
naturally it may be necessary to extend these models for highly specific cases.
The details of these three models are further explained in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
respectively. For an overview of the introduced notation, the reader is referred to appendix
3.A.
3.3 Contract Model
Any incentive contract can be split up into its three components: cost, duration and scope.
Hence, the model presented here also consists of three distinct components which can be
used either jointly or separately for cases where one or more dimensions are irrelevant to
the owner. For each dimension, the owner can opt to implement a linear, piecewise linear
or non-linear contract. For the duration dimension in particular, a lump sum incentive
attached to a specific deadline can also be included.
3.3.1 Cost Incentive Model
Since the outcome of this dimension is already expressed as a monetary amount, setting
cost targets and evaluating the performance is relatively straightforward. The basic prin-
ciple of a cost incentive can be illustrated using a simple linear incentive contract (Perry
and Barnes, 2000). In such a contract the cost incentive (IC) paid to the contractor is
determined by multiplying the difference between the cost target (Ct) and the direct cost
incurred (C) by a sharing ratio (sC ∈ [0, 1]), as given by equation 3.1. When the cost
incurred is lower than the target cost, the difference is positive and a positive incentive
(IC) is awarded, the inverse also being true.
IC = sC(Ct − C) (3.1)
All of the traditional linear cost contract types (see section 2.3.1) can be expressed
as variations of this equation. This is done by varying the sharing ratio sC , and in some
cases capping the risk exposure of either owner or contractor for extreme outcome scenarios
(e.g. when the cost exceeds a certain threshold the disincentive no longer increases and
the owner carries the remainder of the downside risk, avoiding potential bankruptcy of the
contractor).
2Should this not be the case, it would be irrelevant to implement any kind of incentive contract.
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Figure 3.2: Piecewise linear and non-linear clauses.
An implementation of such a piecewise linear contract is visualised in figure 3.2, where
the horizontal axis represents the possible performance outcomes for the contractor in
terms of direct costs (C), and the vertical axis represents the incentive earned by the
contractor (IC). The piecewise linear contract in figure 3.2 defines three regions, numbered
r = {0, 1, 2}. Each region r is defined by its lower bound BCr . For each of these regions a
sharing ratio is defined as sCr . The contract also contains a target for the direct cost (Ct),
which can be situated in any of the available regions. Equation 3.2 shows a mathematical
expression for the 3-piecewise linear contract shown in figure 3.2, analogous expressions
can of course be created for contracts with more dimensions and/or targets lying in other
regions.
IC =

sC1 · (Ct −BC2 ) + sC2 · (BC2 − C) if C > BC2
sC1 · (Ct − C) if BC1 ≤ C ≤ BC2
sC1 · (Ct −BC1 ) + sC0 · (BC1 − C) if C < BC1
(3.2)
An alternative to the piecewise linear approach is the quadratic contract form as pre-
sented in Shr and Chen (2003). Other non-linear forms can of course also be used, but since
their use is infrequent, only the quadratic form is included in this chapter. This quadratic
form requires the owner to specify upper (UBC) and lower (LBC) bounds, which outline
the region over which he wishes to spread his (dis)incentive. Note that these express the
distance from the target cost, rather than an absolute cost. The magnitude of the incen-
tive itself is defined using two parameters: ICmax ∈ [0,+∞[ signifies the maximal possible
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incentive, and ICmin ∈]−∞, 0] which specifies the biggest disincentive amount. The target
cost (Ct) has to be specified as well. For this contract type, the cost incentive amount can
be calculated as follows:
IC =

min
(
ICmax; ICmax ·
(
Ct−C
LBC
)2)
if C ≤ Ct
max
(
ICmin; ICmin ·
(
C−Ct
UBC
)2)
if C > Ct
(3.3)
This type of incentive contract is visualised by the dotted line in figure 3.2. An owner
wishing to use such a contract is left to determine the direct cost target (Ct), the maximal
incentive and disincentive amounts (ICmax, ICmin), and the range wherein the incentive is to
be distributed (LBC , UBC).
3.3.2 Duration Incentive Model
Duration incentives are also frequently used in project management. Since the finishing
time of a project is easy to observe in an objective manner, it is also one of the easiest
to implement. However, it does require the owner to attach a monetary valuation to the
timeliness of project completion. An example of such a valuation is the road user cost used
by the U.S. government when evaluating different bids for road refurbishment (El-Rayes
and Kandil, 2005; Sillars, 2007).
Once this valuation has been determined, the owner has to decide on the fraction of this
valuation to be awarded to the contractor as an incentive. Naturally the value transferred
to the contractor should never exceed the gain of the owner.
Similarly to the cost incentive contracts of section 3.3.1, this can be done using a
piecewise linear contract (equation 3.2), or a non-linear contract (equation 3.3). Equation
3.4 shows how the piecewise linear cost contract can be adjusted to a piecewise linear
duration contract with similar assumptions. The difference between these two contracts
is that rather than using a sharing ratio sCr ∈ [0, 1], a valuation parameter vDr is used.
This parameter defines the monetary amount the contractor earns per unit of time saved
in a specific region, if the region is below the target duration specified in the contract.
If the region is situated above the contract’s target duration, the parameter signifies the
disincentive amount. The non-linear contract for the duration dimension is identical to
the non-linear contract for the cost dimension, and will not be repeated here.
ID =

vD1 · (Dt −BD2 ) + vD2 · (BD2 −D) if D > BD2
vD1 · (Dt −D) if BD1 ≤ D ≤ BD2
vD1 · (Dt −BD1 ) + vD0 · (BD1 −D) if D < BD1
(3.4)
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The concept of time in a project-environment is inherently related to specific project
deadlines. Oftentimes, projects have to be completed prior to a certain date to ensure
their value to the project owner. (e.g. facilities which have to be constructed for Olympic
games.) Since delivering a project prior to an exact date can be so important to the owner,
incentive contracts are of course adjusted to represent this.
Ensuring that the contractor’s valuation of this date is aligned with the owner’s dispro-
portionately large valuation (compared to the dates prior and after this deadline), can be
done using a single lump sum incentive amount. When the contractor delivers the project
prior to the agreed upon date, the agreed incentive amount is wholly awarded. In case the
contractor fails to deliver on time, he does not receive anything. This very simple principle
can be expressed as follows:
ID =
I
D
ls if D ≤ Dtls
0 if D > Dtls
(3.5)
Where Dtls is the target date associated with the lump sum payment, and IDls is the
amount of the lump-sum payment. Naturally, such lump-sum incentive amounts can be
combined with other duration-related incentive provisions such as piecewise linear or non-
linear incentive contracts, since the presence of a deadline does not mean that additional
time savings or delays have no value to the project owner.
3.3.3 Scope Incentive Model
The implementation of a scope incentive requires the adoption of a measurement method.
Because scope envelops a large number of concepts, its measurement often relies on sub-
jective estimates (De Wit, 1988). However, such subjective estimates are of little use as a
basis for awarding incentive amounts, since the estimates of the owner and contractor will
most likely be skewed in opposite directions. Stukhart (1984) has proposed the use of an
external party to provide a more objective measurement in such cases, but even so there
is potential for disputes between both parties. Moreover, the cost of hiring a third party
also decreases the project profitability. The use of key performance indicators has been
advocated by Rose (2008) as a method of making the performance measurement more
objective. Whereas this method does indeed succeed in removing the subjectivity of scope
performance, it does not include a formal method for aggregating the scope performance
over the complete project. A solution for this issue is a top-down approach which defines a
hierarchical structure for the complete project, defining the relative importance of various
components until a degree of detail where objective evaluations are possible is reached
(Love et al., 2010; Pollack-johnson and Liberatore, 2006; Song and AbouRizk, 2005). By
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using such techniques, the scope performance of the complete project can be measured on
a ratio scale. Hence, a value of 0 will always represent no work performed and comparative
calculations can be made using different values of the scope (i.e. a scope of 2 is twice as
valuable to the owner as a scope of 1).
By taking this approach, the analysis of the scope dimension can happen in a way
which is largely analogous to the preceding two dimensions. Assuming that the contract
specifies a minimally acceptable scope as well as a scope target, similar equations as those
constructed for the cost incentive in section 3.3.1 can be constructed. The piecewise linear
incentive contract can be adjusted for application on the scope dimension as follows:
IS =

vS1 · (BS2 − St) + vS2 · (S −BS2 ) if S > BS2
vS1 · (S − St) if BS1 ≤ S ≤ BS2
vS1 · (BS1 − St) + vS0 · (S −BS1 ) if S < BS1
(3.6)
The key difference between the piecewise linear equation for the duration dimension
(equation 3.4) is that the statements between brackets are inverted. This is logical since
a larger scope value is more valuable than a smaller value. Again the valuation is done
using the vSr parameters. These parameters represent the monetary valuation of a unit of
scope within a certain region r.
IS =

min
(
ISmax; ISmax ·
(
S−St
UBS
)2)
if S > St
max
(
ISmin; ISmin ·
(
St−S
LBS
)2)
if S ≤ St
(3.7)
The adjustment of the non-linear contract for the scope dimensions is shown by equa-
tion 3.7. The sole difference between this equation and the expression for the cost dimen-
sion (equation 3.3) is that the positive and negative senses are inverted.
3.4 Trade-off Dynamics Model
Contractors subjected to an incentive contract face a four-dimensional trade-off decision.
These dimensions are: direct cost, duration, scope and contractor effort. The first three of
these dimensions are directly observed by the project owner and can potentially be used
as a basis for an incentive provision. The fourth dimension represents the possibility for
the contractor to enhance the project outcome using his own means.
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3.4.1 Axioms
A number of axioms which are an extension of those proposed by Ghodsi et al. (2009)
are used as a basis for the generation of realistic problem environments for the contractor.
These axioms are assumed to be valid on the level of the (aggregated) project as well as
on the level of individual activities. For sake of simplicity, the relationship between the
different dimensions is considered on a two-by-two basis. A conceptual representation of
these axioms is given by figure 3.3, and a visual representation of their implications is
given by figure 3.4. The axioms can be summarised as follows:
1. The direct cost is a non-increasing convex function of the duration of the project.
(The contractor will first use the cheapest methods for time reduction.) Or in math-
ematical terms: ∂C∂D ≤ 0 and ∂
2C
∂D2 ≥ 0.
2. The direct cost is an non-decreasing convex function of the scope of the project.
(Increasing the scope becomes progressively more expensive as the low hanging fruit
is picked first.) Or in mathematical terms: ∂C∂S ≥ 0 and ∂
2C
∂S2 ≥ 0.
3. The direct cost is a non-increasing convex function of the contractor effort of the
project. In mathematical notation this becomes: ∂C∂E ≤ 0 and ∂
2C
∂E2 ≥ 0. This effort
can be viewed as a way to influence the other relationships, i.e. making a decrease in
duration or an increase in scope less expensive in terms of direct costs. Note that the
cost in this case signifies the cost to the owner, not the contractor. The contractor’s
costs naturally increase when the effort is increased.
4. Shortening the duration of a high-scope project causes a cost increase which is greater
than or equal to the cost increase in a low-scope project. Or in mathematical terms:
∀S1 > S2 : ∂C(S1)∂D ≤ ∂C(S2)∂D ≤ 0. Similarly, increasing scope will be at least as costly
for a shorter duration project: ∀D1 < D2 : ∂C(D1)∂S ≥ ∂C(D2)∂S ≥ 0.
5. Decreasing the duration of a project will be less than or equally costly when the
effort invested in the project is greater. This can be noted as: ∀E1 < E2 : ∂C(E1)∂D ≤
∂C(E2)
∂D ≤ 0. Analogously, a smaller project duration will - ceteris paribus - result in
a steeper slope of the relation between invested effort and project cost: ∀D1 < D2 :
∂C(D1)
∂E ≤ ∂C(D2)∂E ≤ 0.
6. Increasing the scope of a project will be relatively cheap when the effort invested in
the project is greater, and vice versa. In mathematical terms this can be expressed
as: ∀S1 > S2 : ∂C(S1)∂E ≤ ∂C(S2)∂E ≤ 0. Analogously, a change in effort level will
have a greater impact on the project cost when the effort invested is smaller, or in
mathematical notation: ∀E1 < E2 : ∂C(E1)∂S ≥ ∂C(E2)∂S ≥ 0.
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Figure 3.3: Schematic overview of the components of the contractor’s trade-off and the associated
axioms.
Note that the effect of the multiplicators presented in axioms 4 to 6 is represented
visually in figure 3.4 by the change in slopes of the upwardly translated functions, and not
the upward translation itself, which is a consequence of the first three axioms.
In order to quantify these relationships the direct cost is assumed to be the dependent
variable, and the three other dimensions are considered to be independent variables. This
is merely a design choice which is made to improve the comprehensibility of the model.
This design choice is visualised by image 3.4, where the first three axioms represent direct
relationships to the costs, and the latter three axioms are shown as multiplicators. An
important note being that although the cost is the dependent variable in this model, it is
still possible for the contractor to make trade-offs between the independent variables by
making choices which inversely impact the cost of the project.
3.4.2 Mathematical Representation
The relationships expressed above will now be quantified. The complete model of the
relationships is built in three stages: In the first stage, the basic relationships are ap-
proximated using linear relationships (axioms 1-3). Secondly, the interaction effects are
modelled, using the multiplicators which represent axioms 4 to 6. Thirdly, the simplified
linear relationships are transformed to more realistic convex relationships.
All the trade-offs in this model are considered to be discrete, meaning that the functions
they create are piecewise linear functions which connect a discrete number of points.
These discrete points are indexed with subscript i, j and k for duration, scope and effort
respectively, assuming that: i, j, k = 0, 1, ..., n. These discrete points can be seen on the left
panel of figure 3.5, counting from i = 0 for the rightmost point up to i = n for the leftmost
point of the trade-off. The following analysis assumes that there is an equal number of
points (n + 1) for each of the independent dimensions. This is not a prerequisite for the
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Figure 3.4: The axioms visualised.
analysis to be valid but is simply a choice to simplify the notation which is introduced.
Rather than modelling the direct cost (C), duration (D), scope (S) and effort (E)
directly, the model defines ∆-variables which represent the distance of these values from
their lowest cost option, which is indexed 0 (see the left panel of figure 3.5):
∆Di = D0 −Di (3.8)
∆Sj = Si − S0 (3.9)
∆Ek = E0 − Ek (3.10)
Figure 3.5 illustrates this notation. The left panel shows the traditional relationship
between the duration (D) on the horizontal axis and the cost (C) on the vertical axis. For
each of the possible discrete duration steps, an associated distance can be defined to the
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lowest cost option, as illustrated by ∆D4. Associated with this ∆Di-value, a cost value
can be defined as ∆CD4 , which is in effect the cost increase due to the decreased duration
of the project. The right panel of figure 3.5 shows that by using these delta values on the
axes, an increasing convex relationship can be defined.
By defining all the variables in this manner the formulae are simplified, since every
dimension now has an increasing convex relationship to the cost dimension. Moreover,
each of these relations starts at the origin (e.g. (∆D0,∆C0) = (0, 0)). This also simplifies
the definition of the convexity magnitude (see section 3.4.2.3).
3.4.2.1 Linear relationships
The first expression is a basic linear relationship between the cost (as a dependent) and
the three other dimensions. This relationship is in effect the sum of the impacts of the
duration, scope and effort levels respectively. This is expressed by equation 3.11, where
∆CDi represents the impact of selecting duration mode i on the costs, and ∆CSj and ∆CEk
are similar metrics for scope and effort respectively. This is also illustrated on the right
panel of figure 3.5, where the vertical axis shows ∆CDi graphically.
In order to define this relationship, the lowest possible direct cost has to be given
as a parameter (Cmin = C|∆Di = ∆Sj = ∆Ek = 0). Also for each of the independent
dimensions, the slope of the curve has to be defined: SD, SS and SE . This slope represents
both the slope of the linear approximation as well as the average slope of the convex curve,
since the start and end points of the linear approximation and the convex curve are made
to coincide. Due to the ∆ transformation of the independent variables, these slopes can
all be represented as positive numbers, hence the absolute values in equation 3.12.
Cijk = Cmin + ∆Cijk = Cmin + ∆CDi + ∆CSj + ∆CEk (3.11)
Cijk = Cmin + |SD|∆Di + |SS |∆Sj + |SE |∆Ek (3.12)
Equation 3.12 is in effect a simplified linear representation of the first three axioms.
Note that the independent dimensions are indexed separately, since these dimensions can
naturally be at different positions. (i.e. The contractor can select the positions of these
dimensions separately, the effect of which will be reflected in the total cost of the project.)
3.4.2.2 Interaction Effects
Axioms 4 to 6 are then added to the linear expression through the definition of of the
slope multiplicators. These are defined in the following form: mba is the maximal impact
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of the mathematical description, using the relationship between duration
and cost as an example.
of dimension b on the slope of the relationship between the direct cost and dimension a,
expressed as a fraction added to the original slope of the curve. For example mSD = 0.2
indicates that the slope of the duration curve will be 20% steeper when ∆S is at its
maximal value.
Cijk =Cmin + |SD|∆Di
(
mSD
∆Sj
∆Sn
+ 1
)(
mED
∆Ek
∆En
+ 1
)
+
|SS |∆Sj
(
mDS
∆Di
∆Dn
+ 1
)(
mES
∆Ek
∆En
+ 1
)
+
|SE |∆Ek
(
mDE
∆Di
∆Dn
+ 1
)(
mSE
∆Sj
∆Sn
+ 1
) (3.13)
The effect of adding these multiplicators is shown in figure 3.4, where the upwardly
translated curves have a steeper slope than the original curves.
3.4.2.3 Convexity
The third and final step is the conversion of these linear relationships into more realistic
convex functions. To express the degree of convexity of a relation quantitatively, the
convexity magnitude (CM) metric is introduced in this chapter. The logic behind this
metric can be explained by looking at the right panel of figure 3.5 where a triangle is
formed by the simplified linear relationship and the projection towards the horizontal axis.
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Two zones are defined within this triangle such that zone A is the the surface between the
simplified linear relationship and the convex curve and zone B is the area below the convex
curve. Hence, the total surface of the triangular surface is equal to A+B. The CM is now
defined as the fraction of the triangle consisting of zone A. Assuming a uniform step size
(∆∆Di = ∆Dnn ,∀i = 1, ..., n), for the duration dimension this metric can be calculated as
follows (see appendix 3.B for a full derivation):
CMD = A
A+B
= 1− 2 ·B∆Dn ·∆CDn
(3.14)
B = ∆Dn
n
n∑
i=1
[
∆CDi−1 +
∆CDi −∆CDi−1
2
]
(3.15)
In the formula above ∆Dn/∆CD can of course be replaced by ∆Sn/∆CS or ∆En/∆CE
to model the degree of convexity of the scope (CMS) and effort (CME) respectively.
Logically the value of this metric lies in the interval [0, 1[, where a value of 0 represents
a perfectly linear relation and higher values represent different gradations of convexity.
The actual upper bound on the convexity depends on the number of discrete points n:
CMDmax = n−1n . Although this upper bound is attainable, trade-off curves approaching
this bound will often have non-increasing regions and very steep angles.
3.4.2.4 Specific Project Cases
The trade-off points for a specific scenario can either be defined explicitly when full infor-
mation on all feasible execution methods is available, or fitted using partial information
in combination with the aforementioned axioms. Hence, although it is assumed that the
majority of projects will comply with the aforementioned assumptions, this is not a pre-
requisite for the application of the model.
3.5 Contract Evaluation Model
The preceding two models enable a quantitative representation of contract and project
trade-off structures respectively. The contract evaluation model presented in this section
focuses on how appropriate the use of a certain contract is for a given project.
From the perspective of the owner, the optimal contract has three properties. First of
all, it maximises the gain the owner can expect from the project. Secondly, it guarantees
that the evaluation of the contractor is well aligned with that of the owner. Thirdly, the
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contract should guarantee an adequate return for the contractor. An adequate contractor
return has two facets, on the one hand the absolute incentive amount has to be substantial
enough to be relevant to the contractor, on the other hand, the range between the highest
and lowest incentive amount has to be large enough such that the contractor is motivated
to locate the optimum pay-off.
The model presented in this section uses a single index l = 1, ...,m which represents the
m different possible outcome scenarios, in no particular order. Such an outcome scenario
is simply an attainable point of the trade-off model (i.e. a combination of cost, duration,
scope and effort), for which the associated incentive amount has been calculated. When
combined with a trade-off model as presented in section 3.4 the value of m is equal to
(n+ 1)3.
3.5.1 Maximisation of Expected Owner Gain
First and foremost, the goal of the project owner is to maximise his expected return. The
contract evaluation model presented here calculates this amount by assuming that the
contractor is a risk-neutral profit-maximiser (Gibbons, 2005). Given that the choice of a
trade-off point is controlled by the contractor, the expected profit of the project owner is
the profit for the trade-off point where the contractor’s profits are maximised. Hence, the
first step in calculating the expected net owner gain (E [NOG]) is the maximisation of the
contractor’s profit function.
When evaluating the discrete set of scenarios from the perspective of the contractor,
two elements have to be considered for every possible project outcome scenario l. First of
all, the cost of effort invested by the contractor (Ecostl ) and secondly, the total incentive
amount earned (Itotl ). This total incentive amount is simply the sum of the cost incentive
(ICl ), duration incentive (IDl ) and the scope incentive (ISl ) amounts (which are defined
by the contract model, as presented in section 3.3). Using these two elements, the net
contractor gain (NCGl) can be calculated for every scenario:
NCGl = Itotl − Ecostl = ICl + IDl + ISl − Ecostl (3.16)
However, it must not be neglected that there is an opportunity cost associated with
investing effort in a project, since the same effort could also earn a certain return elsewhere.
Hence, the net contractor gain (NCGl) has to be corrected for this opportunity cost using
the return on investment (ROIE) this effort could earn in other projects or activities. The
adjusted NCG can be calculated as:
NCGadjl = I
tot
l − Ecostl (1 +ROIE) (3.17)
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This adjustment decreases the valuation of the scenarios with the opportunity cost
of the effort investment. By doing this, the different NCGadjl values can be directly
compared. In the case where there is no ulterior investment possibility for the contractor’s
effort, ROIE can be set to zero.
The owner’s net gain from a specific scenario (NOGl) is equal to the value derived
from the direct cost (Cl), duration (Dl) and scope (Sl) dimensions diminished by the total
incentive amount awarded to the contractor (Itotl ).
NOGl = OV (Cl, Dl, Sl)− Itotl (3.18)
Where OV is a function expressing the financial value of a certain outcome of the
project for different values of direct cost, duration and scope. This function can be further
detailed as a simple sum of the valuation of each of these three dimensions:
OV (Cl, Dl, Sl) = OV C(Cl) +OV D(Dl) +OV S(Sl) (3.19)
As for the cost component, the owner’s valuation (OV C) is inversely proportional to
the direct cost outcome:
OV C(Cl) = −Cl (3.20)
The time valuation is slightly more complex, containing both the possibility of a linear
value per time unit such as a road user cost, and the possibility of a lump sum value
representing an important deadline.
OV D(Dl) =
{
µD · (−Dl) if Dl ≥ DL
µD · (−Dl) + µls if Dl < DL
(3.21)
In equation 3.21, µD represents the monetary valuation of an unit of time by the
owner (e.g. 1000 Euro/day). This is similar to the road user cost which is often defined
in A + B contracting methods for roadwork manufacturing (Sillars, 2007). Analogously,
the parameter µls is used to represent the monetary value to the owner of satisfying a
certain deadline DL. Note that the parameter DL is different from the Dtls parameter
introduced in section 3.3.2, the former signifies a deadline relevant to the owner, whereas
the latter is a deadline clause included in an incentive contract to which the contractor
is subjected. These two dates are not necessarily the same, since the owner can choose
to insert additional buffer in the contract by setting the contractor’s deadline prior to his
own (i.e. DL ≥ Dtls for rationally designed contracts).
A similar construction is created for the valuation of scope, as seen in equation 3.22.
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Based on the premise that scope can be measured on a ratio scale (see section 3.3.3), it
suffices to introduce µS as the monetary value of an unit of scope to the owner.
OV S(Sl) = µS · Sl (3.22)
Using the formulae above, the play-off functions for both the owner and the contractor
have been fully defined as NOGl and NCGadjl respectively. As stated above, the optimal
contract design has three evaluation criteria: a maximal return for the owner, an accurate
alignment of the evaluation of the contractor and the owner, and an adequate play-off for
the contractor. The first of these criteria can be expressed as follows:
E [NOG] = max
[
NOGl|
(
NCGadjl = maxl
[
NCGadj
])]
(3.23)
Equation 3.23 effectively states that the expected gain of the owner is equal to the gain
he receives when the contractor selects the scenario which maximises the contractor’s own
return. In the case where there are multiple scenarios in which the contractor’s profits are
maximised, the maximal net owner gain is used. The reasoning behind this being that
given the opportunity to do so, the contractor will chose to maximise the owner’s profits
if this does not affect his own return.
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Figure 3.6: Illustration of the optimisation objectives
The top two panels of figure 3.6 illustrate the expected owner profit (E [NOG]) max-
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imisation objective. On the horizontal axis the all the potential outcome scenarios (i.e.
the trade-off points which can be chosen by the contractor) are listed in no particular or-
der. The vertical axis represents the profit for the owner and contractor for the respective
scenarios. As was formerly stated, the contractor is a profit maximiser and will there-
fore always select the scenario which maximises his profits (NCGadjl = maxl
(
NCGadjl
)
).
Hence, the owner profit (NOGl) associated with this scenario is defined as the expected
net owner gain (E [NOG]). This expected outcome is indicated by the rectangle and the
letter E in figure 3.6. Assuming the owner is confronted with a choice between the con-
tract represented by the upper left panel and the contract represented by the upper right
panel, the owner will prefer the right contract, since this is likely to result in an outcome
which yields a much greater net owner gain (NOG). The situation in the top left pane is
in fact equivalent to rewarding a certain strategy, while hoping a different strategy will be
followed (Kerr, 1975).
Note that the example presented in figure 3.6 is simplified in that a change in the
contract structure is likely to change the owner’s pay-off function as well as the function
of the contractor. This is one of the reasons for the complex nature of incentive contract
design.
3.5.2 Evaluation Alignment
The two bottom panels of figure 3.6 present an intuitive example of the importance of
evaluation alignment. Again the horizontal axis lists all possible outcome scenarios in
no particular order, and the vertical axis represents the contractor (NCGadjl ) and owner
(NOGl) gains for the respective scenarios. When comparing the two bottom panels, it is
clear that both contracts have an identical expected net owner gain E [NOG]. Hence, if
this was the only evaluation criterion used, the owner would be indifferent between the
contract resulting in the bottom left and the contract resulting in the bottom right scenario.
However, when looking at the most attractive regions for the contractor, excluding the
contractor’s optimal point, a case can be made for the contract represented in the bottom
right. Namely, it is clear that for the bottom left contract the attractive region coincides
with the least attractive points for the contractor. Hence, should external influence cause
the optimal point to be unattainable, it is likely that the outcome will gravitate towards
such an unattractive point. The opposite is true for the contract on the bottom right,
where even if the expected point should not be obtained for whichever reason, the other
points still result in relatively attractive outcomes for the owner.
The theoretical example in the bottom panels of figure 3.6 can be linked to the concept
of balanced contract design in project management practice (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989).
For example, assume the only time-related incentive of a contract is a lump-sum provision
Chapter 3 51
awarded in case a certain deadline is met, but the contract also includes a substantial cost
incentive to encourage cost savings. Should it at some point during the execution of this
project become apparent to the contractor that it will be impossible to deliver the project
before said deadline, it is highly likely that the contractor will attempt to maximise his
cost incentive and completely neglect the time dimension. This would of course have a
dramatic effect on the value of the project to the contract owner, who of course attaches
a substantial value to the timely delivery of the project. The concept of pay-off alignment
is a way of formalising this issue.
In order to quantify the alignment of the evaluation of the owner and contractor, both
values are expressed in relative terms, meaning that they are rescaled in the range [0, 1].
This results in the following relative expressions for contractor and owner respectively:
RNCGadjl =
NCGadjl −NCGadjmin
NCGadjmax −NCGadjmin
(3.24)
RNOGl =
NOGl −NOGmin
NOGmax −NOGmin (3.25)
Using these relative expressions, a perfect evaluation alignment of both parties can be
defined as the situation where the following is true: RNCGadjl = RNOGl ∀l = 1, ...,m.
Naturally this optimal situation can rarely be attained in practice. Hence the need to
develop metrics to measure the degree of deviation from this optimal situation. The
following two metrics are used in order to express the degree of alignment (i.e. the deviation
from this optimal situation):
MD = 1
m
m∑
l=1
[
RNCGadjl −RNOGl
]
(3.26)
MAD = 1
m
m∑
l=1
∣∣∣RNCGadjl −RNOGl∣∣∣ (3.27)
Equation 3.26 measures the mean deviation (MD) of the relative gains of both parties.
The value of this metric lies within the range [−1, 1], negative values indicating that there
are more scenarios where the owner gains are larger than those of the contractor and
positive values indicating that there are more scenarios where the inverse is true. Hence,
the value of this metric should be as close to zero as possible.
The major flaw in equation 3.26 is of course that opposite deviations cancel each other
out. Hence, the mean absolute deviation (MAD) is presented in equation 3.27. The
MAD always has a value in the range [0, 1], and gives an accurate reading of the overall
deviations, regardless of their sign. By using the MAD to measure the average alignment
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in combination with the MD to measure possible skewness, the overall alignment of the
evaluations can be quantified.
3.5.3 Constraints Enforcing Sensible Contract Design
The preceding two optimisation criteria can be extended by adding constraints enforcing
the contracts to adhere to certain rules for good incentive contract design. Such guidelines
have been regularly proposed in the literature and often include advice on minimal sharing
ratios (Perry and Barnes, 2000), and a bias towards positive incentives rather than disin-
centives (Rose and Manley, 2010). The remainder of this section presents two constraints
which can be used to enforce certain principles when evaluating contracts.
The first constraint guarantees that the maximal incentive earned by the contractor is
larger than or equal to a certain minimal value. If this would not be enforced, the optimal
solution could potentially gravitate towards contracts which impose large disincentives on
contractors. Several authors have already indicated that such contracts are undesirable
because they undermine the contractor’s motivation (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989; Rose and
Manley, 2010).
The level at which this constraint is set is of course strongly project-specific, and
several authors have quoted different values depending on the industry in which they
operated. Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs (1989) examined projects in industrial construction and
found incentive amounts up to 2.62% of total project cost. A study by Veld and Peeters
(1989) found that this percentage was approximately 0.7% in the aerospace industry. A
much higher fraction is apparently used in road construction in the US, where an incentive
cap of approximately 5% of the total project cost is recommended (Tang et al., 2008).
By defining the maximal incentive which can be earned by the contractor as Itotmax and
the lower bound for this value as LBItotmax , this constraint can be formulated as:
Itotmax ≥ LBItotmax (3.28)
The second constraint is introduced to guarantee that there is sufficiently variability
in the pay-off of the contractor. Insufficient variability will impede the contractor’s moti-
vation to locate the optimal pay-off region. Hence, RItot is defined as the minimal range
required for adequate contractor motivation. The difference between the maximal (Itotmax)
and minimal (Itotmin) incentive awarded to the contractor should then be at least as great
as this minimal range.
Itotmax − Itotmin ≥ RItot (3.29)
To illustrate the workings of the different models, as well as the interactions between
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them, section 3.6 presents a simplified fictitious example.
3.6 Fictitious Example
A retail store owner wishes to renovate his store interior and has employed a contractor
to refurbish the entire store. For his services, the contractor receives a fixed fee of 10,000
Euro, plus all the direct material costs (C). The quality (scope) of the work performed
by the contractor will be judged upon completion and scored on a ratio scale in the range
[1, 2], where 1 indicates the lowest quality and 2 indicates the highest quality.
Specific targets are specified with respect to the outcome dimensions of the project:
the total cost of materials is expected to be 6,000 Euro (Ct), the project should take
approximately 10 days to complete (Dt), and the quality of the project is expected to be
at least 1.5 (St) on the aforementioned ratio scale. In order to elicit superior performance
from the contractor, incentives are also included in the contract. The owner has decided
that the impact of possible performance fluctuations are to be shared equitably between
both parties. For the cost dimension this means that the sharing ratio sC (see equation 3.1)
is set to 0.5. With respect to the duration of the project, the owner estimates that he loses
1,000 Euro in income for each day the store has to remain closed for the refurbishment,
hence the per diem (dis)incentive amount (vD, see equation 3.4) is set at 500 Euro. The
quality of the work performed has an impact on the time until a new renovation will be
needed; the highest grade performance will last approximately 2 years longer than the
lowest grade performance. The owner has calculated that he can save 2,500 Euro by being
able to postpone the next renovation by two years. Hence, the valuation parameter for
the scope incentive (vS , see equation 3.6) is set to 1,250 Euro per unit of scope.
During the execution of the project, the contractor is able to allocate resources in
the way which optimises the return (s)he receives from the project. This implies that
the contractor selects a point on the cost, duration, scope and effort trade-off spectrum
(see section 3.4). The contractor can for example choose to decrease the duration (D)
by using fast-drying paints. However, these paints are either more expensive, causing a
rise in the direct cost paid by the owner (C) or of inferior quality when compared to
traditional paints, negatively influencing the quality (scope, S) of the result. The effort
the contractor invests in the project is reflected by the number of labourers (s)he assigns to
the project. Increasing the number of labourers can have a positive influence on the cost,
duration or scope of a project, depending on the specific instructions given to personnel.
Since the labour cost is covered by the contract’s fixed fee rather than its variable cost
component, increasing the number of labourers increases the contractor’s cost with 500
Euro per labourer. Moreover, the contractor also takes into account an opportunity cost
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Figure 3.7: Trade-off points and relative gains for the sample project.
Scenario (l) Cost (C) Duration (D) Scope (S) Effort (E) Effort Cost (Ecostl ) IC ID IS Itot NCG
adj
l NOGl RNCG
adj
l RNOGl
1 3,500 10 1 0 0 1,250 0 -625 625 625 -11,000 0.90 0.70
2 4,000 9 1 0 0 1,000 500 -625 875 875 -10,500 0.96 0.75
3 5,000 8 1 0 0 500 1,000 -625 875 875 -10,500 0.96 0.75
4 3,500 10 1.5 1 500 1,250 0 0 1,250 700 -9,750 0.92 0.83
5 4,000 9 1.5 1 500 1,000 500 0 1,500 950 -9,250 0.98 0.88
6 5,000 8 1.5 1 500 500 1,000 0 1,500 950 -9,250 0.98 0.88
7 3,500 10 2 2 1,000 1,250 0 625 1,875 775 -8,500 0.94 0.95
8 4,000 9 2 2 1,000 1,000 500 625 2,125 1,025 -8,000 1.00 1.00
9 5,000 8 2 2 1,000 500 1,000 625 2,125 1,025 -8,000 1.00 1.00
10 6,000 10 1 0 0 0 0 -625 -625 -625 -13,500 0.58 0.45
11 7,050 9 1 0 0 -525 500 -625 -650 -650 -13,550 0.57 0.45
12 9,000 8 1 0 0 -1,500 1,000 -625 -1,125 -1,125 -14,500 0.45 0.35
13 6,000 10 1.5 1 500 0 0 0 0 -550 -12,250 0.60 0.58
14 7,050 9 1.5 1 500 -525 500 0 -25 -575 -12,300 0.59 0.57
15 9,000 8 1.5 1 500 -1,500 1,000 0 -500 -1,050 -13,250 0.47 0.48
16 9,600 10 2 0 0 -1,800 0 625 -1,175 -1,175 -14,600 0.44 0.34
17 11,600 9 2 0 0 -2,800 500 625 -1,675 -1,675 -15,600 0.31 0.24
18 15,000 8 2 0 0 -4,500 1,000 625 -2,875 -2,875 -18,000 0.00 0.00
Table 3.1: Scenarios and associated results for the sample project.
of 10% (ROIE) since the labourers could otherwise be assigned to other projects.
The left panel of figure 3.7 visualises the 18 attainable trade-off points in this theoretical
scenario. Specifically, the graph shows the relationship between project duration and cost
for various levels of effort and scope. Note that multiple lines have been made to coincide
to improve the readability of the example. Increasing the effort invested in the project
causes a downward translation of the cost-duration trade-off curve, whereas an increase
in the scope of the project has the opposite effect, as indicated on the graph itself. These
trade-off combinations are also listed in table 3.1, together with the incentive amounts
associated with each scenario. Using the total incentive amount (Itot) together with the
formulae from section 3.5.1, both the absolute and relative gains for the owner (NOGl &
RNOGl) and the contractor (NCGadjl & RNCG
adj
l ) have also been calculated.
Given this set of pay-offs, the contractor will choose either scenario 8 or 9, both of
which yield the highest contractor gain (NCGadjl ). Incidentally, these scenarios also result
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in the highest values for the owner gain (NOGl). However, the fact that these two values
coincide does not mean that this is the best contract for this scenario, other contracts may
result in a higher expected gain for the contractor, regardless of the fact that that the
highest gains for both parties coincide or not.
The right panel of figure 3.7 compares the relative gains for both parties in each of
the available scenarios l. Due to the equitable sharing policy implemented by the owner,
it is clear that the fluctuations of both actors are largely similar. This is also reflected in
the MAD and MD values which equal 0.094 and 0.093 respectively. The fact that the
magnitude of the MD indicator is similar to that of the MAD indicator indicates that
there is considerable skew, meaning that deviations are largely biased in one direction.
This can also be seen on the right panel of figure 3.7, which shows that the relative owner
gain (RNOGl) is consistently higher than the relative contractor (RNCGadjl ) gain.
3.7 Evaluating the Performance of Contract Sets
One of the key objectives of this research is to evaluate the performance of different types
of contracts. However, due to the presence of multiple objectives, comparing performance
is not trivial. In order to evaluate how different contract types perform, all Pareto-efficient
contracts of a specific type are considered jointly. These local Pareto frontiers are then
compared to a global Pareto frontier, which can include all contracts regardless of their
type. This section discusses the methods used to make this comparison.
A qualitative interpretation of such a Pareto frontier is the set of viable options created
by a specific type of contract. Ideally, a project owner could limit the complexity of her/his
decision process by using only a limited number of contract types, while still having a
sufficiently broad choice of options compared to the globally best performing solutions
(i.e. the Pareto frontier that is created when all contract types are allowed).
As was stated in section 3.5, the performance of a contract is measured on two key di-
mensions: expected owner gain (E[NOG]), and the alignment of the relative pay-offs of the
contractor and the owner, as measured by the MD and MAD metrics. Since the problem
at hand has multiple objectives, the performance has to be evaluated accordingly. This is
done by constructing a global three dimensional (E[NOG],MAD,MD) Pareto frontier,
containing all the contracts for a problem environment which are not dominated. The
performance of different contract sets (i.e. the contracts belonging to a specific contract
group, can then be compared to this global Pareto frontier. When making such compar-
isons, three aspects are of importance (Okabe et al., 2003; Sarker and Coello, 2002): (i)
the distance to the global Pareto front, (ii) the spread of the solutions found, and (iii) the
number of elements found.
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(i) Distance to the global Pareto front. Frequently used metrics to measure the
distance between the global Pareto front and approximations thereof include the error
rate (ER) , the generational distance (GD), the inverted generational distance (IGD) as
well as the Hausdorff distance (dH) (Sarker and Coello, 2002; Van Veldhuizen, 1999a,b).
However, each of the aforementioned metrics displays certain shortcomings: the error
rate fails to measure the precise distance to the global Pareto front, both the GD and
IGD tend to zero as the number of elements on the tested or global frontier is increased,
and the Hausdorff distance only measures the worst case scenario. Hence, the averaged
Hausdorff distance (∆p), which was introduced by Schutze et al. (2012) to mitigate these
shortcomings, is used as a metric for the distance from the tested set to the best known
Pareto front, this metric is calculated as follows:
∆p(X,Y ) = max
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
dist(xi, Y )p
) 1
p
,
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
dist(yi, X)p
) 1
p
 (3.30)
Where X and Y are the two sets between which the distance is to be measured (i.e. the
global Pareto front and the tested front). These sets contain N and M points respectively,
which are represented as xi and yi. The function dist measures the distance from a point
to the closest point in the other set, using simple euclidean distances. Finally, p is equal
to the number of dimensions in the Pareto front (i.e. p = 3 in this study). The coordinate
system used to calculate this metric in the experiments below has been standardised to
the range [0, 1] for each of the dimensions measured, to avoid one of the dimensions having
a more substantial impact than the others merely due its measurement scale. For more
information regarding this metric, the reader is referred to Schutze et al. (2012).
The calculation of the ∆p metric is illustrated by figure 3.8. To allow for a simple
visual representation, two rather than three evaluation dimensions are considered in this
example. By visual inspection alone, it is hard to determine which of these two sets is
closest to the global Pareto front. The ∆p metric can be used to compare both of these
sets (S1 and S2) to the global frontier (G). The first step is to calculate the distance
from each point on S1 to the global Pareto front, which is simply the euclidean distance
to the closest point on the global front. This is illustrated for the first set (S1) in the top
right panel of figure 3.8. By taking the power mean of all these distances, the first of the
two expressions within the square brackets of formula 3.30 is found. The calculation of
the second expression is simply the inverse of the first and is done by taking the power
mean of the distances from every point on the global front to the first set of points (S1).
This is illustrated for the first set S1 by the bottom left panel of figure 3.8. By taking
the maximum of these two expressions, the “worst case”-averaged distance is acquired.
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When calculating the result for this small example, it appears that the second set (S2)
is somewhat closer to the global Pareto front with a ∆p value of 0.48, compared to a ∆p
value of 0.57 for the first set (S1)
(ii) Spread of solutions. To determine the quality of the spread of the tested Pareto
front, a very simple metric is proposed which compares the distance between the extreme
outcomes for each dimension of the tested front to the distance between the extreme
outcomes for the global Pareto front. For E[NOG] this can be calculated as follows:
spr(E[NOG]) = E[NOG]
test
max − E[NOG]testmin
E[NOG]globmax − E[NOG]globmin
(3.31)
In equation 3.31, E[NOG]testmax and E[NOG]testmin represent the highest and lowest values
for the E[NOG] metric in the Pareto front which is compared to the global front. Similarly,
E[NOG]globmax and E[NOG]
glob
min represent the highest and lowest values for E[NOG] which
can be observed on the global Pareto front. Note that since the global Pareto front
will always include the best known solutions the following is always true: E[NOG]globmin ≤
E[NOG]testmin ≤ E[NOG]testmax ≤ E[NOG]globmax. Hence, the spread will always be a value in
the range [0, 1]. The graphical interpretation of this metric is illustrated in the bottom
right panel of figure 3.8. For this example, it is clear that the spread of the second set (S2)
with regard to the E[NOG] metric is superior to the spread of the first set (S1). Since
the spread for the MD and MAD dimensions is calculated analogously, the respective
equations for these dimensions will not be repeated here.
(iii) Number of elements. The number of elements found on the tested Pareto
front will not be considered as a metric in this chapter, since this number will of course
be strongly dependent on the number of contracts that have been tested. This number
is of course an aspect of the experimental set-up, rather than a property of the contract
structure itself.
3.8 Computational Experiments
The formal models presented in the preceding sections make it possible to carry out com-
putational experiments using carefully constructed datasets. In order to structure the
analysis, the following two concepts are defined:
Contract type: A collection of contracts which adhere to certain design principles with
respect to the dimensions which are incentivised, the formulae used to calculate
the incentive and the owner and contractor accountability in the case of extremely
positive or negative outcomes.
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Environment: The project setting in which a contract operates, which is formed by
combining a trade-off model (see section 3.4) and an evaluation model (see section
3.5).
The goal of these experiments is to compare the performance of different contract
types, as well as the impact of differences in the environments in which contracts operate.
Differences in environments can of course be due to differences in the trade-off model as
well as differences in the evaluation model.
The computational experiments provide answers to four key research questions: (1)
How do different contract types perform in practice? (2) How do environmental factors (i.e.
the properties of the project trade-off and the evaluation models) influence the performance
of these different contract types? (3) How substantial are the added benefits of multi-
dimensional contract forms when compared to uni-dimensional contract forms? (4) How
are these multi-dimensional contract forms influenced by environmental factors?
The answers to the former two research questions are provided by the uni-dimensional
experiment design (section 3.8.2), whereas the latter two research questions are answered
through the multi-dimensional experiment design (section 3.8.3). Before going into further
detail on these two experimental designs, more information on the datasets is provided in
section 3.8.1.
3.8.1 Datasets
In accordance with the methodology which was introduced when modelling the problem,
three separate datasets have been created. Each of these datasets corresponds to one of
the components used to model the problem: the contract, the trade-off and the evaluation
model (see section 3.2). All these datasets are freely available and can be downloaded
from the following website:
www.projectmanagement.ugent.be/?q=research/contracting.
3.8.1.1 Contract Models
The goal of the contract model dataset is to present a comprehensive cross section of
contracting techniques used in practice. By testing this cross section of contract structures
on a wide range of possible environments, the effectiveness of these techniques can be
determined. As was mentioned in section 3.7, the contract dataset consists of several
contract (sub)sets, grouping contracts belonging to a specific type. An overview of this is
given in table 3.2.
Contract types discussed in the literature are usually defined based on which party
is accountable in case of extremely positive or negative outcomes (see section 2.2). This
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Base type Accountability Code # Contracts tested In LiteratureDownside Upside Cost Duration Scope
Linear
Contractor Contractor LCC 7 168 9 Firm Fixed Price
Contractor Shared LCS 56 1,344 72 Guaranteed Maximum Price
Shared Shared LSS 63 1,512 63 Fixed Price Incentive
Owner Shared LOS 56 1,344 72 Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Owner Owner LOO 7 168 9 Cost Plus Fixed Fee
3-Piecewise
Contractor Contractor 3PCC 336 8,064 432 -
Contractor Shared 3PCS 1,176 36,288 3,888 -
Owner Shared 3POS 1,512 36,288 1,944 -
Owner Owner 3POO 336 8,064 432 -
4-Piecewise
Contractor Contractor 4PCC 980 0 1,260 -
Contractor Shared 4PCS 2,940 0 2,520 -
Owner Shared 4POS 4,200 0 3,780 -
Owner Owner 4POO 1,260 0 1,260 -
non-linear Shared Shared N 28,672 1,102,248 59,049 -
TOTAL 41,601 1,195,488 74,790
Table 3.2: Contract dataset
allocation of accountability for the different contract types is shown by the accountabil-
ity columns in table 3.2. Accountability can either be shared or allocated to the con-
tractor/owner. Allocating the downside accountability to the contractor means that all
overruns beyond a certain point will be paid in full by the contractor. Where this spe-
cific point lies depends on the other parameters set in the contract. Contrarily, when the
upside risk is allocated to the contractor, (s)he can fully benefit from all the gains of the
performance (e.g. cost savings) beyond a certain point. Alternatively, the risk can also be
shared between the two parties according to a certain ratio. This accountability in the
extrema is translated into a shortened contract code which will be used from now on to
identify the different contract types (see the code column in table 3.2). The final column
of table 3.2 also mentions the nomenclature used in existing literature for these specific
types of contracts, insofar as this nomenclature exists.
Practically, allocating the accountability to the owner or contractor is equivalent to
setting the sharing ratio for the associated region to 0 or 1 respectively. For the simple
linear contracts, this means that the sharing ratio above and/or below the target is set to 0
or 1. For three- and four-piecewise linear contracts, the upside and downside accountability
refer to the first and final segment.
For each of these types, the parameters which are not fixed due to the nature of the
contract type are varied, resulting in a varying number of available instances per contract
type, as listed in table 3.2. These parameters include the respective targets (Ct, Dt, St), the
bounds for the various regions (BCr , BDr , BSr ), the sharing ratios (sCr ), the region valuation
parameters (vDr , vSr ), the non-linear incentive amounts and bounds (ICmax, IDmax, ISmax, ICmin,
IDmin, ISmin, UBC , UBD, UBS , LBC , LBD, LBS), and lump sum duration incentive targets
and incentive amounts (Dtls, IDls ). Each of these parameters is varied across the complete
relevant range, with a step size equal to 18 of the total size of the range, including or
excluding the bounds of the range as is relevant for practical implementation. This results
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in a total of 41,601 cost contract options, 1,195,488 duration contract options, and 74,790
scope contract options. Note that the number of duration contract options is substantially
greater due to the possibility of including lump-sum incentives related to a specific deadline.
Readers who desire more information on these datasets are referred to the on-line resources
accompanying this research.
3.8.1.2 Trade-off Models
In order to create instances of the trade-off model, the independent parameters (D,S,E)
are spread across a range of size 1: D ∈ [1, 2], S ∈ [1, 2] and E ∈ [0, 1] (i.e. The shortest
possible duration for the project is defined as 1, and the longest possible duration for
the project is defined as 2). For each of these dimensions, 11 equidistant discrete options
were created within this range (n = 10, see section 3.4). This results in a a total of
1,331 (=(n + 1)3) trade-off points for each instance. The actual difference between these
instances is represented by the variation in the costs associated with each of these trade-
off points, which depends on the parameter settings used for the specific instance. These
settings are summarised in the first part of table 3.3.
The generation procedure for the trade-off problems requires a value for each of the
parameters listed in the first part of table 3.3. The generation procedure starts by simply
selecting the values for the three first parameter types: the slopes (|SD|, |SS |, |SE |), the
multiplicators (mSD, ..., mSE), and the minimal cost value (Cmin). Given these parameter
values, a linear approximation of the relation between each of the independent dimensions
(duration, scope and effort) can be made, for every possible value of the other two inde-
pendent dimensions (e.g. the relation between duration and cost given a certain scope and
effort level). These linear approximations are then used in combination with the value for
the convexity magnitude metrics (CMD, CMS , CME) to determine a convex curve which
represents the impact of each separate dimension on the cost. Practically, this convex
curve is created using a linear programming (LP ) model which uses the linear approxi-
mation as well as the relevant CM metric as an input. The workings of this model are
detailed in 3.C. This means that a total of 3 · (n + 1)2 LP models are solved in order to
model the impact of the individual dimensions. The implementation of this model was
done using Gurobi 5.6 optimisation software, which solved each of the instances in under
a minute on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 machine. The result for the individual dimensions is
then combined by summing the cost increases (∆C) for the separate dimensions, resulting
in (n+ 1)3 costs (Cijk) corresponding to every possible duration-scope-effort combination.
Using this methodology and the parameters listed in table 3.3, a total of 380 trade-off
models have been created.
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Model Parameter Symbol Values # Instances Total
Trade-Off
Basic slopes |SD|, |SS |, |SE | {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5} 125
380Multiplicators m
S
D , ..., m
S
E {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} 125
Minimal cost Cmin = C000 ∆Cnnn ·
{
1
0.10 ,
1
0.20 ,
1
0.30 ,
1
0.40 ,
1
0.50
}
5
Convexity CMD , CMS , CME {0, 0.0625, 0.125, 0.1875, 0.25} 125
Evaluation
Max Effort cost Ecostm ∆Cnnn · {0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.75} 5
25
Effort ROI ROIE {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2} 5
Time value µD ∆Cnnn · {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5} 5
Deadline value µls ∆Cnnn · {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2} 5
Scope valuation µS ∆Cnnn · {0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5} 5
Table 3.3: Environment dataset
3.8.1.3 Project Evaluation Models
The generation of evaluation model instances requires the selection of the parameters
which are shown in the bottom half of table 3.3. The majority of these parameters are
expressed relative to the total cost spread of the trade-off problem used, expressed as the
difference between the lowest attainable cost (C000) and the highest possible cost (Cnnn):
∆Cnnn = Cnnn − C000. This is done to ensure a consistent variation of the different
parameters over different trade-off models. As shown in table 3.3, a total of 25 different
evaluation model instances have been created, allowing for a total of 9,500 (25 · 380)
different environments on which contract performance can be tested.
3.8.2 Uni-Dimensional Experiments
The aim of the uni-dimensional experiment is to investigate the relative performance of
different contract types for the different dimensions, as well as the impact of environmental
factors on the performance of these contracts. To do this, the 25 evaluation model instances
are combined with the 380 trade-off model instances (see table 3.3), resulting in 9,500
problem environments on which the different contract type instances (see table 3.2) can
be tested. The nature of this experiment is uni-dimensional, which signifies that only one
type of incentive is tested per environment (i.e. an environment is never subjected to both
a cost and scope incentive simultaneously).
Due to the difference in the number of parameter settings between the contracts, the
time needed to evaluate a single contract differs depending on the contract type. On a 2.26
GHz processor the evaluation of a single environment (i.e. a combination of a trade-off and
an evaluation instance) takes 27, 793 and 135 seconds on average for the cost, duration
and scope contract sets respectively. Hence, the complete experiment takes approximately
2,500 single-core computation hours.
For every environment, the performance of the different contract types is judged by
creating a number of efficient frontiers containing only the contracts of a certain types.
These local efficient frontiers are then compared to the global efficient frontier, which
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includes contracts of all available types. The comparison itself is made by calculating the
averaged Hausdorff distance (∆p) between the local and global frontiers as well as the
spread of the local frontiers.
This process is repeated for different types of sensible contract design strategies (see
section 3.5.3). Whenever a specific contract does not satisfy the criteria for sensible con-
tract design, it is no longer included in any of the local or global efficient frontiers. Four
different sensible contract design strategies have been used. For the first type no restric-
tions whatsoever are included, all contracts are considered in the efficient frontiers. The
second type imposes the restriction that the maximal incentive which can be earned by the
contractor cannot be negative. The third type requires that the maximal incentive which
can be earned by the contractor is at least 2% of the average project cost3. The fourth
criterion extends the third by also requiring that the range between the highest and lowest
incentive amounts which can be earned is at least 4% of the average project cost. These
constraints are similar to the values observed in practice by other authors (Abu-Hijleh and
Ibbs, 1989; Tang et al., 2008; Veld and Peeters, 1989), see section 3.5.3.
The results of the experiments will be presented using visual representations rather
than raw data tables to facilitate interpretation. Readers who would like the raw data
behind these graphs can download them on-line from the following website:
www.projectmanagement.ugent.be/?q=research/contracting.
3measured as the average over all possible outcomes of the project.
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Figure 3.8: Graphical illustration of the metrics used to measure the performance of certain
contract sets. The top left panel shows the Pareto frontier of two contract sets S1
and S2, as well as the global Pareto frontier G, which is constructed using all the
best known contracts regardless of their type. The top right and bottom left panels
illustrate components of the averaged Hausdorff distance (∆p) metric used to measure
the distance to the global front. The bottom right panel illustrates the measurement
of the E[NOG] spread associated with the respective sets.
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3.8.2.1 Performance of Contract Types
The first step in analysing the results of the uni-dimensional experiment is measuring
the (relative) performance of the contract types. Figure 3.9 visualises the the averaged
Hausdorff distance ∆p performance measure, which represents the proximity to the global
efficient frontier. To facilitate comparing results the averaged Hausdorff distance was
standardised within the range [0, 1]. The second performance measure - the spread of the
solutions for the different evaluation dimensions - is shown in figure 3.10. Naturally these
results were also standardised within the range [0, 1], based on the best and worst values
for each specific environment.
For the majority of contract types the fraction of contracts which did not satisfy im-
posed restrictions for sensible contract design (see section 3.5.3) remained limited: in less
than 1.5% of cases violations were observed. Only the LOO contract, which transfers all
risk to the owner, was unable to satisfy any of the imposed constraints, as can be seen
from the results in figures 3.9 and 3.10
Non-linear and piecewise linear contracts outperform linear types: Non-
linear and piecewise linear contract types generally outperform linear contract types in
terms of proximity to the efficient frontier, whilst showing average to good performance in
terms of spread for all metrics. Figure 3.9 shows that the best performance in terms of
proximity to the efficient frontier (∆p) is always observed to be either a non-linear (N)
or piecewise linear contract type. It can also be noted that the best performing piecewise
linear contracts always share the upside potential, rather than allocating it completely to
either party. The spread of these best performing types is also consistently good, as shown
by figure 3.10.
Avoid linear contracts which transfer all risk to a single party: Linear con-
tracts which transfer all the risk to either the contractor4 (LCC) or the owner5 (LOO)
perform worse in terms both proximity and spread when compared to other linear contract
types. Moreover, due to the complete absence of value transfer from the owner to the
contractor when using the LOO contract type, the minimum incentive and range condi-
tions for sensible contract design cannot be satisfied. The relevance of these observations
is validated by the continued extensive use of this type of contract, as can be seen from
table 2.1.
Preferred types are robust to changing restrictions: Adding restrictions to
enforce sensible contract design does not change the preferred contract type for any of the
contract dimensions. For other contract types imposing additional constraints can have a
significant impact on the relative performance. Simple linear contracts seem particularly
4Often dubbed a Firm Fixed Price (FFP ) contract in traditional literature.
5Often described as a cost plus fixed fee (CPFF ) contract in contracting literature
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sensitive to the imposition of constraints for sensible contract design.
Skewness persists within contract types: The alignment skewness as measured
by the MD persists within a contract type, as indicated by the consistently low values for
the standardised spread for this metric (spr(MD)). Figure 3.10 shows that the average
spread for the MD metric is low in both absolute and relative terms for all types of
contracts. Hence, it is likely that other contract types will have to be considered in order
to remove an undesired skew from a contract.
Based on these observations, project owners are advised to use piecewise linear or non-
linear contracts, rather than the traditional linear contract archetypes. Especially linear
contracts which transfer all risk to the contractor or the owner, such as the traditional
firm fixed price (FFP ) or cost plus fixed fee (CPFF ) contract types, should be avoided.
Moreover, when an undesirable skew of the alignment (as measured by the MD indicator)
is observed, it may be beneficial to include other contract types in the analysis.
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3.8.2.2 Impact of Environmental Factors on Contract Type Performance
The properties of the environment in which the contract operates can also have an im-
portant influence on its effectiveness. Hence, the experiment design uses a large set of
parameter settings for both trade-off and evaluation models. The impact of these environ-
mental factors on the average Hausdorff distance ∆p is measured by the slope of the linear
regression line which estimates ∆p as a function of the respective environment parameter
value: ∆p ∼ parameter).
The key considerations with respect to the influence of environment parameters are the
following: Firstly, which of the environmental parameters has the largest average impact on
contract performance? And secondly, which contract types are influenced most by changes
in the environment in which they operate (i.e. the robustness of different contract types)?
Note that impact in this case can mean either a significantly positive or a significantly
negative slope of the linear regression line.
Figure 3.11 provides an answer to the former question by investigating the impact of
different environment parameters. An answer to the latter question is provided by figure
3.12 which plots the average absolute value of the scope coefficients for the various contract
types.
Strong variation of impact across environment parameters: A comparison
of the impact of different environment parameters shows that there is a clear distinction
between parameters with a high and low impact on contract type performance. These high-
impact environment parameters can be identified in figure 3.11 by their large positive or
negative deviation from zero.
The results show that in situations where increasing the effort has a larger impact on
the other trade-offs (i.e. a high value for the mED or mES multiplicators), the proximity to
the efficient frontier worsens for all dimensions. Contrarily, an increase in the convexity
of the relations between the cost and any of its drivers (duration, scope and effort) has
a generally positive influence on the proximity of contract sets of different types to the
efficient frontier, again for all dimensions.
The impact of environmental parameters on different contract dimensions (cost, dura-
tion and scope) can also be substantially different. An example of this are the convexity
parameters (CMD, CMS , CME), which have a substantially larger impact on cost incen-
tive contracts. Moreover, several other parameters show opposite influences on contract
types of different dimensions. An example of this is the cost of effort (Ecostm ): an increase of
this parameter has a negative impact on cost incentive performance, but a positive impact
on the performance of scope contracts.
After analysing which environment parameters have the largest influence on contract
types in general, the inverse can also be tested: which specific contract types are most
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Figure 3.11: The average impact of variation of environment parameters on contract perfor-
mance, measured by the slope coefficient of the linear regression. These are the
outcomes for the situation where both a minimal earning and a minimal range for
the contractor’s earnings is required.
susceptible to changes in environment parameters in general? This impact is expressed
in relative terms for the various contract types in figure 3.12. The vertical axis on these
graphs represents the absolute value of the regression slopes as they were used in figure
3.11.
Duration and scope contract types are more volatile when faced with
changes in the environment: Variations in the environment in which a contract type
is operating have a greater average impact on duration and scope contract types than on
cost contract types. Moreover, the relative impact of changes in the environment differs
little between different cost contract types, whereas more significant fluctuations can be
observed between duration and scope contract types.
Preferred types are also robust to changing environments: The preferred con-
tract types (see section 3.8.2.1) in general, and the non-linear contract types in particular
show a remarkable robustness to changes in the environment. Hence, the superior per-
formance of these types is likely to be valid across most types of projects. Contrarily,
several contract types show an above average volatility when compared to the other con-
tract types. Especially the LCS and 4PCS contract types for the duration and scope
dimension respectively, seem to be greatly influenced by the nature of the environment.
Other contract types which show above average volatility in the scope dimension include
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Figure 3.12: The average impact of variations in the environment for the different contract types.
These are the outcomes for the situation where both a minimal earning and a
minimal range for the contractor’s earnings is required.
the LSS, 3PPC and 4POO types.
Based on these observations, project owners are advised to pay extra attention to
the nature of the environment in which they are operating when designing contracts for
duration or scope dimensions. Even more so when they opt for contract types different
from the ones which were identified as most effective in section 3.8.2.1. Naturally, the
environment parameters which were identified as being most critical should have priority
over the other parameters when analysing the impact of the environment on contract type
performance.
3.8.3 Multi-Dimensional Experiments
The goal of the multi-dimensional experiments is to determine how the performance of
multi-dimensional contracts (i.e. contracts which combine cost, duration and scope incen-
tives) compares to that of uni-dimensional contracts. Several authors have highlighted the
risk of contracts which focus on a single incentive dimension (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989;
Broome and Perry, 2002; Meng and Gallagher, 2012), yet no extensive computational
experiments have been carried out to test these hypotheses.
Due to the exponential increase in computational complexity when testing all possible
contract combinations6, these experiments were carried out using only a subset of the
datasets which were employed for the uni-dimensional experiments (see section 3.8.2). The
contract set used for this experiment is limited to the linear contract types which are listed
6Testing all possible combinations would take approximately 90,000 years on a single core.
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in table 3.2, resulting in a total of 189 cost contracts, 4,536 duration contracts, and 225
scope contracts. This means that a total of 193 million (189 ·4, 536 ·225) multi-dimensional
contract combinations are tested for each environment.
The time needed to evaluate the performance of all these combinations for a single
environment is approximately 40 hours using a 2.26 GHz processor. Because of this, the
number of environments on which the tests are carried out is also a subset of the envi-
ronments used in the uni-dimensional experiment. For both the trade-off and evaluation
datasets, one instance was initialised using the average values for all parameters, plus for
each parameter of the data set a high and low value instance with all other parameters
still at the average value was initialised. The values used are simply the average, maximal
and minimal values which were mentioned in table 3.3. The number of environments was
further reduced by always combining the trade-off and evaluation models with the default
instance of the evaluation and trade-off model respectively. This results in a total of 38
different project environments, based on 27 trade-off models and 11 evaluation models.
Hence, a total of approximately 1,520 single-core computation hours are needed to carry
out this experiment.
The performance of contracts is evaluated by categorising them into different types, and
then comparing the Pareto front formed by contracts of a certain type to the global Pareto
front, which is constructed by taking all possible contracts into consideration. Similar to
the uni-dimensional experiments, this is done for four different strategies regarding sensible
contract design: the unrestricted case, the non-negative case, the minimum earnings case
and the minimal earnings and range case (see section 3.8.2). The results of this experiment
will first be analysed in the context of the relative performance of the different types of
contracts in section 3.8.3.1. Next, the impact of variations in the environment is discussed
in section 3.8.3.2.
3.8.3.1 Performance of Contract Types
The relative performance of different combinations of contract types is visualised in figure
3.13. To analyse the performance of these multidimensional contracts, an number of new
contract types are defined, as can be seen from the horizontal axes on the figure. These
contract types can be interpreted as follows: A first set of contract types focuses on the
number of dimensions used in a contract, as well as the nature of these dimensions. The
n-dim nomenclature simply indicates that the contract set contains incentives affecting n
contract dimensions out of a maximum of three (cost C, duration D and scope S). When
this name is followed by dimension names, this indicates that the contracts belonging to
this type have incentive clauses exclusively for these specific types. For example the 2-dim,
C&S contract type includes contracts which have both a cost and scope incentive, but no
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duration incentive clause.
The second set of contract types refers to the inclusion of the simple contract types
as listed in table 3.3 into a multi-dimensional contract. The nomenclature is similar to
the one used in section 3.8.2. For example, the ∃C − LCC contract type represents all
contracts containing an LCC contract for the cost dimension, regardless of any other
incentives which may or may not be included. This enables a comparison of the average
effectiveness of different types of contract clauses.
More dimensions yields better performance: Increasing the number of dimen-
sions of a contract has a positive effect on all metrics for contract set performance. Looking
at the performance of the contract types which only specify the number of dimensions, it
is clear that the performance both in terms of proximity and spread increases substantially
when moving from a 1-dim contract to a 2-dim contract, and from a 2-dim contract to a
3-dim contract (see figure 3.13). Similarly, when looking at the types which also specify
certain contract dimensions to be used, an improvement can always be seen when adding a
contract dimension (e.g. moving from a “1-dim, C” contract to a “2-dim, C&S” contract).
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Figure 3.13: Average distance to the global Pareto front for multi-dimensional contract types
(top panels), and the average spread obtained using different contract types for the
situation where both minimal earnings and range of the contractor’s earnings is
required (bottom panels).
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Duration > Scope > Cost: In case a 3-dimensional contract cannot be implemented,
the owner should opt to incentivise the duration and scope dimensions in a bi-dimensional
set-up or the duration dimension in a uni-dimensional set-up, preferring the former over
the latter. The top left panel of of figure 3.13 indicates that the performance in terms of
proximity to the global frontier of a one and two-dimensional contract is strongly depen-
dent on the chosen incentive dimensions. Specifically, the owner should prefer to attach
incentives to the duration and scope dimensions - in that order. If the right incentive
dimensions are chosen, the average performance gap between contracts including more or
less incentives can be greatly reduced, although it still remains present.
Avoid contract components which transfer all risk to a single party: Multi-
dimensional contracts which include components which transfer all risk to one of the two
parties (LCC or LOO) result in suboptimal performance. The increased distance to
the global frontier when using such contracts (see the right panels of figure 3.13) cor-
roborates the undesirable behaviour of these contract types which was observed in the
uni-dimensional experiments.
3.8.3.2 Impact of Environmental Factors on Performance
Figure 3.14 shows how variations in the environment impact the performance of the tested
multidimensional contracts. This performance is measured as the slope of the linear regres-
sion line which estimates the ∆p as a function of the respective environment parameter.
Environmental robustness increases with # dimensions: The robustness to
changes in the environment of contract types increases as the number of incentivised di-
mensions in the contract increases (see the left panel of figure 3.14). This is true for all
but one case: when moving from a one dimensional cost contract (1-dim, C) to a two-
dimensional cost and scope contract (2-dim, C&S), there is a slight increase in the average
sensitivity to changes in the environment. This is due to the fact that incentivising the
scope appears to be highly sensitive to changes in the problem environment, as was already
observed in section 3.8.2.2.
Preferred multidimensional types are relatively robust to environmental
changes: The most desirable multidimensional contract types for each dimension iden-
tified in section 3.8.3.1 are not heavily influenced by changes in the environment. This
confirms that these managerial guidelines are valid regardless of the type of project the
owner is facing. Figure 3.14 also shows that unidimensional scope contracts are relatively
unstable with respect to changes in the environment parameters. Project owners should
therefore be cautious and verify the adequacy of such contracts in the specific environment
where they will be implemented.
Including certain components increases the environmental sensitivity: The
74 Chapter 3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1
-d
im
,
C
1
-d
im
,
D
1
-d
im
,
S
1
-d
im
2
-d
im
,
C
&
D
2
-d
im
,
C
&
S
2
-d
im
,
D
&
S
2
-d
im
3
-d
im
A
v
er
a
ge
o
f
th
e
A
b
so
lu
te
V
a
lu
e
o
f
S
lo
p
es
Contracts with varying # dimensions
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
∃C
−
L
C
C
∃C
−
L
C
S
∃C
−
L
S
S
∃C
−
L
O
S
∃C
−
L
O
O
∃D
−
L
C
C
∃D
−
L
C
S
∃D
−
L
S
S
∃D
−
L
O
S
∃D
−
L
O
O
∃S
−
L
C
C
∃S
−
L
C
S
∃S
−
L
S
S
∃S
−
L
O
S
∃S
−
L
O
O
Contracts containing components of certain types
Figure 3.14: The average impact of variations in the environments for contracts of different com-
positions. These are the outcomes for the situation where minimal earning and
range contract design rules are enforced.
right pane of figure 3.14 reveals that using certain components in multi-dimensional con-
tracts can negatively influence the robustness of the contract type. The greatest peak can
be observed for the ∃C −LCC contract type, which indicates that a traditional firm fixed
price contract is used for the cost dimension. Again confirming preceding observations of
the risks involved when implementing this type of contract.
Based on these observations, a contract owner wishing to construct a contract structure
which is robust to changes in the environment in which it operates is advised to use as
many dimensions as possible in the contract. In case it is impossible to construct a three-
dimensional contract, the combination of scope and duration is on average most robust
for a two-dimensional contract. The best uni-dimensional alternative from a robustness
perspective is the introduction of a cost incentive, however given that a uni-dimensional
duration contract is only slightly more sensitive and yields better performance on average
(see section 3.8.3.1), using uni-dimensional duration contracts is preferable.
3.9 Conclusions
This chapter discussed incentive contract design for projects from the perspective of the
project owner. Based on axioms derived from an extensive literature review, a model
consisting of three subcomponents has been constructed. The model serves as a framework
which can be used by project owners to improve the design of incentivised contracts. This
model was also used to conduct computational experiments, from which a set of managerial
contract design guidelines have been derived (see summary in table 3.4).
The results of these experiments indicate that multidimensional contracts with piece-
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Experiment
Uni-Dimensional Multi-Dimensional
Contract type
Non-linear and Piecewise contract outperform linear contracts. More dimensions improve performance.
Avoid transfer of all risk to one party. Duration > Scope > Cost.
Preferred types are robust to imposed restrictions. Avoid contract components transferring risk to a single party.
Skewness persists within contract types.
Environment
Strong variation of impact across environment parameters. More incentivised dimensions improves robustness.
Duration and scope contracts are more volatile. Preferred multidimensional types are more robust.
Preferred types are more robust. Including certain components increases sensitivity.
Table 3.4: Summary of experimental results
wise linear and/or non-linear incentive clauses are superior on all performance metrics.
Moreover, good performing contract structures are generally more robust to changes in
the environment in which they operate, and can therefore be applied in structurally dif-
ferent project environments.
Linear contracts which transfer all the risk to one of the two parties, such as the tradi-
tional firm fixed price (FFP) and cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) contracts should be avoided in
both uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional incentive contracts. These contracts produce
inferior results in terms of both solution quality and diversity, whilst also being less robust
to changes in the environment in which they operate, when compared to other contract
alternatives.
Furthermore, when incentivising all dimensions is impossible from a practical point
of view, the owner’s first aim should be to implement a duration incentive, then a scope
incentive in that order. This opposes the traditional focus on cost incentives in both
literature and practice.
Several extensions of the problem can be considered relevant for future research. A first
extension would be to implement more advanced optimisation techniques to optimise the
contract parameters, rather than the full factorial approach taken in this study. Secondly,
the realism of the model could also be improved by lifting the assumption of full information
as well as the deterministic nature of the trade-offs. These conditions could be tested
within a game-theoretical setting which analyses the optimal behaviour of both owner and
contractor in both single and repeated games. A final area for future research would be
the implementation of this model in real life case studies.
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3.A Overview of Notation
Table 3.5 presents an overview of all the notation introduced in this chapter.
Model Variable Description
C
on
tr
ac
t
M
od
el
C,D, S The observed cost, duration and scope at the end of the project.
IC , ID, IS Cost, duration and scope incentive awarded.
Ct, Dt, St Targets for cost, duration and scope as specified in the contract.
sCr Sharing ratio for (piecewise) linear cost incentive contract in region r.
vDr , v
S
r Region valuation parameter for piecewise linear duration/scope incentive.
BCr , B
D
r , B
S
r The lower bound of cost, duration or scope region r in a (piecewise) linear contract.
UBC , UBD, UBS Upper bound of the region over which a cost, duration or scope incentive is spread using a non-linear contract.
LBC , LBD, LBS Lower bound of the region over which a cost, duration or scope incentive is spread using a non-linear contract.
ICmax, I
D
max, I
S
max Greatest incentive amount which can be awarded in a non-linear cost, duration or scope contract.
ICmin, I
D
min, I
S
min Greatest disincentive amount which can be awarded in a non-linear cost, duration or scope contract.
Dt
ls
Target date associated with a lump-sum duration incentive amount.
ID
ls
Incentive amount for a lump-sum duration incentive clause.
T
ra
de
-O
ff
Di, Sj , Ek The attainable values for duration, scope and effort as defined by a trade-off model.
∆Di,∆Sj ,∆Ek Attainable trade-off points for duration, scope and effort, defined as a distance to their lowest cost option.
∆CDi ,∆C
S
j ,∆C
E
k
The impact on the cost of selecting duration, scope and effort mode i, j and k respectively.
Cmin The lowest attainable cost for the project.
SD, SS , SE The slope of the relationship between the cost (dependent) and duration, scope and effort (independents).
mba Slope multiplicator, max impact of dimension b on the slope of the relationship between dimension a and the cost.
CMD, CMS , CME The convexity magnitude for the relation between C (dependent) and D, S and E (independent) respectively.
C
on
tr
ac
t
E
va
lu
at
io
n
E [NOG] Expected Net Owner Gain
Ecost
l
Cost of effort
Itot
l
Total incentive awarded in scenario l
NCGl Net contractor gain for scenario l
ROIE Average ROI for effort investments by the contractor.
NCG
adj
l
Net contractor gain for scenario l taking opportunity cost into account
NOGl The value the owner derives from scenario l
Cl, Dl, Sl, El The cost, duration, scope an effort associated with scenario l.
µD, µls, µS The monetary valuation of time, deadline and scope of the owner
RNCG
adj
l
Relative net contractor gain: NCGadj
l
rescaled to [0, 1]
RNOGl Relative net owner gain: NOGl rescaled to [0, 1]
MD Mean deviation, a measure for the pay-off alignment
MAD Mean absolute deviation, a measure for the pay-off alignment
Itotmax The maximal attainable incentive amount for the contractor
LB
Itotmax
A lower bound for the maximal incentive amount which can be earned by the contractor
RItot The range of the incentive earnings by the contractor
DL External deadline relevant to the project owner.
Table 3.5: Overview of model parameters
3.B Derivation of the CM Metric
The basic definition of the CM metric is as follows:
CM = A
A+B
(3.32)
The variable A can be eliminated by calculating the surface of the triangle as follows:
A+B = ∆Dn ·∆Cn2
A = ∆Dn ·∆Cn2 −B
(3.33)
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And rewriting CM as:
CM = A
A+B
=
∆Dn·∆Cn
2 −B
∆Dn·∆Cn
2 −B +B
= 1− 2 ·B∆Dn ·∆Cn
(3.34)
The value of B can be calculated as:
B =
n∑
i=1
[(∆Di −∆Di−1)∆Ci−1+
1
2(∆Di −∆Di−1)(∆Ci −∆Ci−1)
] (3.35)
In case of generated convex curves it can be assumed that the step size of the duration
are always identical and therefore all equal to ∆Dnn . This means the formula can be
simplified to:
B = ∆Dn
n
n∑
i=1
[
∆Ci−1 +
∆Ci −∆Ci−1
2
]
(3.36)
3.C Linear Model for Trade-off Model Generation
The objective of this model is to create the smoothest possible convex curve which starts
and ends at the start and end points of the linear approximation curve respectively. The
model uses the variable ∆∆Ci to signify the change in cost between two consecutive
points on the trade off curve: ∆Ci = ∆Ci−1 + ∆∆Ci. The graphical interpretation of
these variables is illustrated in the right panel of figure 3.5. Hence, this variable is indexed
i = 1, ..., n. Since the curve is non-decreasing and convex it is known that each of these
variables is positive (see equation 3.38) and at least as large as the preceding variable (see
equation 3.39).
The smoothness of the curve can be measured by the difference between two consecutive
∆∆Ci variables, which indicate the change in cost caused by a change of an independent
variable (duration, scope or effort). To avoid having linear segments where the scope is
not increased, the minimal difference between these ∆∆Ci variables is maximised. Doing
this guarantees that the continual slope increase over the consecutive discrete steps is as
large as possible. This minimal difference is represented by the variable ∆∆∆Cmin in the
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model. The input parameters required for the linear model are the greatest potential cost
increase (∆Cn), as can be determined by the linear approximation of the curve, and the
desired convexity of the curve (CM).
max ∆∆∆Cmin (3.37)
s.t.
0 ≤ ∆∆C1 i = 1, ..., n (3.38)
∆∆Ci−1 ≤ ∆∆Ci i = 2, ..., n (3.39)
n∑
i=1
∆∆Ci = ∆Cn (3.40)
∆∆∆Cmin ≤ ∆∆C1 (3.41)
∆∆∆Cmin ≤ ∆∆Ci −∆∆Ci−1 i = 2, ..., n (3.42)
CM = 1− 2
n ·∆Cn
n∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
∆∆Cj +
1
2∆∆Ci
 (3.43)
Equation 3.38 stipulates that the ∆Ci curve should always be an increasing function
(see axioms 1-3). The convexity of the trade-off curve is guaranteed by equation 3.39
which states that the consecutive steps have to be of non-decreasing magnitude. Equation
3.40 ensures that the final point of the convex trade-off curve coincides with the linear
approximation on which this curve is based, the latter is defined as the parameter ∆Cn.
The value of the smallest difference between the consecutive steps is assigned by equations
3.41 and 3.42. Finally, equation 3.43 guarantees that the resulting curve has the desired
convexity magnitude specified by the parameter CM .
4
A Parallel Multi-Objective Scatter Search for
Optimising the Owner’s Incentive Contract Design
Where chapter 3 used a brute-force enumeration approach to search for an optimal contract
structure, the main objective of this research is the design of a meta-heuristic optimisation
procedure which can be used by the owner of a project in order to maximise her/his
expected profits as well as the degree to which the motivations of both parties are aligned.
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4.1 Introduction
A novel technique to optimise the structure of the incentivised contractual agreement
between the project owner and the contractor who executes the project is presented in
this chapter. The goal of this technique is to optimise the contract from the perspective
of the contractor, maximising the expected value of the owner and the alignment of the
motivation of both actors, preventing conflicts of interest which can potentially result in
suboptimal results for the project owner (Mu¨ller and Turner, 2005; Turner, 2004).
Because the delegation of a complete project to a contractor is a highly complex under-
taking, an explicit contract which contains all the deliverables as well as the remuneration
for the contractor in sufficient detail is impractical (Van Weele and van der Puil, 2013).
The best alternative for such a high-complexity environment is an alliance between the
two economic actors, effectively forming a single actor for the duration of the project (Rose
and Manley, 2011; Walker et al., 2002). However, the fugitive nature which is inherent to
a project often causes the substantial investment required by both parties to create such a
partnership to be disproportionate to the expected returns of the project. Because of this,
contracts that use incentive clauses are often used as a viable middle ground between an
explicit contract and a partnership of the two actors (Bower et al., 2002).
Investigating, and by extension optimising, such contract structures requires a system-
atic view on the relationship between the owner of the project, and the contractor who is
responsible for executing the project. To do this, the framework proposed in chapter 3 is
used in this research. This framework consists of three components, the first of which is
the contract model, which describes the nature of the incentive clauses and targets which
are set in a specific agreement. These incentive clauses are linked to the three outcome
dimensions which are traditionally used in project management literature: cost, duration
and scope (Marques et al., 2011). The second component of this framework is the trade-
off model, which is used to represent the nature of the project itself as a set of discrete
trade-off points. Specifically, these trade-offs strike a balance between the three tradi-
tional outcome dimensions, as well as the effort investment made by the contractor who
executes the project. The third and final component of the framework is the evaluation
model, which is used to calculate the value of a specific outcome of the project, given the
use of a specific contract. The dynamic of the complete framework considers the owner of
the project to be in full control of the contract model, effectively deciding which contract
structure will be used to govern the project. Similarly, the contractor controls the choice
of a trade-off point, representing her/his control over the manner in which the project is
executed. The precise dynamic of this model will be discussed in further detail in section
4.3.
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Where chapter 3 used a brute-force enumeration approach to search for the optimal
contract structure, the main objective of this research is the design of a meta-heuristic
optimisation procedure which can be used by the owner of a project in order to maximise
her/his expected profits as well as the degree to which the motivations of both parties are
aligned. As such, this research departs from existing literature (see section 4.2) because
of its proactive and prescriptive nature, whereas the majority of existing research has
focussed on the types of contracts used in practice, as well as their perceived effectiveness.
To achieve this goal, a multiobjective scatter search is designed and tested on a set
of problem instances. This type of heuristic is highly suitable to deal with the complex
solution space created by the wide range of possible contract structures. The reason for this
being the inherent mechanisms of the scatter search procedure which conserve diversity
in the solution population. The experiments show that the performance of this heuristic
significantly exceeds that of a brute force approach which attempts to scan a broad area
of solution space (see section 4.7).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 gives an overview
of the existing literature on incentive contracting, as well as multi-objective optimisation
techniques. Next, the modelling approach which is used to describe the problem is dis-
cussed in greater detail in section 4.3. The dynamic of this model is further illustrated
using a small-scale example in section 4.4. Next, the parallel multi-objective scatter search
(MOSS) is described in sections 4.5 and 4.6. Finally, the computational experiments are
discussed in section 4.7 prior to formulating a general conclusion of the research in section
4.8.
4.2 Literature on Multi-Objective Optimisation Methods
The first step in optimising any situation is the formulation of the objective function.
Traditionally a single objective is chosen, such as the maximisation of profits or the min-
imisation of costs. However, the contract design problem studied in this research requires
multiple objectives to be optimised. Specifically, the owner is not only interested in max-
imising his expected profits, but also interested in aligning the objectives of the contractor
with his own objectives as much as possible. Hence, in order to present an adequate
solution to these (potentially) conflicting objectives, a Pareto frontier containing non-
dominated solution is required.
One of the traditional methods of creating such a set of solutions is a weighted-sum
approach which scalarizes a set of objectives into a single objective (Burke and Kendall,
2005). By iteratively varying the weights which are allocated to the separate objectives and
re-running the solution algorithm a varied set of solutions can be created. Nevertheless,
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such techniques are often incapable of guaranteeing an evenly distributed spread across
the true efficient frontier (Deb, 2001).
Multi-objective population based meta-heuristics are an alternative solution technique
which does not require the aggregation of the different dimensions into a single objec-
tive. These techniques are capable of searching in multiple dimensions simultaneously.
Research interest in these techniques has steadily increased during the last two decades
(Zhou et al., 2011). Moreover, these solution techniques have proven their effectiveness
within a project management context (Meier et al., 2016). However, the complex nature
of the contract design problem, which requires both the nature of the contract as well
as the contract’s parameters to be determined, decreases the effectiveness of traditional
evolutionary algorithms which rely on relatively simple chromosome encodings.
The scatter search meta-heuristic has been proposed as a technique which uses a similar
population-based approach but uses a more systemic way to search the solution space,
increasing its effectiveness for complex problems (Glover et al., 2000). Scatter search
algorithms have already proven their efficiency for other operational project management
challenges (Ranjbar et al., 2009; Vandenheede et al., 2015). Moreover, several authors
have already shown that multi-objective adaptations of the scatter search procedure are
capable of exceeding or matching the current state of art for multi objective optimisation
(Bajestani et al., 2009; Beausoleil, 2006; Ebrahim et al., 2009; Nebro et al., 2008; Rahimi-
Vahed et al., 2007; Tavakkoli-Moghaddam et al., 2010). Based on these promising results, a
dedicated multi-objective scatter search (MOSS) has been designed for incentive contract
optimisation. The details of this procedure are outlined in section 4.5. Moreover, the
performance of this heuristic was improved further by taking advantage of recent advances
in parallel computing, allowing increased calculation speed as well as the parallel creation
of multiple populations (see section 4.6).
4.3 Problem Framework
This section describes the framework which is used to analyse the contract optimisation
problem faced by the contractor. An overview of this framework is given by figure 3.1,
which shows how the different models contained within this framework interact. This
framework has already been discussed in detail in chapter 3, but is summarised here for
the convenience of the reader.
The framework considers two separate actors: the owner and the contractor. The for-
mer controls the properties of the contractual arrangement which governs the relationship,
and the latter is in full control over the execution of the project, which is represented as
a discrete set of trade-off points (cost (C), duration (D), scope (S) and effort (E)).
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The interaction between these two actors can be viewed as a sequential two-player game
where the owner makes the first move by defining a contract, and the contractor makes the
second move by determining the manner in which the project will be executed by choosing
one of the trade-off points. Specifically, it is assumed that the contractor is a profit-
maximising actor who will always select the option that maximises his expected outcome.
Hence, the owner can determine the performance of a contract using backwards induction
in order to calculate his expected profit (expected net owner gain E[NOG]). However, the
owner is not solely interested in this expected value, the degree to which the contractor’s
objectives are aligned with his own objectives for the other possible outcome scenario’s
is also important. This alignment is one of the main reasons why incentive contracts are
adopted, since they serve as a safeguard against undesired contractor behaviour. The
methodology used to calculate these outcomes is captured by the evaluation model.
Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 provide a short summary on each of the models contained
in the framework. The notation used for the equations used in this model is summarised
in appendix 4.B.
4.3.1 The Contract Model
The contract model is a representation of the quantitative targets and incentives which
are contained in an agreement between the owner and contractor. The model can be used
to describe linear, piecewise linear and quadratic non-linear incentive clauses linked to the
cost, duration and scope dimension of the project. Hence, the total incentive awarded
(Itot) based on a contract is simply the sum of the incentive awarded for the cost (IC),
duration (ID) and scope (IS) of the project.
Within the dynamic of the framework, the owner of the project decides the structure
(archetype) of the incentive clauses as well as the parameters such as the targets and
sharing ratios for each of the three outcome dimensions. Once this is done, the contract
model uses these parameters set by the owner to compute a total incentive amount for
any given input combination of cost, duration and scope.
Generally speaking, this means that the creation of a contract within this framework
requires the owner to take two decisions. Firstly, the structure (archetype) of the contract
has to be chosen for each of the outcome dimensions. Such archetypes can be linear
with a given number of segments or quadratic, and for the time dimension a lump-sum
linked to a specific deadline. Secondly, the owner has to determine the parameters of the
contract archetypes which have been selected for each outcome dimension (cost, duration
and scope). Especially the combination of the decision on the global structure with the
setting of the parameters greatly increases the size of the solution space. The MOSS
heuristic presented in this research takes advantage of this problem structure by using the
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structure (i.e. the combination of archetypes for the different dimensions) as a measure for
the contract diversity in the solution population (see section 4.5).
To summarise: the contract used by the project owner consists of three distinct
contract clauses, and each of these clauses is linked to a specific outcome dimension:
cost, duration or scope. The total incentive awarded is a combination of the incentive
amount for the separate outcome dimensions, as calculated by the individual clauses in
the contract. These contract clauses belong to a specific archetype that defines the
nature of the equation which is used to calculate the incentive amount. An example of such
an archetype is the piecewise linear cost incentive with three segments shown in equation
3.2. Depending on the selected archetype a set of parameters has to be defined for
each contract clause. For the 3-piecewise linear contract in equation 3.2 this includes
the target (Ct), bounds (BCr ) and the sharing ratios (sCr ).
4.3.2 The Trade-off Model
In this chapter, the subcontractor’s decision regarding the way in which the project is
executed is modelled using a set of discrete trade-off points. Specifically, a subset of
the datasets containing such trade-off points made available by created in chapter 3 are
used to conduct the experiments described in section 4.7. The points in this dataset were
specifically constructed to adhere to a set of six axioms which describe the relation between
the four trade-off dimensions (see section 3.4.1).
All instances in the dataset have a total of 1331 modes from which the contractor can
choose. This number is reached by defining 11 discrete modes for the duration, scope and
effort dimensions and viewing the cost as the dependent variable. Hence, there are 113
possible combinations of duration, scope and effort - each associated with a specific cost.
The diversity of this dataset is guaranteed by varying a set of parameters that define
the topological structure of the project. These parameters are listed in the top part
of table 4.1. Specifically, the slopes of the duration, scope and effort dimensions, the
multiplicators which define the interaction effects between two dimensions, the minimal
project cost, as well as parameters which express how convex the relationship between
the different dimensions and the project cost is. The subset which is used contains one
instance with the default parameters (indicated in bold in the table), plus one instance for
each of the possible variations on the parameters for a total of 17 sets of trade-off points.
For an in-depth look at the interpretation of these parameters, the reader is referred to
chapter 3.
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Model Parameter Symbol Values
Trade-Off
Basic slopes |SD|, |SS |, |SE | {0.5, 0.75,1, 1.25, 1.5}
Multiplicators mSD, ..., mSE {0, 0.1,0.2, 0.3, 0.4}
Minimal cost Cmin max(∆C) ·
{ 1
0.10 ,
1
0.20 ,
1
0.30 ,
1
0.40 ,
1
0.50
}
Convexity CMD, CMS , CME {0, 0.0625,0.125, 0.1875, 0.25}
Evaluation
Max Effort cost Ecostm max(∆C) · {0.25, 0.375,0.5, 0.625, 0.75}
Effort ROI ROIE {0, 0.05,0.1, 0.15, 0.2}
Time value µD max(∆C) · {0.5, 0.75,1, 1.25, 1.5}
Deadline value µls max(∆C) · {0, 0.05,0.1, 0.15, 0.2}
Scope valuation µS max(∆C) · {0.5, 0.75,1, 1.25, 1.5}
Table 4.1: Dataset
4.3.3 The Evaluation Model
The evaluation model is used to calculate the impact of using a specific contract for
a certain project (the latter being represented by a discrete set of trade-off points, see
section 4.3.2). This is achieved by first calculating the contractor’s monetary valuation for
each of the trade-off points, including the incentive awarded according to the contract as
well as the cost of their effort investment. Similarly, a value for each of the trade-off points
can be calculated for the owner. This value is based on the outcome for each of the three
outcome dimensions perceived by the owner: cost, duration and time. The value of the
latter to dimensions also being translated into monetary terms. Similarly, the incentives
which are being paid in each of these scenario’s are also taken into account in the owner’s
valuation. Given the pay-off of both actors for each method of executing the project, the
expected outcome for both parties is given by the option which maximises the profit of
the contractor. Moreover, the alignment of the pay-offs over the various execution modes
can also be evaluated. The following paragraphs provide more information on how these
variables are calculated and how contract performance is evaluated.
This procedure can be formulated as a mixed-integer multi-objective optimisation prob-
lem using expressions 4.2 to 4.11. This optimisation problem aims to maximise the ex-
pected net owner gain (E[NOG]), while at the same time minimising the mean absolute
deviation (MAD) and the mean deviation (MD), two metrics which represent the degree
to which the pay-offs of the owner and the contractor are aligned. The sole decision vari-
able available to the owner is the total incentive amount (Itotl ) associated with a project
execution mode l. Nevertheless, it is only possible for the owner to manipulate these vari-
ables indirectly by deciding the structure and the parameters of the contractual agreement
(see section 4.3.1).
Equation 4.3 determines the value of the net owner gain (NOGl) for each possible
execution mode l of the project. This value is equal to the owner value (OV ) function
86 Chapter 4
which translates the cost, duration and scope of the project into a monetary valuation for
the owner, minus the total incentive (Itotl ) which has been awarded by the owner for a
given outcome l. The owner valuation function is simply the sum of the owner value for
each of these three dimensions: OV (Cl, Dl, Sl) = OV C(Cl) + OV D(Dl) + OV S(Sl). The
monetary valuation of the cost dimension to the owner is simply the inverse of the incurred
costs: OV C(Cl) = −Cl. However, for the other two outcome dimensions some parameters
have to be defined in order to convert time and scope units into monetary amounts. For
the duration dimension, this is done by specifying a monetary value per unit of time (µD),
as well as a monetary value (µls) linked to a specific deadline (DL). The owner value
function of the project duration can then be defined as:
OV D(Dl) =
{
µD · (−Dl) if Dl ≥ DL
µD · (−Dl) + µls if Dl < DL
(4.1)
The valuation of the scope dimensions is done in a similar manner, but no specific
lump sum value is used for this dimension. Given that µS is the monetary value of an
unit of scope to the owner, the owner valuation of the scope dimension simply becomes:
OV S(Sl) = µS · Sl.
The net contractor gain (NCGadjl ) is easier to calculate, as is shown by equation 4.4.
This value is simply equal to the total incentive amount earned (Itotl ), minus the cost of
the additional effort invested by the contractor (Ecostl ), multiplied by the average return
on investment the contractor attains in his other projects (ROIE). This is adjustment is
the reason why net contractor gain is denoted as NCGadj .
Equation 4.5 continues by defining that the expected net owner gain is equal to the
owner gain in the scenario where the contractor’s gains are the highest. Should multiple
scenario’s yield an equal gain for the contractor, the contractor is assumed to select the
scenario which yields the highest benefit to the owner. The reason for this being that the
contractor has no motivation to decrease the owner’s profits, and will always benefit from
having satisfied clients when competing for future business.
Equations 4.6 until 4.9 define the owner’s and contractor’s gain in relative terms
(RNOGl and RNCGadjl ) prior to using these relative quantities to calculate the mean
deviation (MD) and the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the pay-offs. These devia-
tions are used to express how good the motivations of the owner and contractor have been
aligned by the incentive agreement.
Finally, two constraints are imposed in order for the solutions to be considered valid.
Equation 4.10 ensures that the contractor’s optimal gain (maxl(Itotl )) exceeds a predefined
lower bound (LBItotmax). Various different values for this parameter can be observed in the
literature (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989; Tang et al., 2008; Veld and Peeters, 1989), ranging
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from 0.7% to 5% of the total project cost. Based on these observations, the value of this
parameters was set at 5% of the minimal project cost. Similarly, equation 4.11 ensures
that the minimal and maximal outcome values for the contractor are at least as broad as a
predefined range. This is done to ensure that the contractor is in fact motivated to locate
the optimum trade-off point for the contract, should there be no significant variation in his
outcomes, it is unlikely that any effort would be spent in locating the optimum. For the
experiments conducted in this research, the lower limit (RItot) for the range of contractor
outcomes was set to 7.5% of the minimal project cost. This value is similar to the amount
of variation which can be observed in contracts 3 in the literature (the minimal return for
the contractor).
max
(
E[NOG], 1
MAD
,
1
|MD|
)
(4.2)
Subject to:
NOGl = OV (Cl, Dl, Sl)− Itotl ∀l ∈ L (4.3)
NCGadjl = I
tot
l − Ecostl (1 +ROIE) ∀l ∈ L (4.4)
E[NOG] = max
[
NOGl|NCGadjl = maxl [NCG
adj
l ]
]
(4.5)
RNOGl =
NOGl −NOGmin
NOGmax −NOGmin ∀l ∈ L (4.6)
RNCGadjl =
NCGadjl −NCGadjmin
NCGadjmax −NCGadjmin
∀l ∈ L (4.7)
MD = 1
NL
NL∑
l=1
[
RNCGadjl −RNOGl
]
(4.8)
MAD = 1
NL
NL∑
l=1
∣∣∣RNCGadjl −RNOGl∣∣∣ (4.9)
max
l
(Itotl ) ≥ LBItotmax (4.10)
max
l
(Itotl )−min
l
(Itotl ) ≥ RItot (4.11)
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Similarly to the trade-off model (see section 4.3.2) a number of parameters define the
nature of the evaluation model. These parameters which also appear in the equations that
define the optimisation model are listed in the lower part of table 4.1. These values have
also been derived from the dataset created in chapter 3. Again, the values of the basic
scenario are indicated in bold, and one instance is included for each of the variations of
the parameters, resulting in a total of 21 different sets of parameters for the evaluation
model.
4.4 Case Study
This section contains a small example which illustrates the methodology in this research.
This example is based on a real project.
4.4.1 Introduction
The Belgian Sea Electricity consortium has ordered the installation of twenty-four wind
turbines on the Thornton Bank in the North Sea, just off the Belgian coastline. The actual
work is to be carried out by a contractor, who went through the selection procedure. Now
that the precise scope of the work to be performed is known, the project owner (Sea
Electricity) has to decide on the structure of the contractual agreement. The expected
budget for this contract is 150 million Euro.
4.4.2 Project Properties
Prior to the design of the incentive structure for the project, experts from both parties
have agreed on some basic properties of the project. For the duration of the project both
parties agreed that a reasonable execution of the project is unlikely to exceed a total of
550 days (D ≤ 550). However, the use of progressively more expensive equipment could
possibly reduce this duration down to a total of 400 days (D ≥ 400). Ceteris paribus -
assuming that the other dimensions are fixed at their minimum cost level - the approximate
cost of this reduction would be 40 million Euro.
One of the key factors that determines the profitability of offshore wind turbines is
the uptime of the turbines. Hence, it was deemed sensible by the owner to specify an
incentive based on the reliability of the turbines during their first year of operations. The
minimal required uptime percentage was set at 60%, below this level the contractor could
face serious legal consequences. Nevertheless, it is possible for the contractor to deliver
the project with a higher expected uptime level by performing additional quality checks
during the installation process. However, an uptime percentage higher than 90% is deemed
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unattainable in the first year of operations. Evaluating the contractor’s performance based
on the perceived uptime was deemed to be both impractical since the effects could only
be measured one year after completion, as well as possible unfair since a large amount
of randomness affects the actually observed downtime. Hence, it was agreed that the
incentive would be based on the amount of quality checks that had been performed during
the installation process. This amount approximately doubled when the contractor aimed
for the best rather than the lowest acceptable uptime percentage. Within the framework
presented in section 4.3 this is easiest to quantify as a scope ranging from a value of 1
for the lowest acceptable number of checks (S ≥ 1), and a scope value 2 for the greatest
number of quality checks (S ≤ 2). Ceteris paribus, delivering the project at maximal scope
is estimated to be approximately 10 million Euro more expensive than delivering at the
minimally required scope (∆CSn = 107).
The contractor can also influence the project trade-offs by allocating more of his staff
and resources to this project. Practically, this means moving these production factors
from other projects to this project. This is expressed on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 is the
minimally required staff and 1 signifies the largest useful staff allocation (E ≤ 1, E ≥ 0).
Ceteris paribus, the maximal impact of this additional effort is estimated at 10 million
Euro.
Using this basic information, as well as information on the interaction effects, a set of
216 execution modes was created for the project by assuming that each of the dependent
dimensions could be set at one of six discrete options (63 = 216). A subset of these points
is visualised by figure 4.1, the left panel shows the attainable trade-off points when the
invested effort by the contractor is minimal (E = 0). The right panel shows the attainable
points when the contractor invests the highest possible amount of effort (E = 1).
4.4.3 Project Evaluation
Naturally, the outcome of the project has an impact on the owner’s profits. For every day
the wind park is operational, the owner get a gross income of 230,400 Euro (24 Turbines
·5 MWTurbine ·80% uptime ·24hoursday ·100 euroMWh = 230, 400 euroday ⇒ µD = 230, 400). Moreover, the
owner has signed a contract with the energy distributor, promising that the project would
be completed in 475 days time (DL = 475). If this deadline is not met, the project owner
has to pay a penalty of 2.5 million Euro to the distributor (µls = 2.5 · 106).
The attained scope also has a significant impact on the energy production of the wind
farm in the first year. In case the highest attainable scope is reached, an uptime of 90%
can be assumed. However, in case only the lowest acceptable scope level is achieved, this
uptime will only be approximately 60%. From a financial perspective this comes down to
a 31.54 million Euro difference in gross income (µS = 31.54 · 106).
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Figure 4.1: Subset of attainable trade-off points in the sample project.
As stated above, the contractor can choose to allocate more of his own resources to
the project. To achieve the maximal benefit, the contractor will have to invest 5 million
Euro of his own resources (Ecostl = 5 · 106). Note that in case he decides to invest these
resources in another project in his portfolio, he can expect to earn a return on investment
of 10% (ROIE = 0.1).
4.4.4 Contract Options
The owner now has the task of designing the most adequate incentive scheme to maximise
his own profits, as well as the alignment of his pay-off and that of the contractor. In
this case, it is assumed that the choice has already been narrowed down to the contract
components presented in table 4.2. This table contains two potential contract components
for every incentive dimension, which means that a total of eight (23) integrated contracts
can be created through combining these different options by selecting one component for
each dimension.
4.4.5 Analysis
Using the methodology described above, the contract design problem of the owner in this
situation can be analysed. Assuming that the focus of the owner lies on having both the
maximal expected net owner gain E[NOG] as well as a minimal mean absolute deviation
MAD (to enable a simpler visualisation on a two-dimensional plane, the MD metric is not
considered in this example). The different scenarios can be plotted on a two dimensional
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ID Type Ct, Dt, St Linear Param. Non-linear Param. Lump-SumL P N BCr , BDr , BSr sCr , sDr , sSr Imax Imin LB UB Dtls IDls
C1 x 140 {0,140} {0.5, 0.75} - - - - - -
C2 x 140 {0,140} {0.75, 0.25} - - - - - -
D1 x 450 - - 10 -5 25 50 450 0.5
D2 x 450 - - 5 -10 60 100 460 1
S1 x 1.1 {0, 1.1} {15.8, 23.7} - - - - - -
S2 x 1.1 {0, 1.1, 1.3} {15.8, 23.7, 15} - - - - - -
Table 4.2: Sample contract components
representation (see figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Analysis of the example project.
Due to the small number of options considered, it is easy to determine which contracts
are undesirable. Looking at figure 4.2, it is clear that contracts which are closer to the
top and left of the graph are more desirable. Moreover, a number of dominated contracts,
which have both a lower expected net owner gain and a higher level of deviations can
be distinguished. This is illustrated by the dotted lines, any contract which is to the
bottom right of a dotted line is considered to be an undesirable option. Hence, a Pareto
frontier containing three contracts is found. Which of these contracts is ultimately selected
depends on the preferences of the owner. A more risk prone owner will be more likely to
select the contract if the top right corner (C1−D2−S2), whereas a risk averse owner will
be more likely to trade in some of his gain for a better pay-off alignment and therefore a
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Category Parameter Ref ValuePC PPc PPv
Population size Good set size 4.5.1 200 80 {20,24,...,80}Diverse set size 4.5.1 100 50 {34,38,...,50}
Contract Max # Regions 4.5.1 8 8 8
Intensification
# Moves 1st run 4.5.2 50 25 25
# Moves per it 4.5.2 50 50 {10,14,...,50}
Inflow 4.5.2 true / false true / false true / false
Stopping criterion # Generations 4.5.3 100 10 {3,5,7,9}
Recombination
P(Good Parent) 4.5.4 0.5 0.5 {0.25,0.30,...,0.75}
P(2 Parents) 4.5.4 0.5 0.5 {0.25,0.30,...,0.75}
# Offspring 4.5.4 100 50 50
Table 4.3: Parameters for the MOSS heuristic
lower risk in case of unforeseen circumstances.
This simple example was presented to illustrate the contract design decision faced by
the owner of the project. The following section presents the multi-objective scatter search
procedure which was used to facilitate the owner’s contract design decision.
4.5 The MOSS Meta-Heuristic
As discussed in section 4.2, scatter search procedures have proven to be effective solution
mechanisms for complex multi-objective optimisation problems. The multi-objective scat-
ter search (MOSS) procedure proposed in this research is summarised in figure 4.5. This
figure shows that the proposed heuristic largely adheres to the basic steps used by earlier
authors (Glover et al., 2000):
1. Diversification generation
2. Subset generation method
3. Solution combination method
4. Improvement (Intensification) method
5. Reference set update method
Nevertheless, each of these methods has been tailored to the highly complex solution
space of the contract optimisation problem, specifically regarding the multi-dimensional
components of the contract structure. Each of these components will be discussed in detail
in the sections below.
Table 4.3 lists all the parameters used to tune the behaviour of the MOSS heuristic, as
well as the values used for the different implementations (PC, PPc and PPv - see section
4.6) of the heuristic. These parameters are used to define the population size, the nature
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Figure 4.3: Schematic overview of the MOSS heuristic.
of the contract, the number of intensification moves, the stopping criterion and the nature
of the solution recombination procedure. The sections below explain the precise dynamic
of the scatter search procedure, as well as the role of the parameters within this procedure.
4.5.1 Diversification Generation
The algorithm starts by generating a diverse set of solutions, that serve as the starting
point for the MOSS heuristic. The number of solutions in this initial set is equal to
the size of the good set plus the diverse set (see table 4.3). The diversity of the initial
population is guaranteed by evenly spreading the created contracts over all the archetypes
under consideration. Specifically, each of the contract dimensions (cost, duration and
scope) should have at least one contract of each archetype under consideration (linear,
piecewise linear with n segments, non-linear). The initial parameters for these contracts
(target, sharing ratios, incentive amounts,...) are set by drawing random numbers, which
of course have to respect the basic principles of sensible contract design. (e.g: The bounds
for piecewise linear contracts must have a correct position: the lower bound for the n-th
region must be larger than or equal to the bound for the (n− 1)-th region.)
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To prevent the complete elimination of a contract clause archetype, a lower bound
is defined for the size of the diverse set, which can be calculated as: 4 · (rmax + 1) − 3.
Where rmax is equal to the maximal number or regions allowed for the piecewise linear
archetypes (see table 4.3). This number is equal to the sum of the number of different
contract types used for all dimensions, minus the three archetypes that are guaranteed to
be present in the good population (one for each of the three contract clauses). Hence, this
formula represents the worst-case scenario where every contract in the good population
uses an identical archetype for each of the three outcome dimensions. The method used to
update the reference set in turn guarantees that no archetypes are permanently lost from
the population (see section 4.5.3). For the computational experiments presented in this
research, the maximal number of segments has been set to 8, resulting in a minimal size
of 33 for the diverse solution set.
The separate clauses which have been created for the incentive dimensions (cost, du-
ration and scope) are then combined at random in order to form a complete incentive
contract, which can be seen as the solution encoding for the problem at hand. Next, these
newly created contracts are passed to the intensification procedure (see section 4.5.2),
which performs an initial local search in order to improve the values of the randomly
chosen contract parameters.
4.5.2 Intensification Procedure
The local search procedure iteratively searches a better value for each of the contract
parameters. The outline of this procedure is described by algorithm 1. The procedure
randomises the order in which the incentive dimensions (cost, duration and scope) are
searched, as well as the order in which the parameters of these contracts are searched. The
archetypes for the contract clauses remain unchanged during the intensification procedure.
Algorithm 1 Intensification Procedure
1: procedure local search(solution, int nbMoves, bool inflow)
2: contractComponents ← [C,D, S]
3: contractComponents.randomShuﬄe
4: for dim in contractComponents do
5: parameters ← [p1, p2, ..., pn]
6: parameters.randomShuﬄe
7: for p in parameters do
8: for i in 1 to nbMoves do
9: newSolution ← solution
10: newSolution.dim.p← rand | constraints
11: if newSolution is infeasible then
12: continue
13: if newSolution  solution then
14: solution ← newSolution
15: else if inflow then
16: if not (newSolution ≺ solution) then
17: candidateSet.add(newSolution)
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The procedure changes one of the contract’s parameters to a random value, and verifies
whether this move satisfies the conditions imposed regarding the minimal earnings and the
minimal range (see section 4.3.3). Next, the procedure verifies if the newly created solution
dominates the original solution. If this is the case, the newly created solution replaces the
old solution. The number of new values that are tested is determined by the nbMoves
parameter. As shown in table 4.3, this parameter is given a different value depending on
whether the procedure is being called for the first round of intensification, or during one
of the further iterations of the heuristic.
The inflow parameter (see table 4.3) controls what happens when the newly created
solution does not dominate the original solution. If inflow is allowed the algorithm verifies
if the new solution is dominated by the old solution, if this is not the case the newly created
solution may also be a Pareto efficient solution and is therefore added to the set of solution
candidates. When inflow is not allowed, the newly created solution is simply discarded.
Whereas allowing inflow potentially improves the quality of the good and diverse solution
sets, this may cause a substantial inflation of the required computation time due to the
larger number of solutions that have to be considered to construct the good and diverse
solution sets.
4.5.3 Reference Set Update Method
As shown by figure 4.5, the reference set consists of two distinct populations: the good
set and the diverse set. The latter is used to guarantee a better search of the solution
space by favouring solutions which are different from those already included in the overall
population to be used in recombinations. Specifically for the problem investigated in this
research, the diverse set guarantees that no contract archetypes are completely removed
from the reference set.
Because the problem which is optimised has multiple objectives, the way in which the
good and diverse populations are updated is more complex than for optimisation problems
with a single objective. The update method first creates a new set of good solutions, using
Pareto-optimality as the basic inclusion criterion. Once the set of good solutions has been
created, the algorithm scans the remainder of the candidate solution set for solutions to
include in the diverse solution pool. The acceptance condition for the diverse solution pool
is based on whether or not a contract of a similar structure (i.e. the same archetypes for
the respective outcome dimensions) is already included in the good or diverse populations.
When several contracts have identical diversity scores, the tie is broken by measuring the
crowding distance of the solutions in the outcome dimensions. The update procedures
for both the good and diverse populations are summarized by algorithm 2 and 3, and are
described in detail in the remainder of this section.
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Algorithm 2 Update Good Population
1: procedure update good population(int goodSetSize)
2: candidateSet = candidateSet ∪ goodSet
3: goodSet ← {}
4: while | goodSet |< goodSetSize do
5: /* Extract a Pareto front P from the set of candidate solutions */
6: P ← {i ∈ candidateSet : {i′ ∈ candidateSet : i′  i, i′ 6= i} = ∅}
7: /* Reduce the size of front P if needed */
8: while |P |> goodSetSize −|goodSet| do
9: P ← P \ {i} : {∃i′ ∈ P : ε(i, i′) = εmin, i 6= i′}
10: goodSet ← goodSet ∪ P
11: candidateSet ← candidateSet \ P
The good solution pool is created by iteratively selecting efficient frontiers from the set
of candidate solutions (see algorithm 2). If the size of the newly created efficient frontier
is less than or equal to the remaining number of solutions required in the good solution
pool, it is integrally added to the solution pool. If the number of solutions in the frontier
exceeds the total number of solutions still required in the good solution pool, solutions
are eliminated from the efficient frontier based on the crowding distance of the points (i.e.
the solutions which have the lowest euclidean distance to other solutions in the solution
space are eliminated from the frontier). The solutions belonging to the good solution pool
are stored in their respective Pareto frontiers as these have been used to create the good
solution pool. This information, specifically the ‘level’ of the Pareto frontier is later used
as a criterion for the subset generation method, as is explained in detail in section 4.5.4.
The purpose of the diverse solution pool is to guarantee that the algorithm continually
retains a focus on diversification. Specifically for the problem at hand, the purpose of the
diverse solution set is to avoid that complete archetypes or rare combinations of contract
archetypes disappear from the solution pool completely. The primary selection criterion for
accepting a criterion into the diverse solution pool is its diversity score. This is an integer
value in the range [0, 6], where a higher value represents a high structural diversity when
compared to solutions already in the good or diverse solution pools (the diversity score
of the candidates is continually updated as the diverse solution pool grows by iteratively
adding solutions). The interpretation of the seven different diversity scores is as follows:
• 6: 3/3 dimension archetypes not present.
• 5: 2/3 dimension archetypes not present.
• 4: 1/3 dimension archetypes not present.
• 3: 3/3 combinations not present.
• 2: 2/3 combinations not present.
• 1: 1/3 combinations not present.
• 0: Archetype combination already present in solution pool(s).
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The highest diversity scores [6, 4] focus on the number of dimensions (cost, duration and
scope) for which the contract archetype (e.g. a piecewise linear contract with 4 segments)
that is used is not yet included in either the good or diverse population. The lower diversity
scores [3, 0] test if combinations across dimensions of specific archetypes are already present
in the reference set.
The calculation of these diversity scores is best illustrated using a simple example.
Table 4.4 shows the members of the good and diverse populations, as well as the potential
entrants for the diverse population. This table lists the archetypes used for each of the
incentive dimensions of the contracts (e.g. 3PL represents a piecewise linear contract
with three segments, and NL represents a non-linear contract). In order to evaluate the
diversity of these candidates, both the good and diverse solutions have to be compared to
the candidate solutions.
Good Population
i Cost Duration Scope
1 3PL 3PL NL
2 2PL 1PL 1PL
3 3PL 3PL NL
Diverse Population
i Cost Duration Scope
1 NL 2PL 2PL
2 1PL NL 3PL
3 2PL 4PL 5PL
Diverse Candidates
i Cost Duration Scope
1 4PL NL 2PL
2 NL 1PL 2PL
Table 4.4: Diversity Score Example
The first step to calculate the diversity score is to verify if there is one or more of the
archetypes that has not yet been used for the specific dimension. For the example it can
be seen that the first candidate uses a 4PL archetype for the cost dimension, which has
not yet been used by any of the contracts in either the good or diverse population. The
archetypes for the duration and scope dimensions on the other hand have already been
used in other contracts (diverse population members 1 and 2). This observation results in
a diversity score of 4 for the first candidate for the diverse population.
For the second candidate it can immediately be verified that each of dimension specific
archetypes has already been used by one or more of the members in the good or diverse
population. Hence, it is already certain that the diversity score, which can be awarded
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to this candidate will not exceed 3. In order to determine the exact score the occur-
rence of archetype combinations has to be verified. Three different combinations can be
distinguished: cost-duration, cost-scope and duration-scope. When comparing the com-
binations to the good and diverse population it is apparent that both the cost-duration
and the duration-scope combinations of the second candidate are not yet present. The
combination of cost and scope archetypes (NL and 2PL) however is already present in
both the third member of the good population as well as the first member of the diverse
population. Based on these observations the diversity score of the second candidate can
be set to 2.
This diversity score calculation is used by algorithm 3, which shows how the diverse
population is updated. The procedure starts by adding the diverse solution pool from the
preceding iteration to the the pool of candidate solutions. Note that at this time the set
of candidate solutions is equal to the set of candidate solutions at the end of the update
of the good population (see algorithm 2). Next the diverse solution pool is emptied and
diverse solutions are added iteratively until the required number of solutions in the diverse
solution pool is attained.
Algorithm 3 Update Diverse Population
1: procedure update diverse population(int diverseSetSize)
2: candidateSet = candidateSet ∪ diverseSet
3: diverseSet = {}
4: while |diverseSet|< diverseSetSize do
5: candidateSet.updateDiverseRank()
6: newEntrant = ∅
7: maxDistance = 0
8: for s ∈ candidateSet | rank =rankmax do
9: s.eDist = 0
10: for i in goodSet do
11: s.eDist + = distance(s,i)
12: for i in diverseSet do
13: s.eDist + = distance(s,i)
14: if s.eDist > maxDistance then
15: newEntrant = s
16: maxDistance = s.eDist
17: diverseSet.add(newEntrant)
The loop starts by updating the diversity rank (∈ {0, 1, 2, ...6}) for each of the solutions
in the set of candidate solutions. The algorithm continues with the set of solutions which
attains the highest diversity rank. Among this set, the solution which has the greatest
euclidean distance to the set of solutions in the good population as well as the solutions
already included in the diverse solution set is added to the set of diverse solutions.
After the reference set has been updated (see # Generations in table 4.3, the algorithm
verifies whether a new iteration has to be started, or if the required number of generations
has been attained and the algorithm stops.
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4.5.4 Subset Generation Method
Figure 4.4 shows an outline of the subset generation method that selects solutions from the
good or diverse populations to be recombined to form new solution candidates using the
solution recombination method (see section 4.5.5). First the algorithm randomly decides
to use either two or three parents to form a new solution. Also according to a predefined
probability the algorithm decides for each individual parent whether it will be drawn from
the good or diverse pool (also see figure 4.5 for the basic outline of the procedure). Once
the algorithm has decided from which population (good or diverse) the parent will be
drawn, each solution has a certain probability of being chosen. The way in which these
probabilities are calculated differs between the good solution pool - where solutions are
selected based on their overall fitness - and the diverse solution pool, where the diversity
of a solution is the main selection criterion.
Generate Subset
2 Parent 3 Parent
P(2 Parents) 1 - P(2 Parents)
Parent 1 Parent 2 Parent 3Parent 1 Parent 2
Good 
Pool
Diverse 
Pool
P(Good Parent) 1 - P(Good Parent)
Figure 4.4: Subset Generation.
The selection probabilities of solutions in the good population are based on a two-stage
fitness assignment process for multi-objective optimisation which was proposed by Zitzler
et al. (2001). The set of points in the good solution pool (i ∈ G) is divided into the set
of points lying on the efficient Pareto front (P ) and the set of points that are dominated
(P ′) by the points on the Pareto front (hence: G = P ∪P ′). For each point on the Pareto
frontier a fitness score can be calculated as follows:
fi =
ni
|P ′|+1 ∀i ∈ P (4.12)
where ni is the number of points in P ′ that are dominated by the point i:
ni = |{j|i  j,∀j ∈ P ′}| ∀i ∈ P (4.13)
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As such, each point on the efficient frontier (i ∈ P ) receives a fitness score in the
range [0, 1[, where a lower score signifies a greater solution quality. Hence, the algorithm
is tailored to favour solutions situated in more sparsely populated regions of the solution
frontier. Next the fitness scores for the points in the set of dominated solutions are
calculated:
fj = 1 +
∑
i∈P |ij
fi ∀j ∈ P ′ (4.14)
Equation 4.14 assigns worse fitness values to solutions that are dominated my a larger
number of solutions on the Pareto frontier. Based on these fitness values, a selection
probability (Prob) for each member (i) in the good population (including both dominated
(set P ′) and non-dominated (set P ) solutions) can be defined as follows:
Prob(i) =
1
fi
1
|G|∑
j=1
fj
∀i ∈ G (4.15)
The selection probabilities of solutions in de diverse solution set (D) are calculated
based on the diversity scores di (see section 4.5.3). The motivation for this being that the
key attribute of solutions in the diverse solution pool is their diversity, rather than their
fitness value. Hence the selection probability of the solutions in the diverse solution set is
calculated as:
Prob(i) = di∑
di
∀i ∈ D (4.16)
4.5.5 Solution Recombination
The solution recombination procedure takes advantage of the three-dimensional structure
of the problem formulation. A newly combined solution simply inherits the cost, duration
and scope contract clauses from its parents. For a two parent crossover this means that
the new solution will receive one contract component (cost, duration or scope) from one
parent, and the remaining two components from the other parent. Similarly if a new
solution has three parents, the clauses for each of the dimensions will originate from a
different solution. Which parent provides which contract clause is decided randomly. This
procedure is visualised in figure 4.5, which shows a complete flowchart of the MOSS meta-
heuristic. The origin of the parents for these crossovers are determined by the subset
generation method (see section 4.5.4 and figure 4.4).
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4.6 Parallel Implementation of the MOSS Heuristic
Thanks to the increased adoption of multi-core processing power in recent decades, the
possibility of improving the performance of meta-heuristic procedures though parallelisa-
tion has received increasing attention by researchers (Alba et al., 2013). Parallelisation has
also been successfully applied to the scatter search meta-heuristic on multiple occasions
(Boz˙ejko and Wodecki, 2008; Garcıa-Lo´pez et al., 2003; Lo´pez et al., 2006). However,
to the best of the author’s knowledge no implementation of a parallelised multi-objective
scatter search as proposed in this research has been reported in the literature.
The two most convenient forms of parallelisation available for population based meta-
heuristics are the parallelisation of intensive computations on population members and the
use of multiple populations, each of which is assigned to a processor (Alba et al., 2013). The
former technique improves the algorithm performance by assigning each of the available
processing cores a part of the population on which local search moves, and consequently a
large number of objective function evaluations, are performed. This principle is illustrated
on figure 4.5, which shows that during the intensification phase of the algorithm the newly
created solutions are assigned to a specific core which performs the local search and then
returns the improved solution. The results of such a parallelisation technique are identical
to the results of a serial algorithm, but the required wall time can be decreased significantly.
Moreover, because each population member is a standalone solution, the algorithm does
not have to keep track of any shared resources (i.e. what is happing to the other solutions
in no way affects the solution currently being worked on). Because of this, the overhead
created by the parallelisation is negligible.
The second method uses parallelisation by creating separate populations which are
then searched by the separate processors. This improves the diversity of the search by al-
lowing different populations to evolve in different directions. Often times this diversity is
reinforced by using different starting points and/or parametrisations for the populations,
increasing the divergence of the different solution populations. The degree of commu-
nication between these generations can differ between implementations. At one end of
the spectrum the populations can be separated at the start of the algorithm and only
be reunited to observe the final solution when the algorithm is finished. Alternatively,
cross-breeding between different populations could be allowed after a certain number of
generations. The second parallel heuristic tested in this research is situated at the former
end of this spectrum. Effectively, this is similar to running the MOSS simultaneously on
multiple processors.
Both parallel approaches are tested and compared in this research. The first method
method will be dubbed parallel computations (PC). The second method which uses the
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Figure 4.5: MOSS heuristic with parallel computations.
available processing power to create multiple populations is referred to as parallel popula-
tions (PP ). This latter method is tested with both constant (PPc) and variable (PPv)
parameters.
The tests themselves were carried out on the STEVIN Supercomputer Infrastructure
at Ghent University, specifically on the Golett cluster which uses 2 Intel Haswell processors
with 24 cores on each node.
4.7 Computational Experiments
The computational experiments presented in this section compare the quality of the ef-
ficient frontiers created using several variations of the MOSS heuristic, as well as the
full-factorial heuristic used in chapter 3, and a weighted sum approach implemented using
Matlab’s non-linear solver (Messac, 2015). The dataset used for the experiment contains
38 problem instances, each of which consists of a trade-off and an evaluation model (see
sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3).
Section 4.7.1 gives a brief overview of the settings that have been used for the different
solution algorithms. Next, section 4.7.2 discusses the results from the computational
experiments.
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4.7.1 Solution Methods
4.7.1.1 Full Factorial search (FF)
This brute-force solution method was used in chapter 3 to investigate the relative per-
formance of multi-dimensional versus uni-dimensional incentive contracts. The solution
approach starts by creating a set of cost, duration and scope contract clauses and then
tests the performance of each possible combination. The parameters for these clauses are
set in the way which maximises the coverage over the possible (rational) parameter values.
A total of 189 cost, 4,536 duration and 225 scope contract clauses is used by this
solution technique, resulting in a total of 193 million unique combinations. Naturally this
method can only test a very small subset of the solution space, making it unlikely that
the true efficient frontier can be full approximated. For more information on the specific
parameter settings, the reader is referred to chapter 3.
4.7.1.2 Weighted sum approach (NLP)
A second yardstick for the performance of the MOSS heuristic is the traditional weighted
sum approach, implemented using Matlab’s non-linear solver. Because the dataset is
constructed in a way which guarantees that the objectives do not differ by multiple orders
of magnitude, the following maximisation objective function can be constructed without
having to rescale the different outcome objectives:
w1 · E[NOG] + w2 · 1
MAD
+ w3 · 1|MD| (4.17)
Where w1, w2 and w3 are the objective function weights that always satisfy w1 +w2 +
w3 = 1. Figure 4.6 shows how the non-linear optimisation model presented in section 4.3.3
has been implemented using the Matlab optimisation tools. All parameters describing the
problem environment and the constraints imposed on the solution are contained within
the base model, whereas the contract structure is included as a modular component.
Hence, the base model simply contains the logic expressed by equations 4.2 until 4.11.
The modular component on the other hand is a representation of the contract model (see
section 4.3.1). Hence, the modular component contains decision variables that represent
the parameters of the contract clauses, which in turn belong to a specific archetype that
was defined extraneously to the non-linear solution procedure.
Because the archetypes of the contract clauses are extraneous to the non-linear opti-
misation, covering the complete solution space requires looping over the various possible
archetype combinations. A disadvantage of this approach is that the time the solver spends
in attractive and unattractive archetype combinations is similar. However, including the
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Figure 4.6: Structure of the Matlab optimisation.
choice of archetype combination using additional variables prevented the model from con-
verging on a set of feasible solutions due to the increased complexity of the formulation.
The precise way in which the weights are altered is outlined in algorithm 4. The compu-
tation time allowed for the algorithm was set to 4,800 seconds, which is equivalent to 4
million evaluations of the objective function.
Algorithm 4 Call Matlab non-linear solver
1: procedure NLP(problemInstance)
2: for w1 = 0;w1 ≤ 1;w1+ = 0.25 do
3: for w2 = 0;w2 ≤ 1− w1;w2+ = 0.25 do
4: w3 = 1− w1 − w2
5: for c in cArchetypes do
6: for d in dArchetypes do
7: for s in sArchetypes do
8: callMatlabSolver(w1, w2, w3, c, d, s)
9: mergeFronts()
Chapter 4 105
4.7.1.3 MOSS Heuristic
Six different variations of the MOSS heuristic have been tested. The first difference is
based on whether parallel processors are used to reduce wall-time within a single popula-
tion, or to create multiple parallel populations that can be reunited when the algorithm
has finished. The latter category can be implemented using either identical or different
parameters for the parallel populations (see table 4.3). Finally, all of these heuristics can
be implemented with or without additional inflow allowed from the local search proce-
dure (see section 4.5.2 and algorithm 1). This results in six different variations: parallel
computations (PC), parallel populations with constant (PPc) as well as variable param-
eters (PPv), plus all these implementations with inflow from the intensification heuristic
allowed (PCi, PPci, and PPvi respectively).
The parameters for the MOSS heuristics (see table 4.3) have been calibrated using a
separate dataset to yield the best possible result within approximately 4 million schedule
evaluations. Hence, an equal number of schedule evaluations is used as in the Matlab
implementation, and substantially less schedule evaluations are used when compared to
the full-factorial search which uses 193 million schedule evaluations.
4.7.2 Experimental Results
The results from the computational experiments are summarised in figures 4.7 and 4.8.
The quality of the efficient frontiers is judged by looking at three critical aspects (Okabe
et al., 2003; Sarker and Coello, 2002): (i) The number of elements on the frontier; a greater
number implying a better coverage of the frontier. (ii) The proximity of the frontier to the
theoretically optimal efficient frontier, and (iii) the spread of the elements on the efficient
frontier. A statistical analysis of these results is also included in appendix 4.A.
4.7.2.1 Elements on the Frontier
The upper left panel of figure 4.7 shows the number of points on the frontiers created
by the various algorithms. It is immediately apparent that the full factorial search used
in chapter 3 has a factor of magnitude more points on the efficient frontier than any of
the other algorithms. This is a logical result from the much larger number of contracts
that are tested (193 million versus 4 million) when using the full factorial approach. The
next best performance in terms of the number of points is attained by the PC and PCi
algorithms, with considerably better performance attained by allowing inflow in the latter
algorithm. The MOSS implementations using parallel populations appear to have a larger
number of points on the global frontier when different parameters are used for the different
populations. For this performance metric, the performance of all MOSS heuristics are at
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of frontier quality.
least marginally superior to the non-linear weighted sum implementation.
4.7.2.2 Proximity to Global Frontier
One of the simplest metrics to measure the distance of a frontier to the global efficient
frontier is the fraction of points that is also present on the global efficient frontier. Since
the global efficient frontier is unknown for the problem instances studied in this chapter,
the global frontier is approximated by creating a frontier from all non-dominated points
found using the different solution techniques.
The values for this proximity metric are shown by the top right panel on figure 4.7.
From this panel it can be observed that although the full factorial method results in large
frontiers, these do not necessarily contain a proportionate amount of solutions that are on
the global frontier. The MOSS heuristic that uses a single population and allows inflow
is shown to yield the largest fraction of points that are also on the best known global
frontier.
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A more advanced metric to measure the distance to the global frontier is the averaged
Hausdorff distance ∆p (Schutze et al., 2012). This metric was introduced to avoid two
major pitfalls when calculating the distance to the global frontier: (i) convergence to zero
when the number of points increases, and (ii) over-sensitivity to the most distant points
in the frontiers. The precise calculation of this metric is explained in appendix 4.C.
The lower left panel of figure 4.7 shows the average results for this metric across the
different solution methods. Again, it can be observed that although the full factorial
approach yields a large frontier, this frontier is not necessarily closer to the global frontier.
Rather, it appears that the large size of the frontier generated by the FF method is
merely the result from the substantially larger number of contracts tested when using
this technique. The best performance for this metric is again attained by the PC and
PCi implementations of the MOSS heuristic. Markedly, the performance of the general
purpose weighted sum approach (NLP ) is exponentially worse when compared to the
MOSS heuristic proposed in this research.
4.7.2.3 Spread of Solutions on the Frontier
A fourth and final metric for the quality of the constructed frontier is the ‘efficient set
spacing’ (ESS) Sarker and Coello (2002), which can be calculated using equation 4.18.
In this equation n is equal to the number of elements in the Pareto set, and εimin is the
euclidean distance to the point closest to i in the set. εmin is equal to the average of
these minimal distances over all points in the set. A value of 0 for this metric can be
interpreted as an ideal distribution of the points in the Pareto frontier, greater values
indicating that the points are not spread evenly across the Pareto frontier. Similarly to
the average Hausdorff distance (see appendix 4.C), this metric has been calculated using
standardised values in the range [0, 1] for all three dimensions respectively.
ESS =
√√√√ 1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(εmin − εimin)2 (4.18)
The results for this metric are summarised in the bottom right panel of figure 4.7.
Again, the PCi implementation of the MOSS heuristic yields the best results, exceed-
ing the results from the full factorial search. Both the full factorial search and the PC
implementation of the MOSS heuristic also show a good spread when compared to the
performance of the other solution techniques, in particular the weighed sum approach.
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4.7.2.4 Resource Usage / CPU Time
Figure 4.8 shows gives an overview of the resource usage for the various solution algorithms.
Because of the parallel implementation both wall-time and CPU-time are reported. The
difference between these two quantities shows how good the workload is spread over the
various cores (i.e. a good wall-time which is significantly lower than the CPU time indicates
that the computations are well spread across the different processors). The chart clearly
shows that all solution procedures have been given a similar amount of CPU time (with
the exception of the full-factorial search which uses a significantly greater amount of CPU
time.)
The first key observation here is that the full factorial search (FF ) requires a substan-
tially larger amount of CPU and wall-time to complete its search of the solution space.
Moreover, as discussed in section 4.7.2 this excessive computation yields worse solutions
than the other solution techniques. Hence, by using either the PC or PCi implementation
of the MOSS heuristic, all performance criteria other than the number of points can be
improved whilst also providing a significant reduction in computation time. Nevertheless,
the PCi implementation that allows inflow has a substantially greater wall-time than the
PC implementation due to the increased time needed to update the Pareto frontier1. This
is effect is much less pronounced in the implementations using parallel populations, where
the size of the Pareto frontiers of the separate populations is substantially smaller.
1Note that the updating of the frontier is not distributed across different processors. This could be an
interesting extension for future research.
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4.8 Conclusions
This research presented a new optimisation heuristic for incentive contract design in a
project environment, from the perspective of the project owner. Computational exper-
iments confirmed that the proposed parallel multi-objective scatter search constructed
better frontiers in less computation time than the full-factorial search procedure used by
(Kerkhove and Vanhoucke, 2015a). Likewise, the heuristic was also shown to outperform
a variable weighted sum approach in terms of both speed and solution quality.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to extend the functionality of the
parallel population implementation of the algorithm by allowing interaction between the
various populations during the algorithm execution. Ideally this could be done using a
number of parameters that define the timing of the cross-breeding as well as the amount
of cross breeding at those times.
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4.A Statistical Analysis of Relative Algorithm Performance
This appendix investigates the statistical significance of the differences between the fron-
tiers constructed using the various heuristics proposed in this chapter. This is done by
means of an ANOV A test that checks if there is a significant difference across the various
heuristics as well as a Tukey’s range test that provides a one-on-one comparison of the
means (Tukey, 1949). The results of these statistics tests are reported for the four different
measures of frontier quality as were used in section 4.7.2.1.
4.A.1 Number of Points on the Frontier
For the analysis of the number of points on the frontier the full-factorial (FF ) solution
procedure is not included in the comparison. The reason for this is that the number of
points on the frontier for this technique is several orders of magnitude larger than for the
other algorithms. Testing showed that this difference also highly statistically significant
(< 0.000001%), but this large difference for this single technique skews the comparisons
between the other algorithms.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Number of Points on Frontier 6 263995 43999 39.91 <2e-16
Residuals 252 277828 1102
Table 4.5: ANOV A analysis for the number of points on the Pareto frontier
The results from the ANOV A analysis are shown in table 4.5. The key observation
here being that there are very significant differences in the means for the various heuristics.
These differences are investigated in more detail in table 4.6 which shows the one-on-one
comparison of means using Tukey’s range test. The final column of this table shows the
P-values for the average number of points on the frontier for the various solution methods.
From this it becomes apparent that the best performing heuristic (PCi) has a mean
which is significantly higher than all other solution methods (i.e. the technique performs
statistically better for this metric).
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heuristics diff lwr upr Adjusted P value
PC-NLP 49.054054 26.108547 71.99956 0
PCi-NLP 91.243243 68.297736 114.18875 0
PPc-NLP -1.054054 -23.999561 21.89145 0.9999994
PPci-NLP 1.027027 -21.91848 23.97253 0.9999995
PPv-NLP 11.324324 -11.621183 34.26983 0.764143
PPvi-NLP 14.297297 -8.64821 37.2428 0.5142334
PCi-PC 42.189189 19.243682 65.1347 0.0000023
PPc-PC -50.108108 -73.053615 -27.1626 0
PPci-PC -48.027027 -70.972534 -25.08152 0
PPv-PC -37.72973 -60.675237 -14.78422 0.0000372
PPvi-PC -34.756757 -57.702264 -11.81125 0.0002063
PPc-PCi -92.297297 -115.242804 -69.35179 0
PPci-PCi -90.216216 -113.161723 -67.27071 0
PPv-PCi -79.918919 -102.864426 -56.97341 0
PPvi-PCi -76.945946 -99.891453 -54.00044 0
PPci-PPc 2.081081 -20.864426 25.02659 0.999968
PPv-PPc 12.378378 -10.567129 35.32389 0.6802411
PPvi-PPc 15.351351 -7.594156 38.29686 0.4245007
PPv-PPci 10.297297 -12.64821 33.2428 0.8353993
PPvi-PPci 13.27027 -9.675237 36.21578 0.603955
PPvi-PPv 2.972973 -19.972534 25.91848 0.9997413
Table 4.6: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for the number of points on the Pareto frontier
4.A.2 Fraction of Points on Global Frontier
A similar analysis as for the number of points on the frontier is repeated for the second
metric: the fraction of points that lies on the global frontier. Table 4.7 shows the result
from the ANOV A analysis, and table 4.8 shows the results from the pairwise compar-
isons. These results indicate that the superior performance of the PCi heuristic is highly
statistically significant for this metric as well.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Frac Points on Global 7 10.1 1.4426 69.48 <2e-16
Residuals 288 5.98 0.0208
Table 4.7: ANOV A analysis for the fraction of points that lie on the global Pareto frontier
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heuristics diff lwr upr Adjusted P value
NLP-FF -0.117039958 -0.21933347 -0.014746452 0.012724
PC-FF 0.131095342 0.02880184 0.233388849 0.0028414
PCi-FF 0.449918812 0.34762531 0.552212319 0
PPc-FF -0.097383788 -0.19967729 0.004909719 0.0749652
PPci-FF -0.09874859 -0.2010421 0.003544917 0.067162
PPv-FF -0.107203221 -0.20949673 -0.004909715 0.0324942
PPvi-FF -0.09695835 -0.19925186 0.005335156 0.0775453
PC-NLP 0.248135301 0.14584179 0.350428808 0
PCi-NLP 0.56695877 0.46466526 0.669252277 0
PPc-NLP 0.019656171 -0.08263734 0.121949678 0.9990152
PPci-NLP 0.018291368 -0.08400214 0.120584875 0.9993845
PPv-NLP 0.009836737 -0.09245677 0.112130244 0.9999906
PPvi-NLP 0.020081608 -0.0822119 0.122375115 0.9988684
PCi-PC 0.31882347 0.21652996 0.421116976 0
PPc-PC -0.22847913 -0.33077264 -0.126185623 0
PPci-PC -0.229843932 -0.33213744 -0.127550426 0
PPv-PC -0.238298564 -0.34059207 -0.136005057 0
PPvi-PC -0.228053693 -0.3303472 -0.125760186 0
PPc-PCi -0.5473026 -0.64959611 -0.445009093 0
PPci-PCi -0.548667402 -0.65096091 -0.446373895 0
PPv-PCi -0.557122033 -0.65941554 -0.454828527 0
PPvi-PCi -0.546877162 -0.64917067 -0.444583655 0
PPci-PPc -0.001364802 -0.10365831 0.100928704 1
PPv-PPc -0.009819434 -0.11211294 0.092474073 0.9999908
PPvi-PPc 0.000425437 -0.10186807 0.102718944 1
PPv-PPci -0.008454631 -0.11074814 0.093838875 0.9999967
PPvi-PPci 0.00179024 -0.10050327 0.104083746 1
PPvi-PPv 0.010244871 -0.09204864 0.112538378 0.9999876
Table 4.8: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for the fraction of points that lie on the global
Pareto frontier
4.A.3 Distance of Points to Global Frontier
The next metric to be analysed is the average distance to the global frontier. For this
metric the performance of the non-linear programming model was clearly much worse
than the other heuristics. Similarly to the analysis of the number of points on the global
frontier the NLP heuristic is therefore excluded from this analysis.
Table 4.9 and 4.10 show the results for the ANOV A and Tukey statistics. These results
indicate that the superior performance of the PCi heuristic is statistically insignificant for
this metric.
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Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Distance to global 6 2765 460.9 1.817 0.0963
Residuals 252 63931 253.7
Table 4.9: ANOV A analysis for the distance to the global frontier
heuristics diff lwr upr Adjusted P value
PC-FF -5.6664436 -16.673378 5.340491 0.7263992
PCi-FF -7.2921814 -18.299116 3.714753 0.4369449
PPc-FF -1.134687 -12.141622 9.872248 0.999932
PPci-FF 0.6068149 -10.40012 11.613749 0.9999983
PPv-FF 0.1059545 -10.90098 11.112889 1
PPvi-FF 2.3043885 -8.702546 13.311323 0.9960537
PCi-PC -1.6257378 -12.632672 9.381197 0.9994485
PPc-PC 4.5317566 -6.475178 15.538691 0.8844191
PPci-PC 6.2732585 -4.733676 17.280193 0.6206897
PPv-PC 5.7723981 -5.234536 16.779333 0.708655
PPvi-PC 7.9708321 -3.036102 18.977767 0.3254899
PPc-PCi 6.1574944 -4.84944 17.164429 0.6414821
PPci-PCi 7.8989964 -3.107938 18.905931 0.3365575
PPv-PCi 7.3981359 -3.608799 18.40507 0.4186377
PPvi-PCi 9.5965699 -1.410365 20.603504 0.1329791
PPci-PPc 1.7415019 -9.265433 12.748436 0.9991819
PPv-PPc 1.2406415 -9.766293 12.247576 0.9998852
PPvi-PPc 3.4390755 -7.567859 14.44601 0.967648
PPv-PPci -0.5008605 -11.507795 10.506074 0.9999995
PPvi-PPci 1.6975736 -9.309361 12.704508 0.9992932
PPvi-PPv 2.1984341 -8.8085 13.205369 0.9969577
Table 4.10: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for the distance to the global frontier
4.A.4 Spacing of Points on Frontier
The fourth and final metric to be analysed is the spacing of the points on the frontier.
Again ANOV A and Tukey’s test have been applied. The results of these measures can
be found in tables 4.11 and 4.12 respectively. The results of these tests indicate that only
the performance of the non-linear programming model is significantly worse than that of
the other solution algorithms.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Spacing 7 12116 1730.8 12.96 1.75E-14
Residuals 287 38331 133.6
Table 4.11: ANOV A analysis for the spacing of the points on the Pareto frontier
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heuristics diff lwr upr Adjusted P value
NLP-FF 20.48025829 12.219272 28.741244 0
PC-FF 0.17199007 -8.032219 8.376199 1
PCi-FF -0.05098784 -8.255197 8.153221 1
PPc-FF 2.12466338 -6.079545 10.328872 0.993503
PPci-FF 1.31644708 -6.887762 9.520656 0.999699
PPv-FF 2.22514807 -5.979061 10.429357 0.9914004
PPvi-FF 1.85527445 -6.348934 10.059483 0.9972023
PC-NLP -20.30826823 -28.569254 -12.047282 0
PCi-NLP -20.53124614 -28.792232 -12.27026 0
PPc-NLP -18.35559491 -26.616581 -10.094609 0
PPci-NLP -19.16381121 -27.424797 -10.902825 0
PPv-NLP -18.25511023 -26.516096 -9.994124 0
PPvi-NLP -18.62498384 -26.88597 -10.363998 0
PCi-PC -0.22297791 -8.427187 7.981231 1
PPc-PC 1.95267332 -6.251535 10.156882 0.9961426
PPci-PC 1.14445702 -7.059752 9.348666 0.9998821
PPv-PC 2.053158 -6.151051 10.257367 0.994734
PPvi-PC 1.68328438 -6.520924 9.887493 0.998495
PPc-PCi 2.17565123 -6.028558 10.37986 0.992494
PPci-PCi 1.36743493 -6.836774 9.571644 0.9996127
PPv-PCi 2.27613591 -5.928073 10.480345 0.9901471
PPvi-PCi 1.90626229 -6.297946 10.110471 0.9966817
PPci-PPc -0.8082163 -9.012425 7.395992 0.9999889
PPv-PPc 0.10048468 -8.103724 8.304693 1
PPvi-PPc -0.26938894 -8.473598 7.93482 1
PPv-PPci 0.90870098 -7.295508 9.11291 0.9999753
PPvi-PPci 0.53882736 -7.665381 8.743036 0.9999993
PPvi-PPv -0.36987362 -8.574082 7.834335 1
Table 4.12: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for the spacing of the points on the Pareto
frontier
4.A.5 Conclusion of statistical tests
These statistic tests show that the PCi algorithm yields statistically better performance
for two of the four indicators used. For the remaining two indicators the performance is
also better, but statistically insignificant. Overall, these observations support the notion
that the PCi is the most adequate heuristic.
4.B Overview of Notation
Table 4.13 presents an overview of all the notation used in this chapter.
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Model Variable Description
C
on
tr
ac
t
M
od
el
C,D, S The observed cost, duration and scope at the end of the project.
E The effort invested in the project by the contractor.
IC , ID, IS , Itot Cost, duration, scope and total incentive awarded.
Ct, Dt, St Targets for cost, duration and scope as specified in the contract.
sCr Sharing ratio for (piecewise) linear cost incentive contract in region r.
vDr , v
S
r Region valuation parameter for piecewise linear duration/scope incentive.
BCr , B
D
r , B
S
r The lower bound of cost, duration or scope region r in a (piecewise) linear contract.
UBC , UBD, UBS Upper bound of the region over which a cost, duration or scope incentive is spread using a non-linear contract.
LBC , LBD, LBS Lower bound of the region over which a cost, duration or scope incentive is spread using a non-linear contract.
ICmax, I
D
max, I
S
max Greatest incentive amount which can be awarded in a non-linear cost, duration or scope contract.
ICmin, I
D
min, I
S
min Greatest disincentive amount which can be awarded in a non-linear cost, duration or scope contract.
Dt
ls
Target date associated with a lump-sum duration incentive amount.
ID
ls
Incentive amount for a lump-sum duration incentive clause.
T
ra
de
-O
ff
Di, Sj , Ek The attainable values for duration, scope and effort as defined by a trade-off model.
Cmin The lowest attainable cost for the project.
SD, SS , SE The slope of the relationship between the cost (dependent) and duration, scope and effort (independents).
mba Slope multiplicator, max impact of dimension b on the slope of the relationship between dimension a and the cost.
CMD, CMS , CME The convexity magnitude for the relation between C (dependent) and D, S and E (independent) respectively.
C
on
tr
ac
t
E
va
lu
at
io
n
E [NOG] Expected Net Owner Gain
MD Mean deviation, a measure for the payoff alignment
MAD Mean absolute deviation, a measure for the payoff alignment
Ecost
l
Cost of effort
Itot
l
Total incentive awarded in scenario l
NCGl Net contractor gain for scenario l
ROIE Average ROI for effort investments by the contractor.
NCG
adj
l
Net contractor gain for scenario l taking opportunity cost into account
NOGl The value the owner derives from scenario l
Cl, Dl, Sl, El The cost, duration, scope an effort associated with scenario l.
µD, µls, µS The monetary valuation of time, deadline and scope of the owner
RNCG
adj
l
Relative net contractor gain: NCGadj
l
rescaled to [0, 1]
RNOGl Relative net owner gain: NOGl rescaled to [0, 1]
Itotmax The maximal attainable incentive amount for the contractor
LB
Itotmax
A lower bound for the maximal incentive amount which can be earned by the contractor
RItot The range of the incentive earnings by the contractor
DL External deadline relevant to the project owner.
Table 4.13: Overview of notation
4.C Average Hausdorff Distance
The average Hausdorff distance is a metric to measure how far a set of points is removed
from the global frontier. This metric was introduced by Schutze et al. (2012), and was
also used in chapter 3. The average Hausdorff distance (∆p) between two sets of points X
and Y can be calculated using the following formula:
∆p(X,Y ) = max
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
dist(xi, Y )p
) 1
p
,
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
dist(yi, X)p
) 1
p
 (4.19)
Where N and M represent the number of points contained in set X and Y respectively.
The individual points being represented by xi and yi. The dist function is used to represent
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the shortest Euclidean distance between a point and any of the points in the other set.
The average of these values (from both perspectives) are then raised to the power 1p , where
p equals the number of objectives taken into account when constructing the pareto front
(e.g. p = 3 for the frontiers constructed in this research).
Specifically for this research, the distances are measured in standardised intervals [0, 1]
for each dimension, to avoid allotting a greater weight to dimensions with a greater range
of values.
5
Optimising the Contractor’s Schedule in
Incentivised Projects
This chapter presents a novel quantitative methodology to optimise the scheduling of
subcontracted projects from the perspective of the contractor. Specifically, the scenario
where the contractor’s remuneration is performance dependent is investigated. Based on
the incentive methodology introduced in chapter 3, a novel mixed integer programming
formulation as well as a greedy local search heuristic to solve the contractor’s problem
are presented and tested in a computational experiment. For this experiment, a database
containing 3,150 contract-project combinations with diverse structures has been created.
The results from this experiment demonstrate the efficiency of the MIP formulation even
for larger problem instances, as well as the influence of the project and contract structure
on the contractor’s earnings.
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5.1 Introduction
Recent years have shown an increased adoption of incentive clauses in project contracts.
Such clauses enable the project owner to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between
her/himself and the contractor executing the contract (Bower et al., 2002). During the last
decades this has also resulted in a considerable body of literature on the design and effects
of incentive contracts (see chapter 2). However, the impact of such contract structures on
the contractor’s scheduling efforts has remained largely uninvestigated. This research aims
to fill this void using recent advances that allow a more quantitative approach to both the
project and the contract to which it is subjected (Kerkhove and Vanhoucke, 2015a). To
this end, a multi-dimensional multi-mode scheduling model is presented which maximises
the contractor’s returns. These returns are defined as a combination of the incentives
(s)he receives, and the additional costs that are made to improve the performance of the
contract.
We consider a situation where the owner of a project subjects the contractor to a
contract with one or more incentive clauses. These incentives are grouped into three
categories: cost, duration and scope - the latter being an umbrella term for a very wide
range of aspects deemed important to the value of the project by the owner.
The focus lies on the scheduling phase of the project, during which the contractor
decides the execution modes and starting times of all activities in the project. Depending
on the selected execution mode, each activity has a specific cost, duration, scope and
contractor effort level. The contractor effort being a quantification of the investments
made by the contractor to improve activity performance.
Recent research in this domain has analysed the design of the contract from the per-
spective of the owner of the project (Kerkhove and Vanhoucke, 2015a)
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation have analysed the contract design decision from
the owner’s perspective, as well as optimisation procedures that can be used for such
an optimisation. However, such a quantitative analysis of the contractor’s perspective
has not yet been conducted. This chapter aims to fill this gap by applying a similar
methodology, but taking an operational perspective on the project by considering the
scheduling of individual activities rather than the aggregate project. Table 5.1 gives an
overview of the differences between these approaches. The first major difference being that
this optimisation takes the contractor’s perspective rather than that of the owner. The
immediate consequence of this being that the optimisation objective is the contractor’s
profit rather than the dual objective of maximising motivational alignment and owner
profits. The different perspective also has implications for the level at which the analysis
is conducted. Whereas the analysis from the owner’s perspective looks at the project as
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a whole, the contractor has a much more in-depth control over the individual activities in
the project. Because of this the decision variables are also defined on a more operational
level, specifically as the discrete execution modes that can be selected for each activity.
The models used to represent this optimisation problem are based on a combination of
the classical scheduling techniques presented in section 5.2 and the contract structures
discussed in chapter 2.
Chapters 3 and 4 Chapters 5 and 6
Perspective Project owner Contractor
Optimisation Objective max(Owner profit) and Max(Contractor profit)max(Objective alignment)
Trade-off Project level Activity level
Decision variables Contract structure Activity modesContract parameters
Table 5.1: Comparison of this research and the study in chapter 3.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview
of the existing literature, specifically literature on project scheduling. Next, a detailed
outline of the problem is presented in section 5.3. This includes a novel mixed integer
programming formulation (section 5.3.3). This problem formulation is then illustrated
using an example in section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses the methodology used to generate
realistic contracts (section 5.5.1) and projects (section 5.5.2). Both exact and heuristic
solution techniques are discussed in section 5.6. The results of the experiments conducted
with these solution techniques are discussed in section 5.7 prior to formulating an overall
conclusion in section 5.8.
5.2 Multi-Mode Scheduling Literature
The research presented in this chapter builds on two key research domains. The first
research area is the literature on multi-mode project scheduling, specifically concerning
the balancing of multiple outcome dimensions of projects. The second research domain
investigates the contract structures employed by project owners to improve the alignment
of the contractor’s motivations with their own. The former domain will be discussed in
detail in section 5.2, and the second has been treated extensively in chapter 2.
Scheduling projects has been a key topic in operations research since the 1950s. A
classical project scheduling problem which is frequently encountered in practice is the time-
cost trade-off problem (De et al., 1995). This problem formulation requires the scheduler
to decide on the manner in which specific activities are to be executed in order to construct
a schedule for the complete project.
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The simplest form of this problem assumes a linear relationship between the duration
and the cost of every activity (Kelley and Walker, 1959). More recent research frequently
uses more complex models that include more than two dimensions, and uses discrete rather
than continuous trade-off points which better reflect the nature of the decisions made
by the scheduler in practice (Ghodsi et al., 2009). One of the most actively researched
variations on this problem is the multi-mode resource constrained scheduling problem,
where the duration and resource consumption of an activity depends on the selection of
a discrete execution mode (see Van Peteghem and Vanhoucke (2014) for an overview of
recent research on this topic).
A substantial number of authors have defined trade-off problems including the scope
(sometimes also defined as quality) of activities as well as the cost and duration (Afshar
et al., 2007; Hu and He, 2014; Iranmanesh et al., 2008; Keren and Cohen, 2012; Pollack-
johnson and Liberatore, 2006; Pour et al., 2010; Rahimi and Iranmanesh, 2008; Ramo´n and
Cristo´bal, 2009; Shahsavari Pour et al., 2010; Tareghian and Taheri, 2006; Tavana et al.,
2013; Zhang and Xing, 2010; Zhang et al., 2012). These three dimensions are commonly
known as the iron triangle in project management (Marques et al., 2011).
Within the context of subcontracting, the three-dimensional trade-off (cost, duration
and scope) has also been extended by a fourth dimension which can be dubbed contractor
effort (Abu-Hijleh and Ibbs, 1989; Arditi and Yasamis, 1998; Bayiz and Corbett, 2005;
Chapman and Ward, 1994; Choi and Kwak, 2012; El-Rayes, 2001a; El-Rayes and Kandil,
2005; Kandil and El-Rayes, 2006; Kerkhove and Vanhoucke, 2015a,b; Lee and Thomas,
2007; Lippman et al., 2013; Sillars, 2007). Although the nomenclature difffers between the
different authors, this dimension is used to reflect the contractor’s investments beyond the
minimally required investment to complete the project, which are not directly reimbursed
by the project owner. An example of this is the allocation of additional personnel to
increase the speed at which the project is completed in projects where wages are not
directly paid for by the project owner (El-Rayes and Kandil, 2005).
A variety of solution techniques has been employed to solve these multi-dimensional
scheduling problems. The most popular solution techniques being genetic algorithms (El-
Rayes and Kandil, 2005; Hu and He, 2014; Iranmanesh et al., 2008; Kandil and El-Rayes,
2006; Pour et al., 2010; Shahsavari Pour et al., 2010; Tavana et al., 2013), as well as other
population-based meta-heuristics such as ant colony (Afshar et al., 2007) and particle
swarm heuristics (Rahimi and Iranmanesh, 2008; Zhang and Xing, 2010; Zhang et al.,
2012). Several authors have also used mixed integer and mathematical programming
approaches to solve these scheduling problems (Khang and Myint, 1999; Pollack-johnson
and Liberatore, 2006; Ramo´n and Cristo´bal, 2009; Tareghian and Taheri, 2006; Tavana
et al., 2013).
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Similar to classic project scheduling optimisation several authors focus on optimising
one of the trade-off dimensions, while setting minimal requirements for the other dimen-
sions (Hu and He, 2014; Pollack-johnson and Liberatore, 2006; Pour et al., 2010; Ramo´n
and Cristo´bal, 2009; Tareghian and Taheri, 2006). A substantial number of authors has
however departed from this premise and elected to optimise multiple objectives simul-
taneously, creating a set of non-dominated solutions rather than a single solution point
(Afshar et al., 2007; El-Rayes and Kandil, 2005; Iranmanesh et al., 2008; Kandil and El-
Rayes, 2006; Keren and Cohen, 2012; Khang and Myint, 1999; Rahimi and Iranmanesh,
2008; Shahsavari Pour et al., 2010; Tavana et al., 2013; Zhang and Xing, 2010; Zhang
et al., 2012).
5.3 Problem Description
This chapter discusses a multi-mode scheduling problem where the contractor optimises
the high-level trade-off between investing effort in a project and the return he gets in the
form of an additional incentive payment. This is done by optimising the trade-offs at the
level of the individual activities by selecting the correct activity modes. Moreover, the
model is designed to be capable of handling several types of linear and piecewise linear
contract clauses, as well as incentive contracts defining incentives for multiple dimensions
simultaneously. An overview of the notation used in this section is given in appendix 5.C.
An important note regarding the nature of the optimisation problem is that whereas
the contractor’s decisions are made on the level of the activity, the incentive contract is
linked to the outcome of the complete project. Hence, section 5.3.1 explains the nature of
the individual activities and section 5.3.2 analyses the contracts linked to the performance
of the complete project. This aggregation of the activity level information is made explicit
in the linear programming formulation (section 5.3.3).
5.3.1 Project Model
The project is defined as a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) representing an activity on
the node network, where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of arcs connecting the
nodes. Each activity i ∈ V has a number of discrete modes (m = 1, ...,Mi). Each of these
activity modes has a value for the four trade-off dimensions associated with it: cost (Cim),
duration (Dim), scope (Sim) and contractor effort (Eim). The cost of the contractor effort
(Ecostim ) is also defined for every mode of the activity. An important distinction is between
the effort cost (Ecostim ) and the regular cost (Cim) is that the former is paid for by the
contractor, whereas the latter represent the direct costs associated with an activity that
are paid for by the owner of the project. The values for these activity modes are set based
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on the methodology introduced in chapter 3. More details on how the values for these
dimensions for the projects in the dataset have been created can be found in section 5.5.2.
5.3.2 Contract Models
The simplest and most frequently studied form of incentivised contract is the linear incen-
tive cost incentive contract. Based on the notation used by Perry and Barnes (2000) this
contract can be represented as:
Y = F + IC = F + sC · (Ct − C) (5.1)
where Y represents the total remuneration of the contractor, consisting of a fixed com-
ponent F and an incentive amount IC . This incentive is calculated based on the magnitude
of the deviation between the cost target Ct and the cost observed at the completion of the
project C, multiplied with a pre-specified sharing ratio sC ∈ [0, 1].
A single incentive contract can include multiple incentive clauses. Such a contract
clause determines an incentive amount based on the outcome of the project for a single
dimension (cost, duration or scope). Hence, using the methodology used in this research
an incentive contract can consist of up to three incentive clauses: one for cost, duration
and scope respectively.
The manner in which the incentive amounts for the duration and scope dimensions
are calculated is similar to the incentives calculated for the cost dimension with one key
difference. Where the magnitude of the cost incentive is determined by a fraction sC ,
representing the part of the cost over- or under-run transferred to the contractor, the other
two dimensions require a monetary valuation per unit of time and scope to be specified.
The simplest linear for of such contract clauses can be expressed as follows:
ID = vD · (Dt −D) (5.2)
IS = vS · (S − St) (5.3)
Where vD is equal to the (dis-)incentive amount awarded per time unit of deviation
from the duration target Dt, and vS equals the (dis-)incentive amount for the scope di-
mension per unit of scope.
Piecewise linear alternatives for these simple linear equations are also often used in
practice, as is illustrated by (Broome and Perry, 2002) in several practical examples.
The basic principle of these piecewise linear equations is that different sharing ratios and
valuations can be used for the different regions (indexed with r). Equations 5.4, 5.5 and
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5.6 illustrate such piecewise linear equations with three segments1.
IC =

sC1 · (Ct −BC2 ) + sC2 · (BC2 − C) if C > BC2
sC1 · (Ct − C) if BC1 ≤ C ≤ BC2
sC1 · (Ct −BC1 ) + sC0 · (BC1 − C) if C < BC1
(5.4)
ID =

vD1 · (Dt −BD2 ) + vD2 · (BD2 −D) if D > BD2
vD1 · (Dt −D) if BD1 ≤ D ≤ BD2
vD1 · (Dt −BD1 ) + vD0 · (BD1 −D) if D < BD1
(5.5)
IS =

vS1 · (BS2 − St) + vS2 · (S −BS2 ) if S > BS2
vS1 · (S − St) if BS1 ≤ S ≤ BS2
vS1 · (BS1 − St) + vS0 · (S −BS1 ) if S < BS1
(5.6)
The magnitude of the incentive awarded is specified for each of the regions using the sCr ,
vDr and vSr parameters for the cost, duration and scope dimensions respectively. Moreover,
this type of equation also requires the project owner to specify bounds for each of the
regions. Using the notation above the BCr represents the lower bound of the r-th region
for the cost dimension. A similar interpretation is used for the bounds of the duration
(BDr ) and scope (BSr ) dimensions. Note that BCr can also be interpreted as the upper
bound of the (r − 1)-th region.
Figure 5.1 presents a graphical interpretation of the piecewise linear cost contract with
three segments as described by equation 5.4. From this figure it is clear that rate at which
the incentive amount is accrued differs between the different segments. Given that there
are three segments in the contract (NRC = 3), 4 bound variables BCr are defined. Both
the first and last of these bounds are always fixed: BC1 = 0 and BCNRC+1 = ∞, where
BC
NRC+1 can be interpreted as the upper bound of the NR
C-th region.
An important remark on these expressions is that the target (Ct, Dt, Dt) is not neces-
sarily situated in the center region of the piecewise linear contract. The models presented
in this research are especially designed to be capable of dealing with any position of the
target within such contacts, as is evident from the linear programming formulation in
section 5.3.3.
1The construction of incentive contracts with a greater or smaller number of segments is trivial and will
not be discussed in detail.
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Figure 5.1: Piecewise linear cost contract with 3 segments.
5.3.3 Linear Programming Formulation
The linear programming model formulation is divided into a main model and the incentive-
clause specific equations. The main model contains the binary decision variable xim which
defines whether (1) or not (0) mode m of activity i has been selected. With each of these
modes five parameters are associated: activity cost (Cim), duration (Dim), scope (Sim),
effort (Eim) and effort cost (Ecostim ), as defined in section 5.3.1.
The main model also enforces the precedence relations between the activities in the
project, and calculates the sum of the different incentive clauses (Itot). The values for the
individual clauses (IC , ID, IS) are calculated by the equations explained in sections 5.3.3.2
and 5.3.3.3 for linear and piecewise linear contracts respectively. As such, the actual set
of equations used in the linear model differs depending on the contract which has been
implemented.
5.3.3.1 Main Model
Max. Itot −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Ecostim · xim (5.7)
Mi∑
m=1
xim = 1 ∀i ∈ V (5.8)
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fi ≥ fj +
Mi∑
m=1
(Dim · xim) ∀i ∈ V \ {1}, j ∈ Pi (5.9)
f1 = 0 (5.10)
Itot = IC + ID + IS (5.11)
xim ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ V,m = 1, ...,Mi (5.12)
fi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ V (5.13)
The objective of this model is the maximisation of the contractor’s profits, as reflected
by expression 5.7. This objective equals the total incentive earned, minus the total cost
of effort invested in the project. Because the fixed remuneration is constant, this factor is
not included in the objective function.
Constraint 5.8 guarantees that exactly one execution mode is selected for every activity
in the project. Using the variable fi to represent the finishing time of activity i; the
precedence relations of the project are enforced by equation 5.9, in combination with
equation 5.10 which specifies that the first dummy activity finishes at time 0. In equation
5.9 Pi represents the set of predecessors of activity i. The total incentive amount earned
Itot is set as equal to the sum of the incentives for the separate dimensions in equation
5.11. Finally, the nature of the variables is enforced by equations 5.12 and 5.13.
5.3.3.2 Linear Contracts
Linear contract clauses with only a single segment can be added using only a single equa-
tion. The equations used are simply adaptations of equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 that accom-
modate the definitions of the multiple modes used in the model. Equations 5.14, 5.15 and
5.16 determine the value for the cost, duration and scope incentives when linear contracts
are used.
IC = sC1 · (Ct −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim) (5.14)
ID = vD1 · (Dt − f|V |) (5.15)
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IS = vS1 · (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim − St) (5.16)
5.3.3.3 Piecewise Linear Contracts
Constructing linear equations for the piecewise linear contracts is slightly more complex
and requires each segment of the piecewise linear equation to be evaluated separately.
Hence, the total cost incentive becomes the sum of the incentive awarded in each segment
r:
IC =
NRC∑
r=1
ICr (5.17)
Two assisting binary variables are used to determine the positioning of the cost outcome
relative to the bounds of the piecewise linear regions: αCr which is equal to 1 only if the
project cost exceeds the upper bound of the region r, and βCr which is equal to 1 only if
the project cost lies below the lower bound of region r. The values for these two binary
variables are determined using by expressions 5.18 until 5.22. These expressions use a
large value M (i.e. the big-M method), which should not be confused with the last mode
index Mi of activity i.
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim > BCr+1 −M · (1− αCr ) ∀r = 1, ..., NRC (5.18)
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim ≤ BCr+1 +M · αCr ∀r = 1, ..., NRC (5.19)
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim > BCr −M · βCr ∀r = 1, ..., NRC (5.20)
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim ≤ BCr +M · (1− βCr ) ∀r = 1, ..., NRC (5.21)
αCr , β
C
r ∈ {0, 1} r = 1, ..., NRC (5.22)
Next, a number of equations are added which calculate the incentive amount added
for each individual segment. The type of equations added differ depending on the relative
position of the target to the region. Three different scenario’s can be distinguished: (i)
the target is contained within the bounds of region r: BCr ≤ Ct ≤ BCr+1, (ii) the target
is lower than the lower bound of the target region r: Ct < BCr , (iii) the target exceeds
the upper bound of the region r: BCr+1 < Ct. These three scenario’s are indicated in
figure 5.1. The equations used in each of these scenario’s are discussed in the following
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paragraphs. Because the equations used for the different dimensions are largely similar,
only the equations for the cost dimension are covered in detail. The equations for the
duration and scope dimension are included in appendix 5.B.
5.3.3.3.1 (i) Region containing the target Assuming that the region r contains
the target cost, three possible scenario’s for the location of the total cost of the project
denoted as
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim can be distinguished: the total cost can fall within, above or
below the range r. Which of these scenario’s is true determines the formula that has to
be used to calculate the correct incentive accrued within the region.
This is modelled using three pairs of inequalities: equations 5.23 and 5.24 for the
scenario where the final cost falls within the region r, equations 5.25 and 5.26 when the
cost exceeds region r’s upper bound, and equations 5.27 and 5.28 when the cost falls
below region r’s lower bound. Using the assisting variables αCr and βCr the correct pair
of equations is made binding, and all others are made non-binding by using a large value
defined as M .
ICr ≥ sCr (Ct −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim)−M(αCr + βCr ) (5.23)
ICr ≤ sCr (Ct −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim) +M(αCr + βCr ) (5.24)
ICr ≥ sCr (Ct −BCr+1)−M(1− αCr ) (5.25)
ICr ≤ sCr (Ct −BCr+1) +M(1− αCr ) (5.26)
ICr ≥ sCr (Ct −BCr )−M(1− βCr ) (5.27)
ICr ≤ sCr (Ct −BCr ) +M(1− βCr ) (5.28)
5.3.3.3.2 (ii) Target is lower than region lower bound The reasoning for the
second scenario is largely similar, equations 5.29 and 5.30 are binding when the total cost
falls within the range r, equations 5.31 and 5.32 are made binding when the total cost falls
above the range r, and equations 5.33 and 5.34 are binding when the total cost falls below
the range r.
ICr ≥ sCr (BCr −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim)−M(αCr + βCr ) (5.29)
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ICr ≤ sCr (BCr −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim) +M(αCr + βCr ) (5.30)
ICr ≥ sCr (BCr −BCr+1)−M(1− αCr ) (5.31)
ICr ≤ sCr (BCr −BCr+1) +M(1− αCr ) (5.32)
ICr ≥ 0−M(1− βCr ) (5.33)
ICr ≤ 0 +M(1− βCr ) (5.34)
5.3.3.3.3 (iii) Target exceeds region upper bound The third and final scenario
again uses the same methodology: equations 5.35 and 5.36 are binding when the total cost
falls within the range r, equations 5.37 and 5.38 are made binding when the total cost falls
above the range r, and equations 5.39 and 5.40 are binding when the total cost falls below
the range r.
ICr ≥ sCr (BCr+1 −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim)−M(αCr + βCr ) (5.35)
ICr ≤ sCr (BCr+1 −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim) +M(αCr + βCr ) (5.36)
ICr ≥ 0−M(1− αCr ) (5.37)
ICr ≤ 0 +M(1− αCr ) (5.38)
ICr ≥ sCr (BCr+1 −BCr )−M(1− βCr ) (5.39)
ICr ≤ sCr (BCr+1 −BCr ) +M(1− βCr ) (5.40)
5.4 Example
This section presents a small example to clarify the theory presented in the preceding
sections. The example project contains four activities (|V |= 4), and four arcs representing
the precedence relations (|E|= 4) as shown in figure 5.2. Activities 1 and 4 are dummy
activities, representing the dummy start and finish times of the network respectively.
Both of the two non-dummy activities have two possible execution modes, each of which
is associated with five parameters describing the nature of the activities when executed
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2
3
4
Figure 5.2: Example project network.
with these modes (see table 5.2)2. Hence, there are a total of four possible ways to execute
the project, which can be expressed using the decision variable xim. A summary of the
possible project outcomes is presented by table 5.3.
i m Cim Dim Sim Eim E
cost
im
2 1 10 9 7 5 5
2 2 5 15 12 15 3
3 1 8 6 9 3 4
3 2 3 7 1 10 2
Table 5.2: Modes for non-dummy activities.
Project execution Project outcomes
x21 x22 x31 x32 C D S E Ecost
1 0 1 0 18 9 16 8 9
1 0 0 1 13 9 8 15 7
0 1 1 0 13 15 21 18 7
0 1 0 1 8 15 13 25 5
Table 5.3: Possible outcomes.
Furthermore, assume that this project is subjected to an incentive contract consisting
of a piecewise linear incentive clause with three segments for the cost dimension (see figure
5.1), and a linear incentive clause for both the duration and the scope dimension. The
parameters of the piecewise linear cost contract are set as follows: The target cost (Ct)
is set at 14, the bounds are given the following values: BC1 = 0, BC2 = 10, BC3 = 15,
BC4 = ∞, and the sharing ratios are set as follows: sC1 = .25, sC2 = .5, sC3 = .25. The
linear contracts for the duration and the scope only require the target and the valuation
per unit to be set: Dt = 14, vD = .5, St = 15, and vS = .75.
2The dummy activities only have a single execution mode, with a value of zero for all parameters and
have been omitted from the table.
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Hence, the mathematical model representing this scenario would add the equations
5.15 and 5.16 to represent the linear duration and scope contracts respectively. Because
the cost contract is piecewise linear, equations 5.17 up until 5.22 are added to calculate
the incentive amount as the sum of the different segments and to assign the correct values
to the dummy variables αCr and βCr . Next, for each region a number of equations is
added depending on its relative positioning to the target. Hence, for the leftmost region
(see figure 5.1) equations 5.35 until 5.40 are added3. Similarly, the center region requires
equations 5.23 until 5.28 to be added and the rightmost region requires equations 5.29 up
until 5.34 to be added.
When considering the fourth execution scenario (x21 = 0, x22 = 1, x31 = 0, x32 = 1),
the dynamic of the constraints used to represent the cost contract unfolds as follows.
Given that that the total project cost equals 8 (see table 5.2), the leftmost region contains
the cost outcome. Hence, both the αC1 and βC1 variables equal zero - implying that the
cost is neither greater than the upper bound nor smaller than the lower bound of the
region. Hence, looking at the set of equations 5.35 until 5.40 it can be seen that only
equations 5.35 and 5.36 are binding. Hence, the awarded incentive amount for the first
region equals IC1 = sC1 (BC2 −
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Cim · xim) = 0.25 · (10 − 8) = 0.5. Similarly, for the
middle region (r = 2), it can be seen that the cost outcome falls below the lower bound
BC2 of the region, making βC2 = 1. This in turn ensures that equations 5.27 and 5.28 are
binding. Hence, the awarded incentive amount for the second region can be calculated as:
IC2 = sC2 (Ct − BC2 ) = 0.5 · (14 − 10) = 2. Following the same logic, it can be deduced
that for the the third region only equations 5.33 and 5.34 are binding, indicating that no
incentive amount is earned within this region.
x21 x22 x31 x32 IC ID IS Itot Obj
1 0 1 0 -0.75 1.5 0.75 1.5 -7.5
1 0 0 1 0.5 1.5 -5.25 -3.25 -10.25
0 1 1 0 0.5 -1.5 4.5 3.5 -3.5
0 1 0 1 2.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 -5.5
Table 5.4: Possible outcomes.
The calculation of the incentive amounts for the other dimensions are trivial, resulting
in the total incentive amounts shown in table 5.3. By subtracting the total cost of effort
(
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Ecostim · cim) from the total incentive the objective function of the optimisation can
be obtained (see equation 5.7). Hence, it is clear that the optimal solution for this example
3Or in other words, the set of equations is added for r = 1.
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project is to execute activity 2 in mode 2 (x22 = 1) and activity 3 in mode 1 (x31 = 1),
resulting in a total return of -3.5.
5.5 Data Generation
The goal of the data generation procedure is to create a comprehensive set of multi-mode
scheduling problems, including multi-dimensional incentive contracts. The method used
to do this consists of three phases: (i) generation of the set of possible contract parameter
combinations, (ii) defining the multi-mode activities that comprise the project, and (iii)
linking the contract parameters to a specific project by adjusting the relevant contract
parameters.
Component Parameter Meaning Value(s)
Contract
Ct, Dt, St Target value Cmax−Cmin2 ,
Dmax−Dmin
2 ,
Smax−Smin
2
BCr , B
D
r , B
S
r Region lower bound Evenly spaced
rmax Maximal # regions 3
sCr Sharing ratio {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}
vDr Duration region valuation {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} · θD
vSr Scope region valuation {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} · θS
Trade-offs
|V |−2 # non-dummy activities {30, 60, 90}
SP Serial/parallel network indicator {0.16, 0.33, 0.5, 0.66, 0.83}
∆D,∆S,∆E Dimension Range Tri( c2 ,
3c
2 , c)|c = U(1, 10)
n Number of points in range 11
SD, SS , SE Slope of the t/o curve υ(0.5, 1.5)
mba Interaction multiplicators υ(0.0, 0.4)
Cmin Minimal cost ∆C · υ(2, 10)
CMD, CMS , CME Convexity magnitude υ(0, 0.25)
Mi # modes of act i U(1, 10)
Table 5.5: Parameters used to generate the dataset. (Tri(): Triangular distribution, U(): discrete
uniform distribution, u(): continuous uniform distribution.)
Table 5.5 presents an overview of the parameters that are used in the data generation
procedure. The nature of these parameters and their role in the data generation procedure
are described in the sections below.
5.5.1 Contract Parameters
In the first phase of the data generation procedure a set of contract clauses for each of the
outcome dimensions (cost, duration and scope) is defined. To limit the number of possible
contract forms, a number of assumptions has been made regarding the structure of the
contracts. Firstly, it was assumed that the segments of piecewise linear contracts are always
evenly spread across the attainable range of the respective outcome dimension (e.g. if the
maximal and minimal duration of a project are 200 and 100 days respectively, a piecewise
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linear cost clause with two segments will be structured as follows: ]100, 150] and ]150, 200[.)
The second assumption is that the target value specified in the contract (Ct, DT , St) always
lies exactly in the center of the attainable region (e.g. for the contract described earlier
Dt = 150). Naturally, these two assumptions decrease the diversity of contract clauses
considered, but nevertheless the majority of contracts studied in the literature (see chapter
2 for a more extensive overview of literature) use structures that approximate this basic
form. By taking these assumptions, the parameters for the generation procedure are
reduced to the maximal number of piecewise linear segments (rmax), and the values used
for the sharing ratios (sCr ) or region valuations (vDr and vSr ).
As seen in table 5.5, the maximal number of segments for the piecewise linear contracts
is set at 3. This implies that clauses including 1, 2 or 3 segments are included in the dataset.
The sharing ratios and region valuations that specify the magnitude of the incentive given
to the contractor are selected from a list of values (see table 5.5). For the cost clause
sharing ratios this is simply a fraction of the cost incurred, however for the duration and
scope contracts these fractions are multiplied by the owner’s valuation of an unit of time
(θD) and scope (θS) respectively4. For each dimension all possible combinations of these
values are included in the dataset, meaning that the total number of unique contract
clauses for a dimension can be calculated as:
η =
rmax∑
r=1
[
|s|·(|s|−1)r−1
]
=
3∑
r=1
[
5 · 4r−1
]
= 105 (5.41)
Where η is equal to the number of unique contract clauses, rmax equals the maximum
number of regions allowed, and |s| represents the number of sharing ratio values. Note
that piecewise linear contracts that have identical sharing ratios in consecutive regions are
not included. The reasoning being that these contracts do not have the correct number
of piecewise linear segments since the consecutive regions with identical sharing ratios can
be considered to be a single segment. This can be illustrated using a simple example:
consider a cost incentive clause with two segments, if both segments of this contracts have
a sharing ratio of 25% the contract is identical to a cost incentive clause with a single
segment and a sharing ratio of 25%.
The contract clauses for the individual dimensions (cost, duration and scope) are then
merged into a contract by means of random combinations. The size of the dataset can be
increased by including each contract clause multiple times in the combination procedure.
For the dataset used in this research, each contract clause has been included 10 times,
resulting in a total of 1,050 contracts.
4The values for the θD and θS parameters are defined based on the properties of the project, see section
5.5.3.
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5.5.2 Project with Multi-mode Activities
The second step in the data generation procedure is the creation of the project data. As
was stated in section 5.3.1 this comprises a set of interrelated activities, each of which
has a number of discrete modes in which the activity can be executed. Figure 5.3 gives
a high-level overview of the approach used to create diverse projects based on realistic
assumptions regarding the interrelations of the trade-off dimensions. An overview of the
parameters and distributions used in this generation procedure can be found in table 5.5.
First, a detailed overview of the methodology used to generate this data is presented
in section 5.5.2.1. Because this methodology is quite complex, the mechanism is then
illustrated using a simplified example in section 5.5.2.2.
5.5.2.1 Methodology
Data Generation Procedure Externally defined parameters/distributions
Generate network structure using RanGen2
(Vanhoucke et al. 2008)
# activities: {30, 60, 90}
SP-indicator: {⅙,⅓,½,⅔,⅚}
For each activity in the project:
START
Select parameters by random draw from 
predefined distribution Range for independent dimensions 
Slope of cost trade-off
Interaction multiplicators
Minimal cost
Convexity magnitude
Generate set of discrete trade-off points using 
LP model (Kerkhove and Vanhoucke, 2015a)
Select subset of discrete trade-off points # modes: U(1,10)
FINISH
Probability 
distribution Single valueGenerate contractor’s cost of effort
Figure 5.3: Generation procedure for projects with multi-mode options.
The generation procedures consists of two components, the creation of the project
structure and the creation of the execution modes for the individual activities. For the
former step the RanGen2 tool created by Vanhoucke et al. (2008) is used in order to
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guarantee a topologically diverse set of projects. The second step in the procedure iterates
over each individual activity of the project and creates a number of realistic execution
modes. This is done by adapting the methodology introduced in chapter 3 to work on the
level of individual activities rather than on the project level.
The RanGen2 network generator requires two input parameters in order to create a
project network: the number of activities and the serial parallel indicator (Tavares et al.,
1999, 2002; Vanhoucke et al., 2008). The latter is an indicator of where the project is sit-
uated in the range between a completely serial project with a single chain of activities and
a completely parallel project where each activity is only connected to the start and finish
dummy activities. A total of 3,150 networks have been generated for the computational
experiments (section 5.7). This comprises 1,050 projects with 30, 60 and 90 non-dummy
activities respectively. The SP -indicator for these projects was set to one of six values:
{0.16, 0.33, 0.5, 0.66, 0.83} (e.g. 175 projects with 30 activities and SP = .16).
Once the project structure has been created, the data generation procedure iterates
over all the activities to define a number of discrete execution modes. The methodology
introduced in chapter 3 uses a linear programming model in combination with a number
of user-defined parameters to define a discrete set of execution strategies for the project,
which satisfy six axioms defining the interrelation between the trade-off dimensions (cost,
duration, scope and effort). These axioms and the model in general define the cost as the
dependent variable, i.e. the cost is a function of the duration, scope and effort5.
The axioms to which the trade-off points have to adhere describe the relation between
the individual independent dimensions (duration, scope and effort) and the dependent
dimension (cost), as well as the interrelation between the independent dimensions. The
former can be summarised as follows: “The direct cost is a non-increasing convex function
of both the duration and contractor effort. Similarly, the cost is a non-decreasing convex
function of the scope of an activity.” The interplay between the dependent dimensions
is modelled as an influence on their relation to the dependent dimension. For example
the interplay between the duration and scope dimensions can be summarised as follows:
“Shortening the duration of a high-scope activity results in a larger or equal cost increase
than shortening the duration of a low-scope activity. Similarly, a scope increase will be
at least as costly when the activity is executed in a shorter time-frame.” Section 3.4.1
gives an overview of the six individual axioms. The next paragraphs describe how the
project-based approach was adjusted for use on the level of individual activities within a
project.
As shown in figure 5.3, first step on the level of the individual activities is to define
5This is merely a design choice, it is equally feasible to use any of the other dimensions as the dependent
variable.
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Figure 5.4: Generation of discrete trade-off points: a multidimensional representation of gener-
ated trade off points (left) and a subset of the generated points (right).
values for the parameters needed for the generation of discrete trade-off points. Figure 5.4
illustrates the nature of these trade-off points. The left panel of this figure shows a subset
of the four-dimensional trade-off points in a three-dimensional space. The right panel
shows a subset of these points and will be used to explain the meaning of the parameters
listed in table 5.5. A more extensive discussion of these parameters can be found in chapter
3.
The first parameter is the range over which the value of the independent dimensions
can vary (∆D, ∆S, ∆E). The right panel of figure 5.4 illustrates the available range for
the duration dimension. Within this range n equidistant points are defined to represent
the discrete choices available for the independent dimension. As shown in table 5.5 the size
of these ranges is drawn from a triangular distribution. The parameters of this triangular
distribution are expressed in terms of another random variable c which can have any value
in the range {1, ..., 10}. This random variable c is an abstract representation of the ‘size’
of an activity. As such, larger activities will typically have longer durations, larger scope
and more potential for effort investments. A consequence of this is that larger activities
will also have larger costs on average. This is one of the key differences between the
project-based approach presented in chapter 3 and the activity-based trade-offs used in
this research. The number of discrete options available in these ranges (n) in set to 11
for each of the three independent dimensions. This results in a total of 1,331 (n3 = 113)
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possible combinations of the independent dimensions, each of which is associated with a
cost.
The range for the independent dimensions (∆D, ∆S, ∆E) is converted to discrete
options by multiplying the lowest and highest cost options, indexed 1 and n respectively,
with these ranges. The base values for these options are as follows: D1 = 2, Dn = 1,
S1 = 1, Sn = 2, E1 = 1, and En = 0. This reflects that the cost increases when the
duration or the effort decreases, or when the scope increases. As such the highest and
lowest values for the independent dimensions are equal to: [1 ·∆D; 2 ·∆D], [1 ·∆S; 2 ·∆S]
and [0; 1 ·∆E].
Determining the cost for each of these discrete execution modes starts by defining an
approximate linear relationship between the independent dimensions and the dependent
(cost) dimension, as shown in the right panel of figure 5.4. The slope of this linear ap-
proximation is determined by the slope parameters (SD, SS , SE) and the multiplicators
used to represent the interaction between the independent dimensions6.
A mathematical expression for the approximate relation between the cost and the inde-
pendent variables is given by equation 5.42. In this expression the independent duration,
scope and effort dimensions are indexed using i, j and k respectively. These indices run
from 1 to n where n is the option resulting in the highest possible cost (i.e. the shortest
duration, highest scope and lowest effort respectively.) Equation 5.42 shows how the linear
approximation of the total cost is modelled as a function of the independent dimensions.
The impact of these dimensions depends on both the slope (SD, SS , SE) and the values
of the other parameters, the latter being quantified by the mba parameters.
Cijk =Cmin + |SD|
(
mSD
∆Sj
∆Sn
+ 1
)(
mED
∆Ek
∆En
+ 1
)
∆Di+
|SS |
(
mDS
∆Di
∆Dn
+ 1
)(
mES
∆Ek
∆En
+ 1
)
∆Sj+
|SE |
(
mDE
∆Di
∆Dn
+ 1
)(
mSE
∆Sj
∆Sn
+ 1
)
∆Ek
(5.42)
The solid line in the right panel of figure 5.4 shows a subset of these points where the
scope and effort have been assigned their lowest cost options7. As such the lowest point of
the line is the lowest possible cost (Cmin). The linear relation then shows how a decrease
in the duration of the activity inflates the cost of the activity.
The realism of this relation is improved by modelling a convex rather than linear
6mba where b and a are both independent dimensions and mba represents the increase in the slope of
the relation between the cost and the independent dimension a when dimension b is at its most expensive
value, as opposed to its lowest cost setting. The accrual of slope between these extrema of b is assumed to
be linear.
7Note that the highest effort of the contractor results in the lowest cost for the owner.
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relationship, as stated by the axioms defining the interrelationships between the various
dimensions. The degree of convexity is defined as the convexity magnitude CM (Kerkhove
and Vanhoucke, 2015a). The interpretation of this metric is illustrated on the right panel
of figure 5.4. Within the triangle formed by the linear approximation and the projection
of its extreme points towards the axes two zones can be distinguished. Zone A is the area
between the linear approximation and the convex curve and zone B being the remainder
of the triangle. Using these two areas the convexity magnitude CMD (for the duration
dimension) is defined as: AA+B . The same linear model as was used in chapter 3 is used
to create a smooth convex curve which satisfied the specified convexity for the respective
dimensions. The combination of all these curves results in a set of points within a four-
dimensional space.
At this point a large number (1,331) of discrete trade-off points have been created
for the activity. Whereas such a wide range of possible modes may be realistic on a
project level (because of the large number of potential combinations of activity modes),
the number of ways in which an individual activity may be executed is generally more
limited. Hence, rather than making all possible execution modes available, a random
subset of these points is selected. The number of modes Mi for activity i is drawn from a
discrete uniform distribution U(1, 10). The modes which are used are selected at random
from the set of 1,331 generated modes.
As a final step in the generation procedure for the multi-mode activities, the monetary
cost of effort to the contractor is determined. This is done by rescaling the maximal
total cost of effort in relative terms to the total cost variability of the project (∆C =
Cmax − Cmin)8
Ecostmax = υ(0.1, 0.9) ·∆C (5.43)
where Ecostmax represents the maximal cost of effort for the complete project. The effort
cost associated with a specific activity mode can then be calculated as follows:
Ecostim = Eim ·
Ecostmax
Emax
∀i,m (5.44)
where Ecostim is the effort cost associated with mode m of activity i, Eim is the effort
expressed on a ratio scale as was originally generated, and Emax is the maximal possible
effort for the total project, which is calculated as the sum of the maximal effort option of
all activities.
8Where Cmin is a parameter and Cmax is obtained by selecting the highest cost mode for each activity.
138 Chapter 5
5.5.2.2 Example
The first step in the creation of a multi-mode project is the generation of the project
network. Assume that the number of non-dummy activities (|V |−2) is set to 2 and the
serial-parallel indicator is set equal to 0. This would result in a network as shown in figure
5.2 where two non-dummy activities are executed in parallel.
Next, the discrete execution modes are generated for the first non-dummy activity
(indexed 2 on figure 5.2). By means of a random draw, the c parameter which reflects the
general size of the activity is set to 7. Hence, the range for the independent dimensions
(∆D, ∆S, ∆E) are drawn from a triangular distribution Tri(3.5, 10.5, 7).
A random draw from this triangular distribution results a value of 6 for ∆D, 5 for
∆S and 8 for ∆E. This range is then converted to a linear scale. For the duration and
scope this is done by multiplying the range with the 1 and 2 to obtain the extreme points,
based on the assumption that an activity will always have a non-zero duration and scope.
The bounds of the effort dimension are obtained by multiplying the value of the range
by 0 and 1, the reasoning here being that the project can be executed without execution
any extra effort. Hence, the following ranges are created for the duration, scope and
effort dimensions respectively: [6, 12], [5, 10] and [0, 8]. For this example 3 rather than 11
discrete and equidistant options are created within these ranges. As such the duration,
scope and effort are selected from the following sets: {6, 9, 12}, {5, 7.5, 10} and {0, 4, 8}.
This results in 33 = 27 total possible execution modes for the activity, each of which has
to be associated with a specific cost.
The first step to associate a specific cost with each of these execution modes is the
creation of a linear approximation. This linear approximation is based on the slope pa-
rameters (SD, SS , SE), the inter-dimensional multiplicators (mSD, ...) and the lowest
possible cost Cmin, as shown in equation 5.42. Because the minimal cost depends on the
value of the range over which the cost varies (∆C, see table 5.5), the incremental costs
are calculated first. To do this, the following parameters are drawn from their respective
random distributions: SD = 0.5, SS = 1, SE = 1.5, mSD = 0.2, mED = 0.2, mDS = 0.1,
mES = 0.1, mDE = 0.2 and mSE = 0.1.
In the following paragraphs these parameters will be used to determine the marginal
cost for the linear approximation, the total cost for the linear approximation and the total
convex cost. The results for these costs are shown in the final three columns of table 5.6
and are denoted as ‘∆C lin’, ‘C lin’ and ‘C conv’ respectively.
Using these parameters the incremental cost ∆Cijk can be calculated based on equation
5.429. Table 5.6 shows these incremental costs for each of the 27 possible scenarios (∆C
9∆Cijk = Cijk − Cmin
Chapter 5 139
nb D S E ∆C lin C lin C conv
1 12.0 5.0 8.0 0.0 131.1 131.1
2 12.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 137.1 135.9
3 12.0 5.0 0.0 12.0 143.1 143.1
4 12.0 7.5 8.0 2.5 133.6 133.1
5 12.0 7.5 4.0 8.9 140.0 138.2
6 12.0 7.5 0.0 15.4 146.4 145.9
7 12.0 10.0 8.0 5.0 136.1 136.1
8 12.0 10.0 4.0 11.9 142.9 141.6
9 12.0 10.0 0.0 18.7 149.8 149.8
10 9.0 5.0 8.0 1.5 132.6 132.0
11 9.0 5.0 4.0 8.3 139.3 137.4
12 9.0 5.0 0.0 15.0 146.1 145.4
13 9.0 7.5 8.0 4.3 135.4 134.2
14 9.0 7.5 4.0 11.5 142.6 139.9
15 9.0 7.5 0.0 18.7 149.8 148.5
16 9.0 10.0 8.0 7.0 138.2 137.4
17 9.0 10.0 4.0 14.8 145.9 143.6
18 9.0 10.0 0.0 22.5 153.6 152.7
19 6.0 5.0 8.0 3.0 134.1 134.1
20 6.0 5.0 4.0 10.5 141.6 140.2
21 6.0 5.0 0.0 18.0 149.1 149.1
22 6.0 7.5 8.0 6.1 137.2 136.6
23 6.0 7.5 4.0 14.1 145.2 143.1
24 6.0 7.5 0.0 22.1 153.2 152.6
25 6.0 10.0 8.0 9.1 140.2 140.2
26 6.0 10.0 4.0 17.7 148.8 147.2
27 6.0 10.0 0.0 26.2 157.3 157.3
Table 5.6: Generated linear and convex costs.
lin). From these values it is clear that the total range over which the cost varies (∆C)
equals 26.2 (the difference between the highest and lowest value of ∆C lin). Hence, the
minimal cost value Cmin will lie somewhere in the range [52.4; 261.0] (see table 5.5). For
this example a random value of 131.1 has been drawn, resulting the values for the total
cost for the activity modes as shown in the C lin column of table 5.6.
Next, the linear approximation has to be transformed into a convex relationship. The
degree of convexity is defined as the convexity magnitude, which is defined for each of
the independent dimensions (CMD, CMS and CME respectively, see section 5.5.2.1 for
the definition of this metric). The values for these parameters are drawn from an uniform
distribution (see table 5.5). For this example the following parameters are used: CMD =
0.2, CMS = 0.1 and CME = 0.1.
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The convexity is inserted by considering the impact on the cost of each dimension sep-
arately, for each possible combination of values of the other two independent dimensions.
An example for the duration dimension is given by figure 5.5. The horizontal axis on this
figure contains the three possible values of the duration dimension, and the vertical axis
shows the relative cost increase when compared to the minimal cost (Cmin). The convex
relation is obtained by means of a downward shift of the point(s) in between the highest
and lowest value of the independent dimension. For the example in figure 5.5 this means
decreasing the cost associated with D2 from ∆C2jk to ∆C ′2jk. This analysis has to be
made for every possible combination of the j and k indices to determine the convexity of
the relation between the duration and the cost. An analogous procedure has to be followed
for the scope and effort dimensions.
D3 D2 D1
∆C3jk
∆C2jk
∆C ′2jk
∆C1jkIn
cr
em
en
ta
l
co
st
(∆
C
ij
k
)
Duration (Di)
Subset of points with j = 1 and k = 1
linear approximation
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Figure 5.5: Creation of the convex relation between duration and cost.
Because only three possible values are considered in this example, it is straightforward
to calculate the appropriate cost to associate with D2 algebraically. The simplest way to
do this is to calculate the surface of the complete triangle (A+B, equation 5.45) and the
surface B which can be viewed as a combination of two triangles and a (equation 5.46).
Using these expressions it is easy to reconstruct the formula for the convexity magnitude
(CMD = A/(A + B)). Solving this expression for ∆C ′2jk yields the sole possible value
for the cost which satisfies the proposed convexity, as shown by equation 5.47. Similar
expressions can also be determined for the scope and effort dimensions (equations 5.48
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and 5.49 respectively)10.
A+B = (∆C3jk −∆C1jk)(D1 −D3)2 (5.45)
B =
(∆C3jk −∆C ′2jk)(D2 −D3)
2
+ (∆C ′2jk −∆C1jk)(D2 −D3)
+
(∆C ′2jk −∆C1jk)(D1 −D2)
2 (5.46)
∆C ′2jk =
∆C1jk(CMD(D1 −D3) +D2 −D3)
D1 −D3
+ ∆C3jk(CM
D(D3 −D1) +D1 −D2)
D1 −D3 (5.47)
∆C ′i2k =
∆Ci1k(CMS(S1 − S3) + S2 − S3)
S1 − S3
+ ∆Ci3k(CM
S(S3 − S1) + S1 − S2)
S1 − S3 (5.48)
∆C ′ij2 =
∆Cij1(CME(E1 − E3) + E2 − E3)
E1 − E3
+ ∆Cij3(CM
E(E3 − E1) + E1 − E2)
E1 − E3 (5.49)
For the 10-th possible permutation (see table 5.6) only the impact of the cost has to
be adjusted since both the scope and effort are at their lowest cost levels11. The values
for ∆C1jk and ∆C3jk can be found by locating the scenarios where the scope and effort
have the same value. For this scenario this is scenario 1 and 19 respectively. This means
that ∆C1jk and ∆C3jk get the values 0 and 3 respectively. In combination with the three
possible values for the duration dimension (D1 = 12, D2 = 9 and D3 = 6) this allows
formula 5.47 to be filled out. This results in a value of 0.9 for ∆C ′2jk, which is lower than
10It is important to note that these equations are only valid when three possible values are used for the
dependent dimensions. For the actual data a mixed integer programming model was used (see chapter 3
11As shown in figure 5.5 only the middle point has to be adjusted in this example.
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the original value of 1.5. Effectively, the second term of equation 5.42 is replaced by this
new value. As shown in the table this decreases the linear cost for the 10-th permutation
from 132.6 to 132.0, the latter being the value of C conv for the 10th permutation. For all
other modes a similar logic is followed in order to obtain all the values in the final column
of table 5.6.
The process now continues by selecting between one and ten execution modes at ran-
dom for this activity, all others being discarded. Next, the process is repeated for the
second activity in the project network. As such, a number of discrete execution modes is
obtained for both activities.
5.5.3 Adjust Contract Parameters to Project
The third and final step in the data generation procedure is the combination of the contract
structures and the generated multi-mode projects. To do this, the parameters of the
contract have to be adjusted to the properties of the project. As shown in table 5.5,
the contracts generated in section 5.5.1 as defined using relative ranges. Hence, the first
step in adjusting the contract parameters is to calculate the extreme outcomes for each
of the three outcome dimensions perceived by the project owner. For the cost and scope
dimension the minimal (Cmin, Smin) and maximal (Cmax, Smax) values can be calculated
by simply taking the summation of the minimal and maximal modes for the respective
dimension for each activity. Calculating the minimal and maximal project duration is
slightly more complex and requires the critical path to be calculated when the minimal
and maximal duration modes are selected for each individual activity.
For the cost dimension of the contract, the alignment is limited to setting the target
cost equal to the middle of the attainable range ((Cmax − Cmin)/2), and spreading the
bounds evenly across the range as explained in section 5.5.1. Both the duration and scope
dimensions also require determining the owner’s monetary valuation per unit of time and
scope (θD, θS). The values for these parameters are defined by specifying the importance
of the duration and scope dimensions in relative terms to the monetary impact of the cost
dimension, and then rescaling this quantity per unit of time and scope respectively:
θD = υ(0.5, 2.0) ∗∆C∆D (5.50)
θS = υ(0.5, 2.0) ∗∆C∆S (5.51)
These values are then used to calculate the incentive amounts awarded per unit of time
or scope in the various regions, as is explained in section 5.5.1. The adjustment of the
targets and the bounds for the contracts is done in a similar manner.
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5.6 Solution Methodology
Two solution methods are compared in this chapter. The first is simply an implementation
of the mixed integer programming model presented in section 5.3.3. The performance of
this solution technique is compared to the performance of a greedy local search that can be
compared to a ‘rational’ strategy followed by a contractor when faced with the optimisation
problem. By comparing these two approaches in section 5.7 the added value of the exact
solution approach, as well as the impact of project and contract structure on potential
contractor earnings is investigated.
5.6.1 Commercial Solver Software
The model that has been presented in section 5.3.3 has been implemented using Gurobi
6.0 using the C++ interface. The experiments have all been carried out on a dual core
2.4GHz computer with 16GB of RAM.
5.6.2 Greedy Local Search
A greedy local search for the problem is presented in this section. This greedy local search
follows a logical progression starting from the solution requiring the least effort, and moves
on to solutions requiring incrementally greater effort stopping when the next move does
not yield a positive change in the objective function value. A pseudo-code representation
of this heuristic is given by algorithm 5. In this algorithm χ is used to represent the
complete set of xim variables, i.e. a solution to the multi-mode scheduling problem.
Algorithm 5 Greedy local search
1: χ← xim′ = 1 ∀i ∈ V, m′ : Eim′ ≤ Eim∀m ∈ {1, ...,Mi}
2: ι← {1, ..., |V |}
3: while objective for χ has improved do
4: ι.randomShuﬄe()
5: for i in ι do
6: improved ← true
7: while improved = true do
8: improved ← false
9: χ′ ← χ| lowest increment of effort for act i
10: if χ′.objective() > χ.objective() then
11: χ← χ′
12: improved ← true
13: return χbest
The algorithm starts by selecting the mode with the lowest effort for all of the activities
in the project (line 1). Any ties are broken arbitrarily. Next, an array containing the indices
for all the activities (ι) is defined (line 2). The procedure then starts the improvement loop
(line 3). Within this improvement loop, the procedure iterates over all the activities in
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random order (line 4 and 5). For each activity, the activity mode with the lowest increase
in effort is considered and as long as the preceding move has yielded an improvement the
next increment for the activity is tested. Naturally, this process stops when the mode with
the highest amount of effort is reached. This heuristic corresponds to a ‘lowest hanging
fruit’ mindset which is likely to be followed or approximated by practitioners.
5.7 Computational Experiments
Both the exact and heuristic solution techniques have been tested on the dataset described
in section 5.5. All of these instances were solved to optimality by the exact approach. The
results of these experiments will be discussed in this section. Specifically, the impact of
the problem size (section 5.7.1), the network structure (section 5.7.2) and the contract
structure (section 5.7.3) on the performance of the algorithms will be discussed in detail.
5.7.1 Impact of the Problem Size
Figure 5.6 illustrates the impact of the problem size, as measured by the number of ac-
tivities, on the objective function value and the computation time of both solution proce-
dures. The objective function value is shown on the left axis, and the optimality gap for
the heuristic approximation is shown on the right axis. This optimality gap is calculated
as: 1− OFheuristicOFexact .
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Figure 5.6: Influence of the problem size on the solution quality and speed.
Naturally the optimal objective function value increases as the size of the project
increases since a larger amount of work warrants a higher payment. When comparing the
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exact model to the heuristic solution procedure, it is clear that the absolute gap between
the two solutions increases as the size of the project increases. The relative performance
(as indicated by the optimality gap) of the heuristic approach remains quasi constant
across all possible project sizes.
Looking at the second panel of figure 5.6 reveals that the computation time needed for
the exact solution approach increases much faster for the heuristic solution approach than
for the exact solution approach. This leads to the conclusion that the effort needed to
heuristically optimise the project execution increases exponentially with the problem size
(note the exponential scale use for the chart on the right). Moreover, this also indicates
that the mixed integer programming formulation is highly efficient since the increase in
project size has only a limited impact on the CPU time needed to find the optimal solution.
5.7.2 Impact of the Network Structure
This section discusses the influence of the network structure on the performance of the
exact and heuristic solution methods. The network topology is defined using six network
topology indicators:
Coefficient of network complexity: A simple measure of the complexity of an activity
on the node network expressed as the number of direct arcs divided by the number
of nodes. A higher value for this indicator implies that the network is more complex
since there is a higher number of precedence relations per activity (Davis, 1975;
Pascoe, 1966).
Order strength: A measure for the number of precedence relations in the network struc-
ture. The OS is defined as the number of precedence relationships (including transi-
tive relationships) divided by the total number of possible precedence relationships in
an acyclic activity on the node network (n(n−1)2 ). This metric falls within the range
[0, 1], a larger number implying more relationships and therefore a more complex
network structure (Herroelen and De Reyck, 1999; Mastor, 1970).
Serial parallel indicator: Indicates to what degree a network resembles a completely
serial (1) or parallel (0) network structure12 (Tavares, 1999; Tavares et al., 2002;
Vanhoucke et al., 2008).
Activity distribution: This metric gives insight in how the activities are distributed
within the project. This is done by categorising the activities into levels based
on the maximal number of arcs which separate them from the dummy start node.
Next, the distribution of activities among these levels is measured and expressed in
12Note that this indicator is used as an input parameter for the network generation tool used in this
research, hence the specific values used are shown in figure 5.2, rather than the ranges for the values as
was done for the other topological indicators.
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the range [0, 1]. A value of 0 implies that all levels contain an identical number of
activities, whereas a value of 1 implies that one level contains the maximal number of
activities and all other levels contain a single activity (Tavares, 1999; Tavares et al.,
2002; Vanhoucke et al., 2008).
Length of arcs: This metric also uses the same categorisation of activities in levels de-
pending on the maximal number of arcs separating them from the starting node.
The LA metric measures the length of the precedence relationships as measured by
the number of levels these precedence relationships span. When LA = 1 all prece-
dence relationships have a length of 1, meaning that the successors of all activities
are on the adjacent level. Inversely, as LA approaches 0, there are many precedence
relations spanning a large number of levels (Tavares, 1999; Tavares et al., 2002;
Vanhoucke et al., 2008).
Topological float: Measures the degree to which activities can be shifted to other levels
without violating the maximal level of the network. Again this metric is contained
within the range [0, 1]. A value of 0 implies that the network is 100% dense and no
activities can be shifted. A value of 1 indicates that the network consists of a single
chain of activities with the remainder of activities scheduled parallel to this chain.
Hence, all activities scheduled in parallel to the chain of activities have a substantial
amount of float (Tavares, 1999; Tavares et al., 2002; Vanhoucke et al., 2008).
These indicators are frequently used in project management research and their specific
formulae will not be explained here. For a more detailed explanation on the calculation of
these topological indicators, the reader is referred to Vanhoucke (2010a).
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Figure 5.7: Influence of the network structure on the absolute and relative solution quality.
Figure 5.7 shows that the optimal outcome of the project is significantly influenced
by the network topology. The relative performance of the heuristic solution method is
also affected by the network structure, yet always remains significantly below the optimal
value. This implies that optimal solution methods should be preferred regardless of the
structure of the network. The specific influences of network structure on the contractor’s
profits can be summarised as follows:
• An increase in the coefficient of network complexity results in higher objective
function values. This somewhat counter-intuitive observation can be explained by the
significant positive correlation (0.365) between the problem size and the network com-
plexity indicator. Hence, the increase in objective function value is largely due to the
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increase in problem size. As noted in Vanhoucke (2010a), such issues are not uncommon
when using the CNC metric. The relative performance remains markedly stable.
• The impact of the order strength is more intuitive: as the relative amount of prece-
dence relations increases, the optimal objective decreases. The reason for this being that
making efficient alterations in the duration of the project becomes increasingly difficult
as the number of precedence relations increases. This also adds to the complexity of
finding the optimal solution, as is reflected by the decreasing relative performance of
the heuristic solution procedure.
• The observations for the SP-indicator indicate that a higher profit for the contractor
can be obtained for more parallel networks (i.e. lower values for the SP indicator).
The relative performance is more or less constant, with the exception of the most serial
networks where a dip in the relative performance of the heuristic solution procedure can
be observed.
• The impact of the activity distribution is rather ambiguous, no distinctive trend can
be observed in these results.
• There is no consistent trend in the optimal objective function for varying levels of the
length of arcs metric. However, the relative performance of the heuristic is markedly
worse when there are longer arcs (i.e. a lower value for the LA metric).
• An increase in the topological float has a distinctive negative impact on the optimal
objective function value, indicating that denser networks typically yield a better outcome
for the contractor. The relative performance of the heuristic approximation does not
show a clear trend for this topological indicator.
5.7.3 Impact of the Contract Structure
This section investigates how the structure of the contract influences the objective function
value, as well as the (relative) performance of the heuristic solution procedure. Two key
elements of the contract structure have been selected as independent variables: the number
of incentivised dimensions and the total number of segments in the contract. Both of these
are metrics for the complexity of the contracts, and by extension the pay-off function of
the contractor.
The left panel of figure 5.8 shows the impact of the number of dimensions to which
an incentive is attached. A first logical observation is that the optimal objective function
value increases as the number of dimensions which are incentivised is increased. A second
more interesting observation is that the approximation made by the heuristic approxi-
mation procedure becomes significantly worse as the number of incentivised dimensions
increases. This implies that the added value from using exact optimisation techniques
becomes substantially greater when incentives are attached to multiple dimensions.
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Figure 5.8: Influence of the contract structure on the absolute and relative solution quality.
The right panel of figure 5.8 uses the total number of segments in the contract as a
measure for the complexity of the contract. The total number of segments is simply the sum
of the number of segments for the cost, duration and scope incentive clauses. Again, the
optimal function value increases as the number of segments is increased - which is logical
given the nature of the dataset (see section 5.5). The absolute objective function value
of the heuristic approximation method increases as well, but this increase is significantly
less than the increase of the optimal function value. This is also evidenced by the relative
performance measurement.
Based on these observations it can be concluded that the performance of heuristic
approximation methods significantly deteriorates when the complexity of the contract (as
measured by the number of incentivised dimensions and the total number of segments)
increases.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the relation between computation time and contract complexity.
Using computation time as a proxy for problem complexity these two graphs clearly illus-
trate that the problem complexity increases as the complexity of the contract (as expressed
by the number of segments or the number incentivised dimensions) increases.
5.8 Conclusions
In this research a novel quantitative methodology to optimise project scheduling from the
contractor’s perspective is presented. Specifically, the situation where the contractor is
subjected to an incentivised agreement is analysed. This methodology extends traditional
multi-mode scheduling literature and incorporates multidimensional incentive contracts
linked to the cost, duration and scope of the project. These incentive clauses can be of
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Figure 5.9: Influence of the contract structure on the CPU time.
either linear or piecewise linear nature and linked to the cost, duration and/or scope of
the project.
To solve this scheduling problem a novel mixed integer linear programming program-
ming model as well as a greedy local search algorithm are proposed and implemented.
To test the performance of these solution techniques, a substantial dataset has been con-
structed and a computational experiment has been conducted. Based on these computa-
tional experiments the relative performance of the solution methods, as well as the influence
of contract and project nature on the contractor’s pay-off have been investigated.
The main conclusions from the computational experiments are the following. The rel-
ative performance in terms of solution quality of the greedy heuristic is independent from
the problem size, but the computational expense of the greedy approach increases expo-
nentially when the problem size increases. The mixed integer programming formulation
proves to be quite efficient and always results in the optimal solution using less CPU time
than the greedy heuristic, even for larger problem instances of up to 90 activities.
Both absolute and relative performance are significantly influenced by the project prop-
erties. Specifically a more serial network, a higher topological float or a higher order
strength have a negative influence on the contractor’s potential earnings. Also, the rel-
ative performance of the greedy heuristic is markedly worse when the project contains
longer arcs as measured by the length of arcs metric.
A final observation from these experiments is that the relative performance of the
greedy heuristic also decreases when the complexity of the contract increases. Complexity
in this case being measured as the number of incentivised dimensions or the total number
of piecewise linear segments in the incentive contract formulae.
This chapter also opens several avenues for future research. One possible extension
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could be the introduction of resource constraints to the current problem formulation.
Other extensions include the use of stochastic rather than deterministic values or the use
of net present value objective taking into account the timing of the cashflows.
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5.A Statistical Analysis
This appendix investigates the statistical significance of the observations made based on
the computational experiments in the preceding chapter. Specifically, the observations
regarding the impact of the problem size and the influence of contract complexity are
tested for their statistical significance.
5.A.1 Impact of problem size
In section 5.7.1 the impact of the problem size on the relative performance of the algorithms
is discussed. These experiments showed that there is a considerable difference between
the average performance of the linear programming model and the simple rule of thumb
heuristic. A simple (paired) t-test can be used to verify whether or not these differences
are statistically significant. The results of this test are listed in table 5.7.
Problem size (nb activities) t df p-value mean difference
30 -23.805 1049 2.2e-16 -21.07647
60 -24.678 1049 2.2e-16 -43.47932
90 -36.322 1049 2.2e-16 -69.58879
Table 5.7: Results from t-test for various problem sizes.
Based on these results, it can be concluded that the differences in performance are
highly statistically significant.
5.A.2 Problem structure
A similar analysis is made for the observations made in section 5.7.3, which discussed the
impact of the problem structure. This contract structure was defined by two parameters:
the number of incentivised dimensions and the total number of segments in a contract. In
both cases a greater number indicated a more complex contract. The key question here
is if the performance gap increases as the complexity of the contract increases. This was
tested statistically by comparing the average of the optimality gap for different levels of
contract complexity.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Number of Contract Dimensions 3 1621670 540557 146.6 <2e-16
Residuals 3146 11596929 3686
Table 5.8: ANOV A analysis for the number of contract dimensions.
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nb dimensions diff lwr upr Adjusted P value
1-0 -34.81688 -43.71747 -25.916297 0.0e+00
2-0 -59.97414 -68.87178 -51.076509 0.0e+00
3-0 -77.35481 -88.46752 -66.242111 0.0e+00
2-1 -25.15726 -31.58355 -18.730974 0.0e+00
3-1 -42.53793 -51.79111 -33.284747 0.0e+00
3-2 -17.38067 -26.63101 -8.130325 8.5e-06
Table 5.9: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for the number of contract dimensions.
Tables 5.8 and 5.11 show the results of an ANOV A test as well as a pairwise comparison
of the mean (using a Tukey test) of the optimality gap for different numbers of incentivised
dimensions. The results from the ANOV A analysis indicate that there are statistically
significant differences. Moreover, the pairwise comparison indicates that all the results are
statistically significant from each other.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Number of Contract Segments 6 1447884 241314 64.44 <2e-16
Residuals 3143 11770715 3745
Table 5.10: ANOV A analysis for the total number of contract segments.
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 also show the results for an ANOV A and a Tukey’s test, this
time using the total number of contract segments as the indicator for contract complexity.
The results of these tests indicate that the observed trend in chapter 5.7.3 is statistically
significant. Only three of the pairwise comparisons indicate that the difference is not
statistically significant13.
13Notably, these are all adjacent points.
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nb segments diff lwr upr Adjusted P value
4-3 -33.454026 -47.47669 -19.431367 0.0000000
5-3 -35.546726 -45.65783 -25.435623 0.0000000
6-3 -56.022076 -68.60690 -43.437257 0.0000000
7-3 -57.881385 -68.54307 -47.219698 0.0000000
8-3 -72.012797 -89.75786 -54.267737 0.0000000
9-3 -74.308219 -90.24439 -58.372049 0.0000000
5-4 -2.092700 -14.71290 10.527498 0.9989942
6-4 -22.568050 -37.24499 -7.891106 0.0001207
7-4 -24.427359 -37.49283 -11.361886 0.0000008
8-4 -38.558770 -57.84405 -19.273487 0.0000001
9-4 -40.854193 -58.48929 -23.219100 0.0000000
6-5 -20.475350 -31.47590 -9.474800 0.0000009
7-5 -22.334658 -31.06999 -13.599327 0.0000000
8-5 -36.466070 -53.12505 -19.807092 0.0000000
9-5 -38.761493 -53.47869 -24.044294 0.0000000
7-6 -1.859308 -13.36797 9.649353 0.9991331
8-6 -15.990720 -34.25722 2.275775 0.1315573
9-6 -18.286143 -34.80096 -1.771324 0.0189216
8-7 -14.131412 -31.13020 2.867375 0.1773298
9-7 -16.426835 -31.52760 -1.326069 0.0227735
9-8 -2.295423 -23.01374 18.422895 0.9999026
Table 5.11: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for the total number of contract segments.
5.B Linear Model: Equations for Piecewise Linear Duration
and Scope Contracts
5.B.1 Piecewise Linear Duration Contract
ID =
NRD∑
r=1
IDr (5.52)
5.B.1.0.1 (0) Assisting binary variables
|V |∑
i=1
f|V | > B
D
r+1 −M · (1− αDr ) ∀r = 1, ..., NRD (5.53)
|V |∑
i=1
f|V | ≤ BDr+1 +M · αDr ∀r = 1, ..., NRD (5.54)
|V |∑
i=1
f|V | > B
D
r −M · βDr ∀r = 1, ..., NRD (5.55)
|V |∑
i=1
f|V | ≤ BDr +M · (1− βDr ) ∀r = 1, ..., NRD (5.56)
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αDr , β
D
r ∈ [0, 1] r = 1, ..., NRD (5.57)
5.B.1.0.2 (i) Region containing the target
IDr ≥ sDr (Dt − f|V |)−M(αDr + βDr ) (5.58)
IDr ≤ sDr (Dt − f|V |) +M(αDr + βDr ) (5.59)
IDr ≥ sDr (Dt −BDr+1)−M(1− αDr ) (5.60)
IDr ≤ sDr (Dt −BDr+1) +M(1− αDr ) (5.61)
IDr ≥ sDr (Dt −BDr )−M(1− βDr ) (5.62)
IDr ≤ sDr (Dt −BDr ) +M(1− βDr ) (5.63)
5.B.1.0.3 (ii) Target is lower than region lower bound
IDr ≥ sDr (BDr − f|V |)−M(αDr + βDr ) (5.64)
IDr ≤ sDr (BDr − f|V |) +M(αDr + βDr ) (5.65)
IDr ≥ sDr (BDr −BDr+1)−M(1− αDr ) (5.66)
IDr ≤ sDr (BDr −BDr+1) +M(1− αDr ) (5.67)
IDr ≥ 0−M(1− βDr ) (5.68)
IDr ≤ 0 +M(1− βDr ) (5.69)
5.B.1.0.4 (iii) Target exceeds region upper bound
IDr ≥ sDr (BDr+1 − f|V |)−M(αDr + βDr ) (5.70)
IDr ≤ sDr (BDr+1 − f|V |) +M(αDr + βDr ) (5.71)
IDr ≥ 0−M(1− αDr ) (5.72)
IDr ≤ 0 +M(1− αDr ) (5.73)
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IDr ≥ sDr (BDr+1 −BDr )−M(1− βDr ) (5.74)
IDr ≤ sDr (BDr+1 −BDr ) +M(1− βDr ) (5.75)
5.B.2 Piecewise Linear Scope Contract
IS =
NRS∑
r=1
ISr (5.76)
5.B.2.0.1 (0) Assisting binary variables
|V |∑
i=1
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim > BSr+1 −M · (1− αSr ) ∀r = 1, ..., NRS (5.77)
|V |∑
i=1
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim ≤ BSr+1 +M · αSr ∀r = 1, ..., NRS (5.78)
|V |∑
i=1
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim > BSr −M · βSr ∀r = 1, ..., NRS (5.79)
|V |∑
i=1
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim ≤ BSr +M · (1− βSr ) ∀r = 1, ..., NRS (5.80)
αSr , β
S
r ∈ [0, 1] r = 1, ..., NRS (5.81)
5.B.2.0.2 (i) Region containing the target
ISr ≥ sSr (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim − St)−M(αSr + βSr ) (5.82)
ISr ≤ sSr (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim − St) +M(αSr + βSr ) (5.83)
ISr ≥ sSr (BSr+1 − St)−M(1− αSr ) (5.84)
ISr ≤ sSr (BSr+1 − St) +M(1− αSr ) (5.85)
ISr ≥ sSr (BSr − St)−M(1− βSr ) (5.86)
ISr ≤ sSr (BSr − St) +M(1− βSr ) (5.87)
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5.B.2.0.3 (ii) Target is lower than region lower bound
ISr ≥ sSr (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim −BSr )−M(αSr + βSr ) (5.88)
ISr ≤ sSr (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim −BSr ) +M(αSr + βSr ) (5.89)
ISr ≥ sSr (BSr+1 −BSr )−M(1− αSr ) (5.90)
ISr ≤ sSr (BSr+1 −BSr ) +M(1− αSr ) (5.91)
ISr ≥ 0−M(1− βSr ) (5.92)
ISr ≤ 0 +M(1− βSr ) (5.93)
5.B.2.0.4 (iii) Target exceeds region upper bound
ISr ≥ sSr (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim −BSr+1)−M(αSr + βSr ) (5.94)
ISr ≤ sSr (
|V |∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Sim · xim −BSr+1) +M(αSr + βSr ) (5.95)
ISr ≥ 0−M(1− αSr ) (5.96)
ISr ≤ 0 +M(1− αSr ) (5.97)
ISr ≥ sSr (BSr −BSr+1)−M(1− βSr ) (5.98)
ISr ≤ sSr (BSr −BSr+1) +M(1− βSr ) (5.99)
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5.C Overview of Notation
Index Description
i ∈ V = {1, ..., |V |} Activity index
m ∈ {1, ...,Mi} Activity mode index
r ∈ RC ∨ RD ∨ RS Contract region index
Variable Description
xim Binary variable = 1 when activity i is executed in mode m
fi Finishing time of activity i
Itot Total incentive amount earned
IC ID , IS Total cost, duration and scope incentive
ICr I
D
r , I
S
r Cost, duration and scope incentive earned in region r
αCr , α
D
r , α
S
r Binary variable = 1 if project cost/duration/scope exceeds the upper bound of region r
βCr , β
D
r , β
S
r Binary variable = 1 if project cost/duration/scope is lower than the lower bound of region r
Parameter Description
Cim, Dim, Sim, Eim Cost, duration, scope and effort associated with mode m of activity i
Ecostim Cost of effort associated with mode m of activity i
sCr Cost sharing ratio in region r
vDr , v
S
r Incentive amount per unit of time/scope in region r of the contract
Ct, Dt, St Cost, duration and scope target in the contract
BCr , B
D
r , B
S
r Lower bound of region r of the cost/duration/scope contract
M A large value (used for the big-M method)
Table 5.12: Overview of notation
6
Improving Contractor’s Control During Project
Execution: Earned Incentive Management
This research introduces a novel project control method for projects that use cost and/or
time incentives. The proposed earned incentive management (EIM) technique improves
upon the traditional earned value management (EVM) methodology for project control.
This is done by measuring the deviation in the accrual of incentives, rather than the
time and cost performance relative to the planned schedule. The proposed dedicated
approach avoids two key issues when controlling incentivized projects using traditional
earned value management techniques. Firstly, the impact of variations in the cost and
time dimensions are adequately weighted in the control signals. Secondly, the technique is
capable of monitoring the potential non-linear accrual of incentive amounts throughout the
project. The performance of the proposed technique is tested by means of a computational
experiment on 4,200 projects of varying size, structure and type of incentive contract.
The results show that the proposed technique significantly outperforms traditional EVM
techniques.
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6.1 Introduction
Project managers monitoring complex and risky projects rely on support from models to
guide their decision making. These models must provide the correct information to the
responsible actors, without inundating them with extraneous data (Browning, 2010). This
research presents a novel method to monitor the progress of incentivised projects. This
approach is based on the well known earned value and earned schedule techniques, and
extends the methodology in order to give more accurate signals to represent the status
of the project. The technique has been designed to need no more information than the
widely adopted earned value metrics, significantly lowering the threshold for adoption by
practitioners.
This new methodology ‘earned incentive management’ (EIM) circumvents two key
issues related to the monitoring of incentivised projects. Firstly, the relative importance
of the time and cost dimensions, as represented by the magnitude of their respective
incentives is incorporated in the monitoring signal. Because of this, it becomes easier to
set managerially relevant thresholds based on the expected impact on the bottom line. A
second issue resolved by the EIM technique is that the accrual of incentives, as opposed to
the accrual of value and the progression of time and cost as used in traditional EVM/ES,
is not necessarily a strictly increasing function over time. This makes it harder to judge
whether or not a project is progressing as planned, earning the desired incentive pay-off.
Because of the increased adoption of incentive agreements in practice, the literature
on the subject has been steadily expanding in recent years (see section 6.3). Nevertheless,
a practical methodology for monitoring the progress in incentivised projects has yet to be
proposed. Filling this gap is the main objective of this research. To achieve this objective,
the quantitative incentive framework proposed in chapter 3 is used as a foundation to
model incentivised projects.
The scope of this research is limited to the controlling phase of the project. As such,
it is assumed that the contract between the project owner and the contractor has already
been negotiated, and that the contractor has already optimized the manner in which (s)he
will execute the contract. As such, the objective is to optimize the control signals to assist
the contractor during the execution of the contract.
A key difference between this chapter and the preceding chapters on incentives in
projects is that the scope dimension of the trade-off is not included. The reason for this is
that the traditional EVM and ES methodology does not include this dimension. Hence,
including this dimension would require extending multiple facets of the original technique
simultaneously which would complicate the model presented in this chapter. Therefore,
the choice has been made not to include the scope dimension and to focus instead on a
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solid comparison of this technique and the well-known and widely used version of earned
value management.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First the literature which has
formed the basis for the EIM methodology is reviewed in section 6.2. Next, section 6.4
introduces the EIM methodology, using both a theoretical overview (section 6.4.1) and
a practical example of the methodology (section 6.4.2). The validity of this methodology
is then investigated using computational experiments in section 6.5, prior to formulating
a general conclusion in section 6.6. An overview of the notation used can be found in
appendix 6.A.
6.2 Literature on Project Control
The relevant literature consists of two key research areas. Firstly, the existing research
on project control, specifically earned value management and earned schedule which is
discussed in this section. Secondly, the literature on incentive contracting for projects,
which was analysed in detail in chapter 2.
Project control is one of the three key components of dynamic scheduling, a concept
introduced by Uyttewaal (2005) and refined by Vanhoucke (2013). During the control
phase, the responsible actor periodically monitors the project’s progress, taking action
when (s)he believes the project is liable to go out of control. To do this, actors frequently
employ quantitative control techniques that provide warning signals linked to the project
performance.
Having a correct view on how a project is performing during its execution has a pro-
found impact on the quality of the decisions made by the project manager (Bendoly and
Swink, 2007). One of the most frequently used techniques to create such performance data
is earned value management, a technique which has been in use since the 1960s (Vanhoucke,
2012a). The key advantage of this technique being the low effort required to track the
performance of a project. In spite of its considerable age, earned value management and
its more recent extension earned schedule have been the topic of numerous publications
in recent years (Acebes et al., 2015; Batselier and Vanhoucke, 2015; Chen et al., 2016;
Elshaer, 2013; Khamooshi and Golafshani, 2014; Naeni et al., 2014).
An introduction on the basic and more advanced concepts of earned value manage-
ment is given by several authors such as Anbari (2003), Fleming and Koppelman (2005),
Vanhoucke (2010b) and Vanhoucke (2014). For a recent and extensive review of literature
on earned value management and project control the reader is referred to Willems and
Vanhoucke (2015). A brief summary of the basic principles of earned value management,
as well as the basic formulae is presented in appendix 6.B.
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Despite its popularity, the earned value management technique is of course imperfect.
Hence, the technique is continually being extended and modified to fit specific situations
or in order to cover more aspects of project management. One example of this is the
earned schedule technique (Lipke, 2003). More recently, an extension has been proposed
by Browning (2014), who created a novel framework to account for quality, uncertainty,
risk, as well as opportunities when controlling project execution. This chapter also presents
an extension of this model, specifically to account for the use of incentive contracts.
6.3 Incentive Contracts
The project control methodology proposed in this research focuses on the two most fre-
quently used incentive dimensions: project cost and duration. The EIM methodology can
be used regardless of the type of contract, but for this research only the most frequently
used contract archetypes are used: linear, piecewise linear and quadratic (non-linear) for-
mulations. The notation used for these equation is identical to the notation used in chapter
3.
A linear incentive clause is the simplest possible incentive. Such an incentive only
requires the project owner to specify a specific target, and the magnitude of the (dis-
)incentive awarded to the contractor for deviations from this target.
IC(C) = sC · (Ct − C) (6.1)
Equation 6.1 is an example of such a linear contract for the cost dimension, and defines
IC(·) as a function calculating the awarded incentive amount, based on the final cost of the
project C. This equation is defined by two parameters: the target cost Ct and the fraction
of the deviation (sC ∈ [0, 1]) from this target which will be awarded to the contractor as
an incentive.
A similar equation can be constructed for the time performance of the contractor, the
sole difference being that the magnitude of the incentive is no longer a fraction of the
deviation, but a monetary valuation per unit of time (vD).
A piecewise linear contract is an extension of these simple linear formulations, allowing
for different incentive magnitudes to be used at varying distances of the target cost or
duration. As shown in equation 6.2 and illustrated in figure 6.1 for the cost dimension,
this is done by defining a number of regions r wherein specific sharing ratios sCr are used.
These regions are simply defined by their lower bounds BCr . A similar approach can be
taken for the duration dimension, again with the sole difference being that the magnitude
is no longer defined by a sharing ratio in the range [0, 1], but by a monetary valuation per
time unit vDr (see equation 6.3).
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of piecewise linear and non-linear cost incentive clauses.
IC(C) =

sC1 · (Ct −BC2 ) + sC2 · (BC2 − C) if C > BC2
sC1 · (Ct − C) if BC1 ≤ C ≤ BC2
sC1 · (Ct −BC1 ) + sC0 · (BC1 − C) if C < BC1
(6.2)
ID(D) =

vD1 · (Dt −BD2 ) + vD2 · (BD2 −D) if D > BD2
vD1 · (Dt −D) if BD1 ≤ D ≤ BD2
vD1 · (Dt −BD1 ) + vD0 · (BD1 −D) if D < BD1
(6.3)
A third type of equation which is used to determine the incentive amount awarded is a
non-linear incentive clause. The main advantage of such an incentive is the progressiveness
of the reward and/or penalty, which often allows a closer accord with the underlying cost
structure of the contractor, and therefore a better alignment of the objectives of both
actors.
Equations 6.4 and 6.5 show the non-linear formulations which are used in this research
(these equations are based on those used by Shr and Chen (2003)).The profile of the non-
linear cost incentive equation is also indicated on figure 6.1. Similarly to the (piecewise)
linear contracts, the non-linear contracts require the owner to specify a target for the
cost (Ct) or duration (Dt) dimensions. The magnitude of the incentive is determined by
the greatest incentive and disincentive amounts (ICmax, ICmin, IDmax and IDmin). Besides the
overall magnitude of the incentive, the owner also has to specify the range over which these
amounts should be spread. This range is expressed as a distance from the target cost or
duration. The positive incentives are spread over the ranges LBC and LBD for the cost
and duration dimensions respectively. Similarly, the disincentive amounts are spread over
the ranges UBC and UBD for the cost and duration dimensions respectively.
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IC(C) =

min
(
ICmax; ICmax ·
(
Ct−C
LBC
)2)
if C ≤ Ct
max
(
ICmin; ICmin ·
(
C−Ct
UBC
)2)
if C > Ct
(6.4)
ID(D) =

min
(
IDmax; IDmax ·
(
Dt−D
LBD
)2)
if D ≤ Dt
max
(
IDmin; IDmin ·
(
D−Dt
UBD
)2)
if D > Dt
(6.5)
Naturally, a lot of other contract clauses are used. However, the aforementioned types
are some of the most frequently employed in practice and studied in academic literature.
Moreover, the goal of this research is mainly to investigate the performance of project
control metrics rather than offer an in-depth analysis of the impact of highly-specific
incentive contracts.
6.4 Earned Incentive Management
6.4.1 EIM Methodology
Figure 6.2 shows a schematic overview of the proposed EIM methodology. The methodol-
ogy is based on a comparison of three schedules: the break-even schedule (β), the planned
execution schedule (pi), and the actual execution (α).
The break-even schedule is a project plan which results in a final cost Cβ and duration
Dβ which are exactly equal to the target cost (Ct) and target duration (Dt) as specified in
the contract. Hence, the incentives awarded are exactly zero for this scenario. Defining the
break-even schedule requires specifying a duration (Dβi ) and cost (C
β
i ) for each activity
i. The planned accrual of value (PV βt ) of the break-even schedule serves as a benchmark
against which the accrual of incentives can be compared.
The second schedule is the planned execution schedule (pi), which again requires a cost
(Cpii ) and a duration (Dpii ) to be specified for each activity i. This schedule is the result of
an optimisation which takes into account the properties of the activities constituting the
project, as well as the potential incentive earned. The objective of such an optimisation is
to maximise the profits for the actor executing the project, weighing his own investments
against the marginal incentive earnings, whilst also making the correct trade-off between
activity duration and cost. An example of such an optimisation can be found in chapter
5, where a multi-mode optimisation problem for projects with incentive contracts is pre-
sented. Hence, a comparison of the break-even (β) and the planned execution (pi) provides
insight in the desired accrual of the cost (IC) and duration (ID) incentives over time, as
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shown in figure 6.2.
The third and final component is the actual execution schedule (α), which consists of
data gathered during the execution of the project. This includes the percentage completed
(PCαi ), as well as the incurred cost (Cαi ) for each activity i. This incurred cost is equivalent
to the actual cost (AC) definition used in the traditional EVM approach. By comparing
the the actual (α) to the break-even (β) schedule, the actual accrual of the cost (IC) and
duration (ID) incentives can be monitored.
β. Break-even project 
execution
π. Planned project 
execution
α. Actual project 
execution
Planned 
incentive 
accrual
Actual 
incentive 
accrue
Traditional 
EVM/ES
EIM
Figure 6.2: Schematic overview of the EIM methodology
The project progress is monitored by comparing the actual accrual of incentives, as
derived from the comparison of schedules α and β, and the planned accrual of incentives,
as was derived from the comparison of pi and β. This approach can be contrasted with the
traditional EVM/ES methodology, which compares the planned project execution (pi) to
the actual project execution (α).
By comparing the accrual of incentives rather than the time and cost performance,
the signals are more closely linked to the contractor’s bottom line than in the EVM/ES
approach. Moreover, this also enables tracking possible irregular accrual of incentives. The
remainder of this section explains how the metrics for this comparison can be calculated
and interpreted, prior to illustrating this process on an example in section 6.4.2.
6.4.1.1 Step 1: Analyze the Planned Accrue of Value for the Break-even
Schedule
The first step of the process simply aggregates the activity-specific information of the
break-even schedule in order to accurately represent the accrual of value over time. This
is done using discrete time intervals indexed t = 1, ..., T , which represent the moments
when the project’s progress is measured (i.e. the control periods). As such, the planned
value of the work for each time period can be calculated as shown in equation 6.6.
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PV βt =
n∑
i=1
PCβit · Cβi (6.6)
In equation 6.6, PCβit represents the planned percentage completed of activity i in time
period t.
6.4.1.2 Step 2: Calculate the Planned Incentive Accrue
Once the planned value for the break-even (i.e. the benchmark project execution) has been
calculated, the next step is to compare the planned execution to the break-even schedule
in order to obtain the planned accrual of incentives. The accrual of cost in the planned
schedule can simply be calculated as follows:
Cpit =
n∑
i=1
PCpiit · Cpii (6.7)
Next, the earned value of the planned execution for each time period (EV pit ) is calcu-
lated as shown in Equation 6.8.
EV pit =
n∑
i=1
PCpiit · Cβi (6.8)
In equation 6.8, PCpiit represents the fraction of the work content of activity i which
has already been completed in time period t according to the planned execution schedule
(pi). This earned value information can then be used to determine the planned time
performance of the project. This is done using the earned schedule technique, which has
the advantage of being expressed in units of time rather than cost, allowing for a more
intuitive calculation of the incentive amounts. The earned schedule for the planned project
execution (ESpit ) at time period t can be calculated as shown in equations 6.9 and 6.10.
ESpit = τ +
EV pit − PV βτ
PV βτ+1 − PV βτ
(6.9)
τ = t|PV βt ≤ EV pit < PV βt+1 (6.10)
Once these quantities have been calculated, the planned accrual of cost and duration
incentives can be outlined. The planned accrual of the cost incentive at moment t is
calculated by inserting the difference of the target cost (Ct) and the cost variation (CV pit )
in the cost incentive equation IC(C) (see equations 6.2 and 6.4 in section 6.3). This results
in a planned cost incentive amount ICpit for time period t.
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ICpit = IC(Ct − CV pit ) = IC(Ct − [EV pit − Cpit ]) (6.11)
In a similar vein, the planned accrual of the duration incentive can be calculated
by inserting the difference between the target duration (Dt) and the schedule variance
(SV (t)pit ) into the duration incentive equation ID(D) (see equations 6.3 and 6.5 in section
6.3). The result of this calculation is a planned duration incentive amount IDpit for time
period t.
IDpit = ID(Dt − SV (t)pit ) = ID(Dt − [ESpit − t]) (6.12)
6.4.1.3 Step 3: Monitor Incentive Accrue During Project Progress
Once the benchmark incentive accrual has been established by calculating ICpit and IDpit ,
the project progress can be monitored. In order to do this the actual project progress
is compared to the break-even schedule (see figure 6.2). The calculations required to
determine the accrual of the incentives are analogous to those used to determine the
planned accrual of incentives, as is shown below.
First and foremost, the actual costs (Cαt ) at a specific moment in time can simply be
observed, either on the level of the project or at the level of the complete project1. This
approach is identical to the measurement of actual costs during traditional earned value
management, and is a practice requiring little effort since these costs are tracked using
standard cost accounting.
Aside from the incurred costs, the accrual of value has to be measured at the control
periods (t) during the execution of the project. This accrual is calculated using the break-
even scenario as a reference point, as shown in equation 6.13. In this equation PCαit
represents the actual percentage completed for activity i in time slot t. The earned value
for the actual schedule (EV αt ) is calculated by multiplying this percentage completed with
the foreseen cost from the break-even scenario.
EV αt =
n∑
i=1
PCαit · Cβi (6.13)
Once the earned value at a certain point in time is known, the earned schedule can be
calculated to determine the time performance (equations 6.14 and 6.15).
1For the example in section 6.4.2 it was assumed that the accrual of costs happened linearly throughout
the activity’s progress. As such, actual cost can be calculated as Cαt =
n∑
i=1
PCαit · Cαi , which is analogous
to equation 6.7.
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ESαt = τ +
EV αt − PV βτ
PV βτ+1 − PV βτ
(6.14)
τ = t|PV βt ≤ EV αt < PV βt+1 (6.15)
Finally, these values are used to determine the actual accrual of incentives at a certain
point in time. Again these equations are similar to those used to determine the planned
incentive accrue. Equation 6.16 shows the formula for the actual accrual of the cost incen-
tive (ICαt ), and equation 6.17 does the same for the duration incentive (IDαt ). Similarly to
the equations used to determine the planned accrual of incentives, these calculations link
back to the incentive clauses contained within the contract, as represented by equations
6.2 and 6.3.
ICαt = IC(Ct − CV αt ) = IC(Ct − [EV αt − Cαt ]) (6.16)
IDαt = ID(Dt − SV (t)αt ) = ID(Dt − [ESαt − t]) (6.17)
As indicated in figure 6.2, the actual monitoring of the project progress is done by
comparing the planned incentive accrual (ICpit , IDpit ) to the actual accrual of incentives
(ICαt , IDαt ). This can be done either separately for the cost and duration dimensions, or
jointly for the incentivised dimensions combined.
The simplest measure of project performance is the difference between these two sce-
narios at a specific point in time. In line with the EVM/ES nomenclature, these differ-
ences are dubbed incentive variation. Naturally, this metric can be calculated for the cost
(IV (C)t), duration (IV (D)t) or total (IV (tot)t) incentive amounts. Equations 6.18, 6.19
and 6.20 show how these respective measures are calculated.
IV (C)t = ICαt − ICpit (6.18)
IV (D)t = IDαt − IDpit (6.19)
IV (tot)t = (ICαt + IDαt )− (ICpit + IDpit ) (6.20)
A negative value for these metrics can be interpreted as a worse than planned perfor-
mance, whereas a positive value indicates a better than planned performance. In order to
transform this information into a control signal a threshold has to be set by the actor who
controls the project. The specific value of this threshold should be motivated from an eco-
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nomic perspective, including factors such as the inherent project risk as well as the weight
of the project within the total portfolio. A key factor which also has to be considered is
the effort which the actor is able to invest in project control. Setting the threshold too
tight may cause an inordinate workload to rectify a project that was not truly in trouble.
Combined with a threshold, these incentive variations result in a binary control indicator
which signifies when the project performance lies outside of the acceptable range.
6.4.2 Example
This section illustrates the EIM methodology using a small example project containing
three activities. The structure of this project is summarized in an activity on the node
network in figure 6.3. Furthermore, it is assumed that the contractor is subjected to a
contract containing a linear incentive for both the duration and the cost of the project.
These incentive clauses have the following form:
IC(C) = (C − Ct) · sC = (C − 22) · 0.5 (6.21)
ID(D) = (D −Dt) · vD = (D − 9) · 0.75 (6.22)
Where IC(C) and ID(D) represent the awarded cost and duration incentive based on
the final project cost (C) and duration (D). The target cost (Ct) and duration (Dt) in
this contract are set to 22 and 9 respectively. Cost savings or excesses are shared equally
by setting the sharing ratio (sC) of the cost contract to 0.5. Time savings or overruns are
valued (vD) at 0.75 per unit of time.
S
1 2
3
F
Figure 6.3: Activity on the node representation of the example problem
The first step in the EIM procedure is the creation of a break-even (β) and planned
(pi) schedule by defining a duration and cost for each of the activities, as shown in table
6.1. From this table it is clear that the total project cost for the break-even schedule (Cβ)
is equal to the target cost (Ct):
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Activity (i) Break Even (β) Planned (pi)
Dβi C
β
i D
pi
i C
pi
i
1 5 10 4 9
2 4 5 4 4
3 6 7 8 5
Table 6.1: Activity information for the break-even and planned schedules
Cβ =
n∑
i=1
Cβi = 10 + 5 + 7 = Ct (6.23)
Similarly, the duration of the break-even contract (Dβ) is equal to the target duration
(Dt) specified in the contract:
Dβ = max(Dβ1 +D
β
2 , D
β
3 ) = 9 = Dt (6.24)
Analogous calculations for the planned execution schedule (pi) reveal that the contrac-
tor is aiming for a duration (Dpi) of 8 time periods, and a total cost (Cpi) equal to 18. By
doing so, the contractor hopes to earn an incentive for both the time and cost dimension,
equal to 0.75 and 2 respectively2.
An important note is that the planned execution does not necessarily result in a pos-
itive outcome in terms of awarded incentives, since it may be more beneficial to allocate
scarce resources to other projects where the return on investment for these resources is
greater. For example, assume that a contractor is simultaneously executing two projects
for separate project owners and he has to allocate scarce resources such as equipment,
staff or management time between these two projects. If one of these two projects is
has substantially higher (dis-)incentive payments, the contractor is likely to allocate a
disproportionate amount of his resources to this project, all other factors remaining equal.
The next step is to calculate the planned accrual of both the cost and time incentive
based on the planned schedule (pi). An earliest start schedule is used for this example, but
any type of schedule can of course be used. A second assumption made for this example
is that the accrual of value for the activities happens in a linear fashion. Again, this
assumption is made to keep the example as simple as possible, and other assumptions can
also be used to adapt the technique to the reality of the project without changing the
proposed EIM technique. Based on these assumptions, it is straightforward to calculate
the planned value of each time period for the break even schedule, as described in section
6.4.1.1. The results of these calculations are shown in the PV βt column of table 6.2.
2ID = (9− 8) · 0.75 and IC = (22− 18) · 0.5
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t PV βt C
pi
t EV
pi
t ES
pi
t I
Cpi
t I
Dpi
t I
totpi
t C
α
t EV
α
t ES
α
t I
Cα
t I
Dα
t I
totα
t
1 3.17 2.88 3.38 1.07 0.25 0.05 0.30 2.51 2.77 0.87 0.13 -0.09 0.03
2 6.33 5.75 6.75 2.13 0.50 0.10 0.60 5.48 6.05 1.91 0.28 -0.07 0.22
3 9.50 8.63 10.13 3.20 0.75 0.15 0.90 8.35 9.23 2.91 0.44 -0.06 0.38
4 12.67 11.50 13.50 4.26 1.00 0.20 1.20 11.12 12.32 3.89 0.60 -0.08 0.52
5 15.83 13.13 15.63 4.93 1.25 -0.05 1.20 13.61 15.34 4.84 0.87 -0.12 0.75
6 18.25 14.75 17.75 5.79 1.50 -0.16 1.34 15.13 17.31 5.61 1.09 -0.29 0.80
7 19.50 16.38 19.88 7.30 1.75 0.23 1.98 16.85 19.55 7.04 1.35 0.03 1.38
8 20.75 18.00 22.00 9.00 2.00 0.75 2.75 18.09 21.16 8.33 1.53 0.24 1.78
9 22.00 - - - - - - 18.75 22.00 9.00 1.63 0.00 1.63
Table 6.2: Calculation of the EIM metrics for the example project.
t IV (C)t IV (D)t IV (tot)t
1 -0.12 -0.14 -0.27
2 -0.22 -0.17 -0.38
3 -0.31 -0.21 -0.52
4 -0.40 -0.28 -0.68
5 -0.38 -0.07 -0.45
6 -0.41 -0.14 -0.54
7 -0.40 -0.19 -0.59
8 -0.47 -0.51 -0.97
9 -0.38 -0.75 -1.13
Table 6.3: Incentive variance for the example problem
Using the same two assumptions, the planned accrual of value and incentives can be
calculated as described in section 6.4.1.2. The results of these calculations are shown in
table 6.2. When looking at these results it can be observed that the accrual of the cost
incentive is expected to be quite linear, whereas the accrued duration incentive is more
volatile over time. This aspect is highly relevant when monitoring the accrual of the
incentive amount over time.
Once these calculations have been made, the progress of the project can be monitored
using the formulae described in section 6.4.1.3. For this example it is assumed that the
status of the project has been checked at each discrete time period t. The results of the
calculations are shown in the rightmost part of table 6.2. Note that the earned value
of the actual project execution (EV αt ) is a given is this table, as this is observed by the
contractor. Using this information, the project’s progress can be monitored. This is done
by calculating the incentive variances (see section 6.4.1.3), as shown in table 6.3.
As a point of reference, the traditional EVM approach has also been applied to the
example project. The results of these calculations are shown in table 6.4. As indicated
in figure 6.2, the traditional EVM technique compares the actual project execution to
the planned project execution. Hence, the planned value (PV ) measure in table 6.4 cor-
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t PV EV AC ES CV CPI SV SPI SV (t) SPI(t)
1 2.88 2.37 2.51 0.83 -0.14 0.94 -0.36 0.83 -0.17 0.83
2 5.75 5.17 5.48 1.80 -0.31 0.94 -0.27 0.90 -0.20 0.90
3 8.63 7.87 8.35 2.74 -0.48 0.94 -0.28 0.91 -0.26 0.91
4 11.50 10.48 11.12 3.64 -0.64 0.94 -0.38 0.91 -0.36 0.91
5 13.13 12.94 13.61 4.88 -0.67 0.95 0.48 0.99 -0.12 0.98
6 14.75 14.46 15.13 5.82 -0.67 0.96 0.38 0.98 -0.18 0.97
7 16.38 16.17 16.85 6.87 -0.69 0.96 0.48 0.99 -0.13 0.98
8 18.00 17.40 18.09 7.63 -0.69 0.96 0.09 0.97 -0.37 0.95
9 18.00 18.00 18.75 8.00 -0.75 0.96 0.75 1.00 -1.00 0.89
Table 6.4: The traditional EVM metrics applied to the example project.
responds to the costs of the planned project execution (Cpit ) in the EIM methodology.
Similarly, the actual costs (AC) of the EVM methodology are equivalent to the costs of
the actual schedule (Cαt ) in the EIM methodology. A key difference between the two
techniques is that the earned value (EV ) of the EVM technique is expressed in terms of
the planned schedule, rather than the break-even schedule and does not correspond to any
of the earned value calculations in the proposed EIM approach.
The results of the EVM and EIM techniques are visualised in figure 6.4. The top
two panels in this figure show the traditional EVM approach, and the bottom two panels
show the EIM approach. Both control techniques clearly indicate that the project’s
performance was worse than the performance outlined in the planned schedule.
When comparing the signals provided by the two techniques, the advantages of the
EIM technique are clear. Firstly, the deviations in performance are measured in terms
of their actual financial impact on the project performance. A second advantage which
follows from this first observation is the possibility of creating a single aggregated metric
which represents the overall performance of the project (IV (tot)t in the bottom right
panel). A third key advantage of the EIM approach is the possibility of tracking non-
linear or non-increasing accrual of incentives throughout the project. An example of this
is the cost performance during the first four periods of the project. Whereas the EVM
technique indicates that the cost performance remains relatively stable, it is clear that the
deviation from the planned cost incentive is becoming progressively worse during these
time periods (the IV (C)t curve on the bottom right panel is steadily declining).
As was stated in 6.4.1.3, it would be up to the actor controlling the project to define
thresholds for the total incentive variation (the IV (tot)t) and/or for the cost and duration
incentive variations (IV (C)t and IV (D)t).
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Figure 6.4: Analysis of the example using EVM (top panels) and EIM (bottom panels).
6.5 Computational Experiments
In this section a computational experiment is presented which tests the performance of
the proposed EIM methodology when compared to the performance of the traditional
EVM approach for project control. The experimental procedure is first outlined in section
6.5.1. Next, the dataset and parameters used for the experiment are discussed in section
6.5.2. Finally, the results which compare the performance of the different project control
approaches are discussed in section 6.5.3.
6.5.1 Experiment Design
This section explains the nature of the computational experiment. First, section 6.5.1.1
gives an overview of the simulation procedure used to model activity progress. Next,
the way in which the results from these simulation runs are aggregated and analysed is
discussed in section 6.5.1.2.
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6.5.1.1 Simulation Procedure
To compare the performance of the project control techniques, the actual project progress
is simulated. For each of these simulations, the binary signals produced by the control
techniques are determined for a number of predefined control periods. These signals are
then compared to the actual project outcome, enabling the veracity of signals to be eval-
uated. Figure 6.5 shows a high-level overview of the simulation procedure which will be
explained in more detail in this section.
START
For each activity i in the project
(algorithm 1)
Draw random duration
Determine activity cost
For each control period
Determine project status
Calculate project outcomes
(total cost and duration)
Calculate control metrics 
(EVM and/or EIM)
Warning 
Signal No Signal
FINISH
Figure 6.5: Schematic overview of the simulation procedure
The first step in the simulation procedure is the generation of activity durations and
activity costs. The two-step procedure used to do this is shown in algorithm 6. First,
the actual activity duration (Dαi ) for activity i is drawn at random from a triangular
distribution. This distribution is defined by a mode, minimal and maximal value for
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the activity duration (Dmodi , Dmini and Dmaxi respectively). Next, the generated activity
duration is used as one of the components to determine the actual activity cost (Cαi ).
The actual activity cost is defined as an increasing function of the activity duration, since
activity delays are likely to increase the costs associated with an activity. This function is
multiplied by a random noise factor to represent possible inconsistencies in the relationship
between activity duration and costs. In this equation Cmini represents the cost associated
with the shortest possible duration of activity i, ρi signifies the marginal cost increase
when the activity have its maximal duration. The noise factor for activity is expressed as
a factor δi which has to be situated in the range ]0, 1[.
Algorithm 6 Simulate activity
1: procedure SimulateActivity(i)
2: Dαi ← Tri(Dmini , Dmaxi , Dmodi )
3: Cαi ←
(
Cmini +
Dαi −Dmini
Dmax
i
−Dmin
i
· ρi
)
· [1 + u(−δi, δi)]
Once the duration and cost for each activity has been determined, the total project cost
and duration can be calculated. The former is simply equal to the sum of the costs of the
individual activities (Cα = ∑ni Cαi ). The actual project duration (Dα) is calculated using
a simple recursive procedure which assumes that all activities start as soon as possible.
As shown in figure 6.5, the final step in the simulation procedure is an iteration over
the control periods, which are evenly spread over the planned duration (Dpi) of the project.
At each control period t, the status of the project has to be determined. Specifically, the
accrued cost and value for the individual activities is calculated. This is done assuming a
linear accrual of costs and value throughout the actual duration (Dαi ) of the activities.
This information can then be used in combination with a performance metric (see
section 6.4) and a signal threshold to determine whether or not a signal is given to the
actor controlling the project. The computational experiments presented in this research
include four different performance metrics, which are explained below.
Basic EVM performance indicators: This controlling technique simply sets a
threshold for the CPI and the SPI(t) indicators as calculated using the traditional
EVM and ES methodology (see section 6.2).
EVM forecasting: Rather than setting thresholds for the relative performance indica-
tors, this method uses the EVM metrics to forecast the project duration and costs.
At time interval t the duration of the project is forecast as τ + (Dpi−ESt). Where τ
represents the current time. Similarly, the project cost is forecast as Cαt +(Cpi−EVt)
at time interval t. This technique gives a signal when the forecast duration or cost
exceeds the thresholds set for either of these two criteria.
Separate EIM: The first technique for the EIM metric sets a threshold for the cost
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and duration incentive variation respectively, as calculated by equations 6.18 and
6.19. If either of these two variations exceeds the predefined threshold, a signal is
given to the controlling actor.
Joint EIM: Rather than setting thresholds for the cost and time objectives separately,
this method sets a threshold for the total incentive variance (equation 6.20). In
theory, this should allow for a perfect weighing of the cost and time performance,
also allowing for good performance in one of these dimensions to compensate for
deficiencies in the other dimension as long as the total incentive earnings are not at
risk.
Rather than testing the performance of these techniques for an arbitrary threshold, a
large number of thresholds spread over a reasonable range have been tested. For the basic
EVM technique the following thresholds have been tested: 0.6, 0.625, 0.65, 0.675, 0.7,
0.725, 0.75, 0.775, 0.8, 0.825, 0.85, 0.875, 0.9, 0.925, 0.95, 0.975, 0.99, 0.995, 0.999, 1. (i.e.
if the CPI or SPI(t) exceeds this threshold a signal is produced.) For the EVM method
with forecasting a similar approach is used: a signal is produced when the cost or duration
forecast exceeds the planned cost (Cpi) or duration (Dpi) divided by x respectively, where
x is equal to one of the numbers in the set of thresholds which is also used for the basic
EVM technique.
Because the EIM technique does not use ratios to measure performance, the threshold
used can not simply be an abstract value as for the EVM metrics. To get an adequate
spread for the threshold values the project is simulated 1, 000 times in order to estimate
the standard deviation for the project cost and duration. Using this information thresholds
can be determined as follows:
THRC = IC (Cpi + x · σ(Cα)) (6.25)
THRD = ID (Dpi + x · σ(Dα)) (6.26)
THRtot = THRC + THRD (6.27)
Where THRC and THRD are the thresholds used for the first EIM technique which
measures the performance for the cost and duration dimensions separately, and THRtot
is the threshold used for the second EIM technique which monitors global performance.
These estimates are made by passing the cost and duration from the planned schedule
(Cpi and Dpi) plus a fraction x of the observed standard deviation for these two quantities
(σ(Cα) and σ(Dα)) to the respective incentive equations (see equations 6.2 until 6.5). The
tightness of these thresholds is determined by setting a value for the parameter x. For
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True condition
Project failure Project success
Predicted status Failure (signal) True positive False positiveSuccess (no signal) False negative True negative
Table 6.5: Overview of possible scenarios
the experiments presented below, the x parameter has been given the following values:
{0.1, 0.27, 0.44, ..., 3.33}.
Once these signals have been obtained, the next step is to judge their adequacy. The
next section gives a detailed overview of the classification and metrics used for the signals
derived from these calculations.
6.5.1.2 Output Metrics
The first step to judge whether or not a control metric correctly classifies the status of a
project is to classify the potential outcomes of the project in two categories: failure and
success. The criterion used for this is whether or not the total incentive amount earned
is within an acceptable range of the planned incentive amount earned (see equations 6.11
and 6.12).
Similarly to the definition of the threshold for the EIM metrics (see section 6.5.1.1),
the inherent cost and time risk of the project is taken into account in order to set the
allowable deviation from the target incentives. These target incentive amounts can be
expressed as IC(Cpi) and ID(Dpi) for cost and duration respectively. For this experiment,
it was assumed that a deviation up to 50% of one standard deviation would be deemed
within acceptable limits. As such, the lower bounds for the acceptable incentive amounts
become equal to IC(Cpi + 0.5 · σ(Cα)) and ID(Dpi + 0.5 · σ(Dα)) for cost and duration
respectively. The lowest total incentive earnings then simply become the sum of these two
quantities. Hence, the project is considered to be successful if:
ICα + IDα ≥ IC(Cpi + 0.5 · σ(Cα)) + ID(Dpi + 0.5 · σ(Dα)) (6.28)
Given the binary nature of the project results (success/failure) and the control signal
(warning/no warning) there are four possible results for a single control period. Table 6.5
summarises the possible combinations.
By observing the frequencies of observations in each of these categories across multiple
simulations and project environments, a number of summary statistics can be calculated.
The first of these is the true positive rate (TPR), which is the fraction of positive signals
which rightfully indicate that the project is out of control (equation 6.29).
178 Chapter 6
TPR =
∑True positive∑Project failure (6.29)
A second summary metric is the false positive rate (FPR), or the likelihood of a
positive signal being given when the project was actually under control (equation 6.30).
FPR =
∑False positive∑Project success (6.30)
The third summary metric is the positive predictive value (PPV ), which represents the
fraction of positive signals rightfully indicating the project being out of control (equation
6.31).
PPV =
∑True positive∑Signal (6.31)
Similarly, the negative predictive value (NPV ) represents the likelihood of the project
being under control when no signal is given (equation 6.32).
NPV =
∑True negative∑No signal (6.32)
A final metric is the accuracy (ACC), which is the total fraction of project which have
been correctly classified by the control technique (equation 6.33).
ACC =
∑True positive + True negative∑Total population (6.33)
6.5.2 Dataset
An extensive dataset containing 4,200 projects has been created in order to test the per-
formance of the proposed EIM methodology. The procedure used to create this dataset
consists of four phases, which are explained in detail in the sections below. The first phase
is the creation of a network structure for the project (section 6.5.2.1). Once this network
structure has been defined, the properties of the individual activities are defined (section
6.5.2.2). This includes stochastic distributions which govern the time and cost perfor-
mance of the activities. The third step in the procedure is the definition of the planned
and break-even schedules which are used by the EIM methodology (section 6.5.2.3). In
the forth and final phase, the incentive contract for the project is defined (section 6.5.2.4).
The parameters used for the data generation procedure are summarised in table 6.6. In
this table the notation u(·, ·) is used to represent a continuous uniform distribution.
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Parameter Meaning Values
n Number of non-dummy activities {30, 60, 90, 120}
SP Serial-Parallel indicator {0.16, 0.33, 0.5, 0.66, 0.83}
Dmodi Mode of activity duration for activity i u(5, 25)
Dmini Minimal activity duration for activity i u(0.2, 0.9) ·Dmodi
Dmaxi Maximal activity duration for activity i u(1.1, 2.0) ·Dmodi
Cmini Minimal activity cost for activity i u(0.5, 10.0)
ρi Marginal cost for maximal time increase for activity i u(1.0, 10.0)
δi Cost noise factor for activity i u(0.05, 0.15)
Dβi Duration of activity i in the break-even schedule u(0.5, 1.5) ·Dmodi
− Contract type {NL,L, 2PL, 3PL}
sCr Cost sharing ratio for region r u(0.1, 0.9)
vDr Incentive per unit of time in region r u(0.1, 0.9) · TV
BCr , BDr Bounds for piecewise linear cost or duration clause spread evenly over simulated range
ICmax Maximal incentive amount in non-linear cost clause u(0.1, 0.9) · (Cβ − Csimulatedmin )
ICmin Minimal incentive amount in non-linear cost clause u(0.1, 0.9) · (Csimulatedmax − Cβ)
LBC Lower bound for non-linear cost clause Cβ − Csimulatedmin
UBC Upper bound for non-linear cost clause Csimulatedmax − Cβ
IDmax Maximal incentive amount in non-linear duration clause u(0.1, 0.9) · TV · (Dβ −Dsimulatedmin )
IDmin Minimal incentive amount in non-linear duration clause u(0.1, 0.9) · TV · (Dsimulatedmin −Dβ)
LBD Lower bound for non-linear duration clause Dβ −Dsimulatedmin
UBD Upper bound for non-linear duration clause Dsimulatedmax −Dβ
Table 6.6: Parameters used for data generation.
6.5.2.1 Network Structure
The network structure has been created using the RanGen2 tool which has been created
by Vanhoucke et al. (2008). This tool takes the number of non-dummy activities and the
serial-parallel (SP ) indicator as input parameters in order to create a set of topologically
diverse network structures. The SP -metric represents a continuum between completely
serial (1) and completely parallel (0) project networks (Tavares et al., 2002). As shown in
table 6.6, the project size was varied from 30 to 120 projects, and the SP -indicator was
set to one of five different values. For each combination of project size and SP -indicator
210 projects are generated, resulting in a total of 4,200 projects.
6.5.2.2 Activity Stochasticity
Once the network structure has been created, the data generation procedure iterates over
all the (non-dummy) activities to define the associated stochastic distributions (see section
6.5.1.1). As shown in the second part of table 6.6, the values for these parameters are
all drawn from continuous uniform distributions. Note that the minimal and maximal
durations are defined in relative terms to the mode of the activity duration.
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6.5.2.3 Schedule Generation
As explained in section 6.4.1 the EIM requires three schedules. Specifically, the planned
(pi), break-even (β) and actual schedules (α) are used. Whereas the actual schedule is
the result of the (simulated) project execution, the other two schedules have to be defined
beforehand. In order for a schedule to be defined, both the duration and cost of all its
activities have to be specified.
The activity durations for the planned schedule are simply equal to the mode of the
activity duration distributions (Dpii = Dmodi ). The associated costs (Cpii ) for this schedule
are generated using the same procedure as shown in algorithm 6.
For the break-even schedule, the activity durations (Dβi ) are determined using a random
variation around the mode of the activity duration distribution (see table 6.6). Again, the
logic from algorithm 6 is used to associate a cost with this activity duration.
6.5.2.4 Incentive Contract Structure
The final step in the problem generation procedure is the creation of incentive agreements
for the created projects and schedules. As explained in section 6.3, an incentive contract
consists of multiple incentive clauses. For this research two incentive clauses are considered.
These clauses are linked to the project cost and duration respectively.
Four different archetypes of incentive equations are considered for the dataset used in
these experiments: non-linear (NL, see equations 6.4 and 6.5) linear (L), piecewise linear
with two segments (PL2) and piecewise linear with three segments (PL3, see equations
6.2 and 6.3). Moreover, it is also assumed that the incentive clauses for the cost and
duration dimensions have the same archetype (e.g. if the cost incentive is determined by a
non-linear function, the duration incentive will be as well). The four archetypes used are
spread evenly across the 4, 200 created projects (see section 6.5.2.1), resulting in a total of
1, 050 projects using each contract archetype.
Once the contract type has been determined, the parameters for the contract are
defined. As per definition the target cost (Ct) and duration (Dt) are set equal to the cost
and duration of the break-even schedule (Cβ and Dβ respectively).
The setting of the other parameters is based on the inherent variability of the project
as observed from 1, 000 simulation runs of the actual schedule (see section 6.5.1.1). For
the linear and piecewise linear contracts the magnitude of the incentive is determined by
the sCr and vDr parameters respectively. Since the former is a relative fraction of the cost
deviation which is allocated to the contractor, the value used can simply be drawn from
a continuous uniform distribution, as indicated in table 6.6. To determine the magnitude
of the duration incentive (vDr ), a theoretical valuation of the duration dimension relative
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to the cost dimension is defined as TV .
TV = u(0.5, 2.5) · C
simulated
max − Csimulatedmin
Dsimulatedmax −Dsimulatedmin
(6.34)
In equation 6.34, Csimulatedmax , Csimulatedmin , Dsimulatedmax and Dsimulatedmin represent the maxi-
mal and minimal outcomes of the simulation runs for the project’s total cost and duration.
The value of TV should be interpreted as the owner’s monetary valuation per time unit.
This value is determined in relative terms to the cost variability observed in the simulation
runs. Hence, the time dimension can be anywhere from half as important to two and a
half times as important as the cost dimension in the eyes of the project owner. For each
region in the duration contract clause the actual fraction of this value awarded to the
contractor as an incentive is again determined using a random draw from a continuous
uniform distribution, as shown in table 6.6.
The bounds for piecewise linear contracts (BCr and BDr ) are spread evenly across the
range given by the minimal and maximal outcome of these simulations. i.e. If the cost
clause uses a piecewise linear contract with two segments the value of BC2 will be equal to
0.5 · (Csimulatedmax − Csimulatedmin ).
For the non-linear contract forms, a similar approach is taken which uses the outcome
of simulated project to estimate the variability of the project to define reasonable upper
and lower bounds, as well as incentive amounts. The specific distributions used to do this
are shown at the bottom of table 6.6.
6.5.3 Computational Results
For each of the 4,200 projects in the dataset (see section 6.5.2) 1,000 simulations runs have
been performed. The project control metrics have been calculated in four evenly-spaced
control periods for each of these simulations. Using the metrics described in section 6.5.1.2,
the results of this computational experiment are discussed in this section. First, the overall
performance of the different control techniques is discussed in section 6.5.3.1. Next, the
sensitivity of these observations to the problem size, network structure and contract type
is discussed in section 6.5.3.2.
6.5.3.1 Overall Performance
Figure 6.6 shows the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve for the four different
control techniques for each of the four control periods. Since an optimal technique would
have a true positive rate equal to 1 and a false positive rate equal to 0 the optimal region
on these plots is the upper left corner of the plot. The diagonal from the lower left to the
upper right corner represents the theoretical performance of a randomly generated signal.
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Figure 6.6: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) chart
Hence, the performance of the binary classifiers can be judged by the surface area between
their respective curve and the random diagonal. A number of conclusions can be drawn
from these different plots.
(i) All methods perform better than a random signal. For every control period and
every controlling technique the signals are better than a random signal, as indicated by
the diagonal line on the curve.
(ii) The EIM -techniques consistently outperform the EVM -techniques. The perfor-
mance of both the EIM techniques is consistently better than that of either of the EVM -
based techniques, across all control periods.
(iii) The joint EIM -techniques perform better than the separate EIM techniques.
None of the points on the separate EIM curves dominate the points on the joint EIM
curves, whereas the opposite is true for a large fraction of the points. Hence, it is advisable
to use the joint EIM technique that defines a single threshold based on the total incentives
earned to monitor the project performance. An interesting consequence of this is that the
effort needed to control the project is reduced (since only one rather than two metrics has
to be checked), whilst also improving the performance of the project control.
(iv) The performance difference between EVM and EIM techniques becomes smaller
as the project progresses. As the project progresses the performance of the EVM -based
techniques becomes better, as indicated by the increased distance from the random di-
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agonal. Nevertheless, the performance is still significantly worse than that of the EIM
technique.
(v) The performance difference between the joint and separate EIM techniques in-
creases as the project progresses. As shown in figure 6.6, the area between the joint and
separate EIM curves increases as the project progresses.
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Figure 6.7: Accuracy (ACC), positive predictive value (PPV ) and negative predictive value
(NPV ) averaged over all control periods.
A comparison of the accuracy as well as the positive and negative predictive values
(see section 6.5.1.2) of the various techniques is made in figure 6.7. For this chart the best
threshold value was selected for each technique for each of these metrics. For each of these
metrics, the superior performance of the EIM -based signals is confirmed. When judged
in terms of overall accuracy or positive predictive value it appears that the separate EIM
thresholds outperform the joint approach.
6.5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 6.8 shows the influence of the project size, the project structure and the nature
of the contract on the accuracy of the control signals. A first key observation is that
the difference in performance between the various techniques appears to be approximately
constant when the environment in which they operate varies.
Table 6.7 shows the results of an ANOV A test that compared the means for each
technique and for each of these environment parameters (only the p-values are reported,
a large p-value indicating that the null hypothesis that all means are equal cannot be
rejected). It is immediately apparent that changes in the serial-parallel structure or the
type of contract do not influence the mean performance. There do however seem to be
statistically significant differences for the EIM technique for increasing problem size.
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Figure 6.8: Impact of project and contract structure on the accuracy of control signals.
To further investigate this trend for the EIM indicators, a Tukey test is used to perform
a pairwise comparison of the means for varying project sizes. The results of this test are
summarised in table 6.8 (again only the p-values are reported here). From this table it is
clear that the difference in the averages between adjacent points is not always significant,
but that the differences between other points appear to be statistically significant. In spite
of this, the magnitude of this change is only small and it is unlikely that this difference is
substantial in practical applications.
The analysis of the performance sensitivity for the other performance measures (see
section 6.5.1.2) revealed similar robustness of the project control techniques. Hence, it can
be concluded that the observations made in section 6.5.3.1 are robust to changes in the
project and contract structure.
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Structure parameter EVM EVMFC Separate EIM Joint EIM
Project size 0.481 0.268 0.002 0.000
Serial-Parallel 0.969 0.942 0.917 0.620
Contract type 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Table 6.7: p-values from ANOV A analysis for project size, SP -indicator and contract type.
separate EIM Joint EIM
30-60 0.9998588 0.9707012
60-90 0.0889764 0.0006076
90-120 0.9413071 0.9792367
30-90 0.0745908 0.0031896
30-120 0.0155919 0.0118580
60-120 0.0194406 0.0026689
Table 6.8: Tukey multiple comparison procedure for different project sizes.
6.6 Conclusions
This research introduced a novel project control technique specifically tailored to projects
subjected to incentives. This technique is an extension of the traditional EVM/ES tech-
niques and is dubbed ‘earned incentive management’ (EIM). By taking this more ded-
icated approach to project control two key issues can be avoided. Firstly, the separate
impact of the cost and duration dimensions can be correctly weighted, eliminating the
need for dimension-specific metrics. Secondly, the EIM methodology is capable of moni-
toring non-increasing and irregular accrual of incentives throughout the project, resulting
in more effective project control.
The advantages of the proposed control technique have been tested using a computa-
tional experiment which simulated the control performance on 4,200 projects with varying
size and contract structures. The results of these experiments showed that the EIM tech-
nique significantly outperforms conventional EVM/ES methods, and should therefore be
preferred in projects where cost and time incentives play a significant role.
Several opportunities for future research have also been uncovered, such as the adoption
of the model for highly specific incentive contracts. Another avenue for future research is
the extension of the control signals to create probabilistic estimators, which could provide
a more detailed risk analysis for an incentivised project. The model could also be extended
to include incentives linked to dimensions other than time and cost such as scope, quality
or safety. Another extension could be to apply the incentives logic to less clearly defined
projects where making a very detailed a priori plan is impossible (as was done by Le´va´rdy
and Browning (2009)).
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6.A Overview of Notation
A comprehensive overview of the notation introduced in this research is given by table 6.9.
Index Description
i ∈ V = {1, ..., n} Activity index
t ∈ {1, ..., T} Time index (control periods)
r ∈ {1, ..., R} Contract region
Contract Variables Description
IC(·), ID(·), Itot Cost, duration and total incentive awarded
Ct, Dt Cost and duration target as specified in the contract
sCr Cost sharing fraction for contract region r
vDr Awarded incentive per unit of time in region r
BCr , B
D
r Lower bound of region r in piecewise linear cost or duration contract
UBC , UBD Upper bound of incentive spread in non-linear cost or duration contract
LBC , LBD Lower bound of incentive spread in non-linear cost or duration contract
ICmax, I
D
max Maximal cost and duration incentive amount for non-linear contract
ICmin, I
D
min Minimal cost and duration incentive amount for non-linear contract
Project Control Variables Description
β Break-even schedule
pi Planned execution project schedule
α Actual observed execution of the project
Cβ , Cpi , Cα Total project cost for respective schedules
C
β
i
, Cpii , C
α
i Cost associated with activity i for respective schedules
C
β
t
, Cpit , C
α
t Total cost at a time interval t for respective schedules
Dβ , Dpi , Dα Total project duration for respective schedules
D
β
i
, Dpii , D
α
i Duration associated with activity i for respective schedules
ICpi , ICα Cost incentive earned for planned and actual schedule respectively
IDpi , IDα Duration incentive earned for planned and actual schedule respectively
PC
β
it
, PCpiit, PC
α
it Percentage completed for activity i at time t in the respective schedules
PV
β
t
Planned value at time interval t in the break-even schedule
EV pit ,EV
α
t Earned value at time interval t of the planned and actual schedule respectively
ESpit ,ES
α
t Earned schedule at time interval t of the planned and actual schedule respectively
CV pit ,CV
α
t Cost variance at time interval t for the planned and actual schedule respectively
SV pit ,SV
α
t Schedule variance at time interval t for the planned and actual schedule respectively
IV (C)t, IV (D)t, IV (tot)t Cost, duration and total incentive variance at time interval t
Table 6.9: Overview of notation
6.B A Summary of Traditional Earned Value Management
Earned value management relies on a number of straightforward metrics to measure the
time and cost performance of a project. The baseline against which the performance of
the project is compared is dubbed the ‘planned value’ (PVt). This is a time-phased budget
baseline that equals the planned cumulative expenses at every time period. Plotting the
planned value as a function of time results in the frequently encountered ‘S-curve’ (see
top left panel in figure 6.4). The calculation of the planned value for time period t can be
expressed as follows:
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PVt =
n∑
i=1
PCpiit · Cpii (6.35)
Where PCpiit is the planned percentage of work completed for activity i at time period
t and Cpii is the planned total cost of activity i.
During the execution of the project two types of information are gathered. The first
is the actually incurred cost (ACt), which is the result of straightforward cost accounting.
Secondly, the value of the amount of work which has been completed is tracked. This
metric is dubbed ‘earned value’ (EVt) and is calculated by multiplying the percentage
completed by the planned cost for the activity. Using the notation used in the research
this becomes:
EVt =
n∑
i=1
PCαit · Cpii (6.36)
Where PCαit is the fraction of the work for activity i completed in time period t of the
actual project execution, and Cpii is the activity cost as initially planned.
These three measures (PVt, ACt and EVt) form the basis for all metrics used in earned
value management. The cost performance of the project can be expressed by the cost
variance (CVt) or the cost performance index (CPIt) as follows:
CVt = EVt −ACt (6.37)
CPIt =
EVt
ACt
(6.38)
A positive value for the cost variance (CVt) indicates better than expected cost perfor-
mance, whereas a negative value indicates that the costs are higher than initially expected.
The cost performance index (CPIt) is interpreted in a similar manner, a value below unity
indicating worse than expected cost performance, the inverse being true for a value above
unity.
The time performance can be analysed in a similar manner, resulting in a schedule
variance (SVt) and schedule performance index (SPIt) which can be calculated as follows:
SVt = EVt − PVt (6.39)
SPIt =
EVt
PVt
(6.40)
The interpretation of these metrics is analogous to the cost metrics. A negative value
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for the schedule variance (SVt) indicates that the project is behind schedule, a positive
value that the project is progressing faster than originally planned. The same is true for
values below and above unity for the SPIt metric.
These traditional time performance metrics have two major shortcomings. Firstly, they
measure time performance as a monetary amount, which can be quite hard to interpret
correctly. Secondly, the schedule performance index (SPIt) converges to unity at the end of
the project, which may convey an incorrect signal that the time performance is improving
when this is not the case in reality. To mitigate these issues, the earned schedule (ESt)
metric has been proposed by Lipke (2003). This approach translates the earned value to
time units by calculating the fraction of the original schedule that has been earned at a
specific point in time. The earned schedule metric at time period t is calculated as follows:
ESt = τ +
EVt − PVτ
PVτ+1 − PVτ (6.41)
where τ is an integer value which satisfies the following criterion:
PVτ ≤ EVt < PVτ+1 (6.42)
The schedule variance (SVt) and schedule performance index (SPIt) can then be recal-
culated using the earned schedule methodology as shown in equations 6.43 and 6.44. The
conventional notation adds (t) to indicate that these metrics have been calculated using
the earned schedule formulae. This is not to be confused with the index t that indicates
the time period.
SV (t)t = ESt − t (6.43)
SPI(t)t =
ESt
t
(6.44)
Again, the schedule variance (SV (t)t) is negative when the project’s time performance
is worse than expected and positive when the opposite is true. Similarly, SPI(t)t is below
unity when the project is behind schedule and above unity when the time performance is
better than expected.
The metrics which have been summarised in this appendix can be used as the basis for
forecasting and control systems, as is evident from the substantial amount of literature on
the subject (see section 6.2). The specifics of these applications fall outside the scope of
this appendix, and the reader is referred to the following authors for a more comprehensive
overview of the subject matter: Anbari (2003); Fleming and Koppelman (2005); Vanhoucke
(2010b, 2014).
Part II
Schedule optimisation for
weather-sensitive projects
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7
Modelling the Weather
This chapter presents an overview of weather modelling principles, and proposes a new
weather model which is stylised specifically for operational relevance. Specifically, this
simulation model is capable of simulating both wind speed and wave height simultaneously.
As such, this model can be employed to improve the quality of operational simulations,
specifically for offshore operations, which is the subject of chapters 8 and 9.
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7.1 Introduction
Accurately estimating the weather has been a goal in operations management for over a
century. The majority of models which have been created for this purpose have focussed
on predicting precipitation, which is of major importance to agriculture and many other
industries (Wilks and Wilby, 1999).
For offshore construction there are two key weather factors which determine whether
working is possible or not: the significant wave height and the average wind speed (Gra-
ham, 1982). Depending on the nature of an activity, an acceptable threshold for both these
dimensions can be defined. If this threshold is exceeded, the activity has to be interrupted
and resumed when weather conditions have improved. Such interruptions can of course
be highly detrimental to project performance.
This chapter starts by giving an overview of the various types of weather models
in section 7.2. This overview focuses on models that are capable of generating realistic
weather patterns, rather than models with strictly meteorological objectives. Next, a novel
weather model specifically tailored for use in offshore projects is presented in section 7.3.
7.2 A Brief Overview of Weather Modelling Techniques
7.2.1 Types of Weather Models
Two different kinds of weather models can be distinguished: weather simulation models
and weather forecasting models. Simulation models can be viewed as a highly complex ran-
dom number generators whose outputs resemble weather conditions at a certain location.
However, these random sequences are in no way meant to be a forecast of what is going
to happen; i.e. the weather pattern remains completely fictitious, but is assumed to have
similar properties to weather at the location. Weather forecasting models on the other
hand operate from a deterministic point of view and try to make short term predictions
of what the weather will be like (Wilks and Wilby, 1999).
Both simulation and forecasting models are highly useful when managing offshore con-
struction models. A good forecasting model can help project management with day-to-day
operational decisions, allowing them to delay work when weather conditions are expected
to be suboptimal. Weather simulation on the other hand can help to optimise the schedul-
ing of a project in order to make it more robust with regards to weather influences. This
robustness is highly important since offshore construction projects are highly capital in-
tensive due to the use of expensive machinery. Impromptu leasing of this machinery is not
possible, hence it is highly important to make accurate predictions of when this machinery
will be needed as well as accurate estimates of the duration for which this machinery will
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be needed.
Both simulation and forecasting models can be used for either meteorological or eco-
nomical purposes. Where the focus of the former lies on providing an explanation for a
physical phenomenon, the latter is interested in the impact of weather on a certain process
or activity. This distinction obviously has a major impact on the way the model is con-
structed. Models wishing to explain meteorological phenomena usually use much smaller
time steps (less than one hour) than models used for economical purposes, which almost
always use time steps between one and six hours, and in some cases even more (Monbet
et al., 2007). This different time step size also impacts the choice of modelling techniques.
An example of this are Markov Chains which have been shown to be less adequate for
weather models taking time steps of less than 40 minutes (Brokish and Kirtley, 2009).
Monbet et al. (2007) also highlight the importance of the trade-off between a model’s
ease of use and the accuracy of a model. A model’s ease of use can be expressed using
a number of qualitative criteria. Firstly, the robustness to the data source which may
contain a considerable number of missing values. Secondly, the ease of use also depends
on the robustness to the process itself. Some models are easier to use for a broader
set of processes than others, especially for weather models where complex correlation
between different elements may occur. Finally, the mathematical complexity and the time
needed to implement such a model is also important. A model should not be needlessly
complex thereby squandering scarce resources for its implementation when a simpler model
would have sufficed. The accuracy of a model signifies the degree to which the statistical
properties of the model correspond to the statistical properties of the original data. This
includes various statistical properties such as the average, standard deviation, seasonality
and autocorrelation.
7.2.2 Dealing with Non-stationary Data
Many traditional forecasting and simulation models such as Markov chains and autore-
gressive models are valid under the assumption that the underlying process is stationary1.
Most weather parameters however are subject to strong seasonal influences. Moreover,
some weather variables such as wind can differ depending on the time of day. To deal with
this issue many authors have proposed methods to transform this non-stationary data into
stationary or quasi-stationary processes.
There are two ways in which this issue can be resolved (Monbet et al., 2007). The
first method uses statistical techniques to remove the seasonal component from the data,
the resulting series is then stationary and the aforementioned techniques can then be used
1A stationary process is a process whose joint probability does not change when the process is shifted
in time.
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(Monbet et al., 2007; Stefanakos and Athanassoulis, 2002; Stefanakos and Belibassakis,
2005). A potential issue here is that these statistical techniques may not succeed in
removing all the non-stationarity from the data. An alternative method is fitting a separate
model for each season, assuming that stationarity can be assumed within a certain season.
The most important drawback of this method is the need for substantially more data since
a model has to be estimated for each season. Furthermore, this method also introduces
artificial breaks in the data, which are of course not present in reality.
When using the first method for dealing with non-stationary data, the transforma-
tion which changes data into stationary data usually takes the following form (using the
notation of Monbet et al. (2007)):
Yt = m(t) + σ(t)Y statt (7.1)
Where Yt is the original non-stationary process, m(t) is a deterministic function de-
scribing the average value for time period t, σ(t) is a deterministic function for the standard
deviation in time period t. The Y statt is then the underlying stationary process which can
be used in a wide range of different modelling approaches. An important note is that
weather data can exhibit non-stationary behaviour on both a seasonal and an intra-daily
scale. To be able to assume a truly stationary process both of these have to be removed.
Cunha and Guedes Soares (1999) compare different methods for removing seasonality
prior to fitting an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. For simulation purposes
they advise using a Box-Cox transformation with λ = 02 to obtain variance stationarity
and then correcting for changes in the average using a Fourier model.
7.2.3 Modelling Techniques
This section presents a short overview of weather modelling techniques, discussing their
key advantages and drawbacks. These approaches are grouped using the categorisation
used by Monbet et al. (2007), who distinguish Gaussian-based parametric techniques,
non-Gaussian based parametric techniques and non-parametric techniques.
7.2.3.1 Gaussian-based Parametric Techniques
Gaussion-based parametric techniques remove seasonality from data using statistical tech-
niques, such as Box-Cox and Fourrier transformations (Cunha and Guedes Soares, 1999).
Once this transformation is complete, a wide variety of techniques such as autoregres-
sive (AR) models or translated Gaussian processes are fitted to the deseasonalized pat-
tern. Because all weather data is used to estimate a single model, relatively little data is
2This is in effect taking the natural logarithm ln(Yt).
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needed to estimate parameters when compared to techniques such as Markov chains which
typically split the available data into seasons which are modelled separately. Moreover,
Gaussian-based techniques are capable of identifying trends in potentially noisy weather
data. Nevertheless, these techniques fall short when multiple weather components (i.e.
wind, wave height, precipitation, etc.) have to be modelled simultaneously (Monbet et al.,
2007).
7.2.3.2 Non-Gaussian-based Parametric Techniques
Several other parametric techniques have been used to model weather. Finite state space
Markov chains and their variants are undoubtedly the most widely adopted for offshore
weather simulation purposes. Rothkopf et al. (1974) present a first-order Markovian model
which defines a number of sea states and define a transition matrix based on the locality
and season in which operations are carried out. The authors also note that a more accurate
representation of the weather conditions can be obtained by increasing the number of states
considered in the Markov weather model, insofar as the quantity of available observations
allows this.
The persistence of good and bad weather spells is of paramount importance to offshore
construction projects. Because of this, a number of authors have focussed on modelling
this persistence and incorporating it in simulation models. Graham (1982) describes how
weather simulations can be made to take into account persistence by using a transition
matrix in combination with two-parameter Weibull distributions which model persistence
of a certain state.
Bowers and Mould (1994) specifically investigate weather risk for offshore construction
projects. The model used to simulate weather conditions combines a Markov chain anal-
ogous to the one presented in Graham (1982) with a gamma distribution. In this model
six different transition matrices are used to represent the six main seasons in which the
simulation operates. Each of these transition matrices defines the possibility of transfer-
ring between one of 5 possible states. Because the persistence behaviour of the Markovian
model in the first (calmest) of the five states did not correspond to the historic data, a
gamma distribution was used to randomly draw the persistence upon arrival in the first
state. Another example of the use of Markov chains to simulate wave height is presented by
Norlund et al. (2015), who used the technique to create robust and more environmentally
friendly schedules for offshore supply vessels.
Markov chains have also been used to simulate wind rather than significant wave
heights. A study by Sahin and Sen (2001) shows that even a very simple first order
Markov chain with eight states can attain an adequate level of accuracy. Ettoumi et al.
(2003) used Markov chains in combination with a Weibull distribution to model both wind
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speed and wind direction. For the wind speed each of the discrete states of the transfer
matrix is linked to a certain Weibull distribution, from which the exact wind speed is
then drawn at random. Second order Markov chains were used by Shamshad et al. (2005)
to make short-term predictions of wind speed. The authors noted that there is a slight
improvement in terms of autocorrelation when using a second order rather than first order
Markov chain model.
Brokish and Kirtley (2009) make an important observation with regard to the use of
Markov Chains used to simulate wind power, namely that this technique is often unable
to match the autocorrelation of the original distribution when used for time steps which
are shorter than 40 minutes. Hence, this technique should only be used for situations with
longer time steps.
Hidden Markov models have also been used successfully to model weather conditions,
one example of this is the Markov Switching Autoregressive model (MS-AR) which was
proposed by Ailliot et al. (2006).
Another parametric technique which is often used for weather prediction weather is
an artificial neural network (ANN). More and Deo (2003) used artificial neural networks
to forecast wind speeds in coastal regions and found that these artificial intelligence tech-
niques outperform traditional ARIMA techniques. The usefulness of this technique for
weather prediction has also been illustrated by Arena and Puca (2004) who have used
this technique to reconstruct significant wave heights based on correlated data from other
measurement stations. Makarynskyy et al. (2005) also used ANN to predict wave height
and period in order to deliver a warning signal up to 24 hours in advance. More recently
Mandal and Prabaharan (2010) have also used the ANN technique to make short term
predictions for significant wave height.
Non-linear autoregressive models are another technique which may be used rather
than the traditional Gaussian techniques. Due to the fact that the underlying process is
inherently non-linear, non-linear models can improve the estimation of the higher statistical
moments such as skew and kurtosis (Scotto and Guedes Soares, 2000).
7.2.3.3 Non-parametric Techniques
The use of non-parametric techniques is considerably less widespread than that of paramet-
ric techniques. One technique which is sporadically used for making bootstrap estimations
is re-sampling (Monbet et al., 2007). This technique consists of a nearest neighbour heuris-
tic with a random component to create weather patterns which are similar to the patterns
observed in the original data. The advantage of this technique being that no assumptions
have to be made regarding the stationarity of the underlying data. Hence, it is unneeded
to construct separate models for different seasons, nor is it required to subject the data to
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transformations to remove seasonal patterns. The key disadvantage of this technique is the
significant risk of overfitting, resulting in weather patterns which resemble the observed
data too closely.
Resampling is the most frequently used non-parametric technique, but its use is gen-
erally limited to bootstrap estimations. The technique itself uses a nearest neighbour
heuristic with a random component to create similar weather patterns as in the origi-
nal data. The key advantage of this technique is that no assumptions have to be made
regarding the stationarity of the original data.
7.2.4 Concluding Remarks
Based on this review of existing weather simulation models in section, a Markovian model
capable of simulating both wave and wind conditions is proposed in this chapter. This
capability to create realistic simulations of both weather parameters which impact the
construction activities is the main motivation for choosing this type of model. The key
disadvantage of such a model being that it needs a considerable amount of data to be fitted
adequately. Nevertheless, since large datasets containing both wind and wave information
this was not an issue for this research. Similarly, the limitations regarding the minimal
step size imposed by this type of model were not operationally relevant for the offshore
construction projects investigated in this research.
7.3 Weather Simulation Model
Using historic wind speed and significant wave height data collected off the Belgian coast
in the North Sea3, a simulation model was created. This model uses a combination of tran-
sition probability matrices and Weibull distributions to replicate a realistic combination
of wind and wave conditions faced by offshore construction projects in the North sea.
The main difficulty encountered when creating this model was simultaneously guar-
anteeing the right correlation of wind speed and wave height, as well as the individual
autocorrelation of both these variates. This was achieved by defining conditional proba-
bilities that link these variables to each other as well as to past observations.
Because the main objective of this simulation is to determine the economical impact of
the weather conditions, rather than a detailed description of meteorological phenomena,
both wind and wave data have been transformed into discrete states. The evolution of
these weather states is described using four-hour intervals. This interval is somewhat
3This data was collected by the Measurement Network Flemish Banks, specifically the data from the
“Westhinder” measuring pile was used since this location most accurately reflects weather conditions for
offshore wind farms off the Belgian coast. More information can be found at: http://www.vliz.be/en/
measurement-network-flemish-banks
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Figure 7.1: Flowchart of the weather generation model.
longer than that of models with meteorological objectives. The reason for this is dual:
Firstly, very short time intervals are not relevant from an economic perspective. Secondly,
using longer time intervals allows for a better approximation of autocorrelation.
Figure 7.1 shows the main flow of the weather simulation algorithm. Because sub-
stantially more wind data was available4, the starting point is the generation of the wind
speeds. These wind speeds then form the basis to generate associated wave heights.
7.3.1 Wind Speed
The simulation of wind states is done using separate first-order Markov chains for every
month of the year, to account for the inherent non-stationarity of the data. Each of these
models uses a transition matrix which defines a probability pwindij , signifying the likelihood
of moving from wind state i to wind state j during a certain season. Naturally these
probabilities have to satisfy the following property:
44,897 days of wind data and 1,396 days of wave data were available at the time of this research.
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n∑
j=1
pwindij = 1, ∀i (7.2)
Where n signifies the total number of possible wind states. This property simply states
that for every wind state i, the sum of all the transition probabilities must be exactly equal
to 1. The exact value for these probabilities (pwindij ) has been calculated for every month
based on the available weather data.
Given that these Markov models for the wind states are ergodic (i.e. any state can be
reached from any other state in a finite number of steps), it is possible to calculate the
equilibrium probabilities by means of simulation. These simulations start at a random
point and perform a certain number of iterations (ι), after which the frequencies at which
specific states were visited are transformed into probabilities. After the probabilities have
been updated the steady state estimates are compared to the previous estimates, if the
change exceeds a preset threshold the simulation continues for another ι iterations. For
the model presented in this chapter a threshold of 0.1% and an ι = 100 was used. The
steady state probabilities obtained using this method are used to generate a starting point
for the weather generation model (see figure 7.1).
A trade-off has to be made between the amount of information conveyed by the sim-
ulation by increasing the number of wind states, and the accuracy of the model, which
decreases as the number of wind states increases because a larger number of parameters
has to be estimated. The calibrations of the simulation model have indicated that the
accuracy of the model starts to decrease when more than ten wind states are used. Hence,
the total number of wind states has been set to ten (n = 10). Note that the bounds for
these states are simply the n-th percentiles of the available data.
7.3.2 Significant Wave Height
The simulation of realistic wave heights to accompany the wind speeds is more complex
for a number of reasons: (i) the wave state has to be correlated with the wind state, (ii)
the wave state also has to have the right level of autocorrelation, (iii) the persistence of a
wave state has to be realistic, and (iv) the limited amount of data points - especially for
rare weather conditions - for fitting have to be taken into account.
To accommodate all these aspects, a combination of three techniques is used: two
of which simulate realistic transitions between different wave states, and a third which
simulates the persistence of a wave state once it is attained. The difference between the
two techniques which simulate transitions is that the first one takes into account both the
correlation with the wind state and the autocorrelation of the wave states, whereas the
second technique only takes into account the correlation with the wind state. Which of
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these techniques is used is a response to the amount of data which is available to estimate
the transition probabilities; in case insufficient data is available to use the first model the
second model is used.
The first model which simulates wave state transitions uses a variation on a second-
order Markov chain. This variation defines the possibility of transitioning to another wave
state in period t based on the preceding wave state from period t−1, as well as the already
generated wind state for period t. Hence, a three-dimensional matrix containing transition
probabilities pwavekli is created. The value of pwavekli represents the probability of moving from
wave state k in period t to wave state l in period t+ 1, given that the wind state (which
has already been simulated using the wind state Markov chain) in period t+ 1 is equal to
i. Again, for every possible value of k and i, the sum over all possible l values (l = 1, ...,m)
has to equal unity:
m∑
l=1
pwavekli = 1, ∀k, i (7.3)
Because the persistence of these wave states is modelled separately, the probability of
moving to the same wave state is set to zero. Using the same notation this implies that:
pwavekki = 0, ∀k, i (7.4)
By using this transition matrix, the correlation between the wind and wave data, as
well as the autocorrelation of the wave data can be guaranteed. However, the drawback
of this method is that it requires a lot (n2 ·m) of probabilities to be estimated. Especially
for rare scenarios where winds are relatively high and waves relatively are low or vice
versa it may not be possible to estimate realistic probabilities by simply fitting them to
the available data because no such observations exist. Nevertheless, the simulation model
should be capable of dealing with these unlikely scenarios. This is the reason for the
introduction of the second method for generating correlated wave states.
The second method for simulating transitions between wave states only takes the cor-
relation between the wind and wave states into account. Depending on the wind state
which has already been simulated, the accompanying wave state is drawn from one of n
Weibull distributions. These n distributions have been fitted to subsets of the wave data,
based on the wind state which accompanied the specific wave state. Assume for example
that a wave state has to be simulated, given the fact that the wind state for the specific
period has already been simulated and is equal to 2. Moreover, there is insufficient data to
accurately estimate parameters using the first model. Hence, the wave state will be ran-
domly drawn from a Weibull distribution whose parameters have been fitted to the wave
heights which occurred when the wind state was also equal to 2. Note that this Weibull
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model is both fitted to and simulates continuous data rather than the discrete wave states,
requiring the wave state to be determined after a continuous Weibull distributed random
variable has been returned.
Similarly to the first method of generating the wave state transitions, the Weibull
model also does not allow the wave state to remain unchanged. Should an identical wave
state be drawn from the distribution, the draw is discarded and a new Weibull distributed
random number is drawn.
The persistence of good and bad weather conditions is one of the most important as-
pects of a weather simulation model (Bowers and Mould, 1994; Graham, 1982). Hence,
one of the major goals of this situation model was to give an accurate representation of
the persistence of weather conditions. Preliminary experiments which used the previously
described models to simulate both transitions to different and the same wave state con-
cluded that these techniques could not guarantee a realistic persistence of the wave states.
This is caused by the correlation which is introduced between the wind and wave states.
This issue was solved by generating the persistence of a wave state separately. This is
done by creating a persistence probability matrix for every wave state based on the avail-
able wave data. This matrix consists of probabilities ppersistkt , which signify the probability
that wave state k persists for t time periods. Naturally, the following must be true:
tmax∑
t=1
ppersistkt = 1 ∀k (7.5)
Where tmax represents the maximal number of time periods a wave state can persist.
Using these conditional probabilities, the persistence of every wave state is modelled.
Analysis shows that by using this method of simulation satisfactory results are obtained
for the autocorrelation of both wind and wave states (see appendix 7.A).
The cost of this improved autocorrelation of the wave states is a slight decrease of
the correlation between wind and wave states. In the original data a correlation of 0.8
was noted between wind and wave states. Due to the fact that the persistence of a wave
state is assumed to be independent from the wind states, the global correlation between
these two variates is reduced to 0.7. Insufficient data inhibits the use of a correction of
the Weibull distribution without overfitting the available data points. Artificially inflating
the correlation of the wind and wave states on the other hand results in a substantial
reduction of the frequency of the wave states.
During the calibration of the simulation algorithm it was concluded that setting the
number of available wave states to ten (m = 10) provided the best compromise between
model complexity and accuracy in representing the weather patterns.
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7.4 Conclusion
This section has presented an overview of weather modelling techniques designed to simu-
late realistic weather patterns and has proposed a novel weather model specifically tailored
to the operational challenges in offshore projects. This model distinguishes itself from ex-
isting weather simulation models by its capability of simulating the correlation between
wind- and wave states accurately with a long time horizon. Traditional weather models
generally focus on a single weather dimension (such as precipitation), or on the prediction
of the short term evolution of a number of different weather dimensions. For the latter
case the autocorrelation of these measures plays a much stronger role than the correlation
between the various dimensions. Hence, separate models are generally applied for separate
dimensions. The model proposed in this chapter departs from this and is therefore capable
of generating realistic long-term weather evolutions for operational scenarios where these
elements have a joint impact on the process under study.
The usefulness of this model, and its integration in operationally and economically
relevant simulation procedures will be discussed in chapters 8 and 9.
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7.A Weather Model Persistence Plots
As was noted in the literature review (see section 7.2), the persistence of weather conditions
is an important indicator of the quality of a weather model. Moreover, this aspect of the
weather model is also of great importance to accurately estimate the influence of weather
conditions on activity durations.
Figure 7.2 and 7.3 show how the persistence of wind- and wavestates of the weather
generation model compare to the actual persistence observed from the empiric data gath-
ered from the offshore measuring stations. Each of these figures shows a separate chart
for each of the ten possible states for wind and waves respectively. These charts show the
cumulative probability of remaining in a certain wind- or wavestate for a certain number
of periods. From these charts it can be concluded that the simulation model is capable of
modelling the persistence of both wind- and wave conditions with great accuracy.
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Figure 7.2: Wind state persistence
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8
Optimised Scheduling for Weather Sensitive
Offshore Construction Projects
This chapter presents a comprehensive methodology for the proactive scheduling of capital
intensive projects that are sensitive to weather conditions. This is done by combining
heuristic optimisation techniques and weather simulation models which are fitted to data
gathered on the North Sea off the Belgian coast. The construction of an offshore wind farm
will be used as an archetypical example of such a a capital-intensive and weather-sensitive
project.
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8.1 Introduction
The significant lead times and costs associated with materials and equipment in com-
bination with intrinsic and weather related variability render the planning of offshore
construction projects highly complex. Moreover, the way in which scarce resources are
managed has a profound impact on both the cost and the completion date of a project.
Hence, schedule quality is of paramount importance to the profitability of the project. A
prerequisite to the creation of good schedules is the accuracy of the procedure used to
estimate the project outcome when a given schedule is used. Because of the systematic
influence of weather conditions, traditional Monte Carlo simulations that only include
activity-related stochasticity fail to produce a reliable estimate of the project outcomes.
Hence, the first objective of this research is to improve the accuracy of the project simu-
lation by creating a procedure which includes both uncertainty related to the activities as
well as an integrated model of the weather conditions. The weather model presented in
chapter 7 has been designed to create realistically correlated wind- and weather conditions
for operationally relevant time intervals.
The second objective of this research is to optimise the project planning itself by using
both general meta-heuristic optimisation approaches and dedicated heuristics which have
been specifically designed for the problem at hand. The performance of these heuristics is
judged by the expected net present value of the project. The approach presented in this
chapter is tested on real data from the construction of an offshore wind farm off the Belgian
coast and weather data gathered by the Flanders Marine Institute using measuring poles
in the North Sea.
8.2 Literature
This study combines techniques from project scheduling literature with insights from
weather modelling, specifically stochastic weather generation models. This was motivated
by the arguments made by Regnier (2008), who stated that recent advances in meteorologi-
cal sciences have created substantial opportunities for quantitative modelling. Specifically,
the OR/MS community could make significant contributions by tailoring meteorological
products to the users’ decision contexts. Incidentally, this is the main objective of this
research.
A review of the weather modelling literature was given in chapter 7, where the weather
model used for this research was presented. This section focuses on the contributions
from the field of project management. This encompasses recent advances in dealing with
uncertain activity durations, resource constraints and non-regular objectives which more
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accurately represent the financial implications of project scheduling. This foundation is
then used to construct a model for large-scale offshore construction projects in section 8.3.1.
As was noted earlier, these theoretical foundations are supplemented with information from
offshore wind projects (see section 8.5).
Offshore construction projects present one of the most challenging operational envi-
ronments. Within this environment, the operational strategy can significantly impact the
profitability, robustness and the environmental impact of a project (Norlund et al., 2015),
and even prevent the loss of lives (Qian et al., 2012, 2015). This section highlights the
specific challenges faced when scheduling offshore construction projects. This is done by
presenting a concise review of relevant project scheduling literature. This literature forms
the basis for the project model presented in section 8.3.1.
First and foremost, offshore projects are highly susceptible to adverse weather condi-
tions. Rothkopf et al. (1974) and Graham (1982) highlight the importance of extended
periods of good weather for the execution of certain activities, as well as the significant
start-up cost which is incurred when an activity has to be interrupted due to harsh weather
conditions. Hence, the project manager will try to optimise his project in light of the
weather risks (s)he is facing. Bowers and Mould (1994) have analysed how this can be
done by either delaying the start of the project, or by using more expensive equipment
which is less susceptible to extreme weather conditions. Obviously, many other strategies
can also be used to improve the expected performance of a project.
Traditional project scheduling literature usually analyses risk in a more general way,
by considering activity costs and/or durations to be stochastic rather than deterministic.
Although the majority of project scheduling research still uses the assumption that activity
durations are deterministic (Herroelen and Leus, 2005), several authors have proposed
methods for scheduling whilst taking stochasticity into account. An overview of these
methods is presented in section 8.2.1.
A second challenge faced in the scheduling of offshore construction projects is the plan-
ning of expensive resources needed to perform the activities. The chartering of jack-up
barges, transport ships, dumping vessels, crane vessels,etc. (European Wind Energy Asso-
ciation, 2011) is the key cost in the majority of offshore construction projects. Especially
since many of these vessels have to be reserved up to two years beforehand, and significant
mobilisation and demobilisation costs are incurred (Scho¨nefeld, 2014). These issues can
be related to resource constrained scheduling, as well as resource renting problems. These
concepts are discussed in further detail in section 8.2.2.
The combination of weather sensitive activity durations and substantial variable costs
associated with activities results in a significant financial risk. Hence, it makes sense
to use a financial objective, rather than makespan-based targets. More specifically, the
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main interest of the project manager in this case is the net present value of the complete
project. The default formulation of this problem assumes that a fixed positive or negative
cashflow is associated with the start of each activity, the goal being to speed up cash
inflows and delay cash outflows. This basic formulation has been extended by considering
time-dependent rather than static cashflows. Section 8.2.3 presents an overview of the
most relevant publications which analyse this issue.
8.2.1 Dealing with Uncertainty
The techniques used for dealing with uncertainty that typifies projects in progress are
frequently summarised using the term dynamic scheduling (Vanhoucke, 2012b). Within
dynamic scheduling, three basic approaches can be distinguished: a reactive strategy,
a proactive strategy or a mixed strategy (Fahmy et al., 2014). The literature review
on stochastic scheduling by Herroelen and Leus (2005) provides even more detail and
identifies six techniques which can be used to deal with stochasticity in a project scheduling
environment.
Given that resources needed for the execution of offshore construction activities have
to be reserved long beforehand, the focus of this research lies on the proactive approach.
More specifically the construction of robust schedules, which are capable of dealing with
the impact of adverse weather conditions in a satisfactory manner.
Practically, the creation of schedules for stochastic project scheduling problems is most
frequently done by defining priority lists. Several different methods for creating these lists
exist, each has advantages and disadvantages. Research by Stork (2000) has shown that
linear restrictive policies can be expected to perform best in situations where resource
restrictions (as defined by minimal forbidden sets) are limited. When this is not the case,
and complex resource restrictions are present in the project, it is better to use activity-
based priority rules. A key downside of this simple approach is that it is not possible
to insert buffers at strategic moments in time when it may be ill-considered to proceed
immediately with the next activity on the priority list.
Another approach which resolves this issue has been analysed by Ke and Liu (2005),
who use a genetic algorithm in combination with a simulation procedure in order to de-
termine the earliest start times of activities. This algorithm is tested on the three basic
approaches for stochastic optimisation: the maximisation of the objective, the maximisa-
tion of the objective value attained with a certain probability α, or the maximisation of
the probability of obtaining a certain objective function value. The latter two scenarios
being of great significance when the aim of the project manager is protecting the downside
risk associated with the project.
The method of improving schedule robustness by inserting time buffers at critical points
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in the schedule is studied more explicitly by Herroelen and Leus (2004). The authors in
this study analyse how the robustness of a schedule can be maximised for a given project
deadline. The concept float is used to express the magnitude of the buffer inserted between
activities. Three different types of float are identified for an activity: the pairwise float is
equal to the amount of float between two activities which are connected to each other by
a precedence relation. This float can be calculated by subtracting the planned finish time
of the predecessor from the planned starting of the successor. The two other float metrics
are derivations from this basic concept. The free float is the maximal delay of an activity,
without affecting the start of it successors. Note that this metric takes all predecessors and
successors into account. The total float is similar, but now the successors of the activity
are assumed to start at their latest possible times. The origins of this technique can
be traced back to earlier studies in machine and job-shop scheduling (Mehta and Uzsoy,
1998), where it was used to maximise a deterministic metric representing the robustness
of a schedule.
Such deterministic proxies for robustness are hard to use in the situation studied in this
chapter, where the stochasticity depends on a complex external process. An alternative
for these deterministic metrics is presented by Huang and Ding (2011), who use a genetic
algorithm combined with stochastic simulations to estimate the outcome of a specific
strategy.
8.2.2 Dealing with Resources
The resource constrained project scheduling problem, commonly known as the RCPSP ,
is the most basic way of dealing with resources in a project environment (Hartmann and
Briskorn, 2010). A variation on this approach is the resource renting problem, which
does not only include renewable resources, but also takes into account the cost of renting
these resources. Specifically, the costs associated with mobilisation and demobilisation of
resources can inflate the total cost of a project to a project owner. This problem class was
originally introduced by Nu¨bel (2001), and more complex heuristic solution techniques
have since been presented by Ballest´ın (2007, 2008). Extensions including more complex
cost structures and the possibility of scheduling in overtime have also been presented
in recent years (Kerkhove et al., 2015; Vandenheede et al., 2015). These more complex
cost structures have a number of analogies with the chartering process used in offshore
construction projects.
However, to the best of our knowledge literature on this problem has only studied the
resource renting problem under the assumption of deterministic activity durations. Never-
theless, other authors have investigated methods of dealing with resources in a stochastic
project setting. The CC/BM methodology presented by Goldratt (1997) is the most widely
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known methodology to deal with similar situations.
A more specialised method for doing this is presented by Trietsch (2006), who uses
gates to represent the moment in time when a resource has been made available for a
certain activity. This methodology also defines two costs associated with these gates: a
holding cost, which is incurred when an activity has to wait for resources, and a shortage
cost, which is incurred when resources have already been made available, but the activity
is still waiting for one or more predecessors to finish. A recent paper by Bendavid and
Golany (2011) also uses this concept of gates in combination with a solution technique
based on the cross entropy methodology in order to schedule a project with stochastic
(exponential) activity durations.
8.2.3 Maximising Financial Returns
When cashflows can be determined for each individual activity, it is possible to use the
project’s net present value (NPV ) as an objective measure of the outcome of the project,
and by extension the comparative quality of different scheduling strategies. Traditionally,
this is done within a deterministic setting where both the activity durations and the
magnitude of the cashflows are assumed to be set with 100% accuracy beforehand. The
problem described in this chapter however has a very pronounced stochastic component,
which influences both the timing and the magnitude of the cashflows associated with the
different activities. These variations are caused by stochasticity due to weather conditions,
as well as the intrinsic variability of the activities. Although this specific scenario has not
yet been investigated in existing literature, it can be linked to earlier problem formulations
which have considered the implications of time-dependent cashflows. The remainder of this
section focuses on authors which have investigated net present value optimisation whilst
assuming some degree of variability of the cashflows associated with activities.
One such study is presented by Etgar et al. (1996), who investigate how projects
consisting of activities with cashflows that increase or decrease over time can be scheduled
to maximise net present value. An exact solution procedure for this problem was later
presented by Vanhoucke et al. (2001). A variation on this problem where certain regions are
defined wherein the cashflows remain constant is presented by Achuthan and Hardjawidjaja
(2001).
The preceding authors all assumed that cashflows linked to activities could either
increase, decrease or remain constant over time. However, for the problem studied in
this chapter, it is possible that cashflows linked to activities display seasonal patterns, as
variable costs are heavily influenced by weather conditions. This assumption was relaxed
by Mo¨hring et al. (2001), who defined a specific cost based on the starting time of an
activity, but the evolution of this cost had the potential of fluctuating freely over time. In
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a later paper Mo¨hring and Schulz (2003) discovered that this problem formulation can be
solved using fast minimum-cut operations.
The fluctuations in activity cashflows for the problem studied in this research are caused
by stochastic variations in activity duration, depending on the time when the activity is
executed. This is not completely identical to the problems studied in the aforementioned
papers, which assumed that the cashflow itself is directly affected by the moment in time.
Nevertheless, formulations which use time-dependent processing times have already been
investigated in the context of machine scheduling (Cheng et al., 2004).
One key limitation of all preceding studies is that they consider time dependence within
a deterministic rather than stochastic setting, something which some of these authors had
already identified as a key limitation and possible avenue for future research (Etgar et al.,
1996). Sobel et al. (2009) depart from this deterministic setting and maximise NPV for
a project with stochastic activity durations using a reactive priority list approach. Such
reactive strategies are, however, not adequate for the problem studied in this chapter.
The reason for this being the significant lead times associated with both consumable and
renewable resources required to execute activities. Hence, the focus of this research is to
design a proactive approach in order to create robust solutions.
A recent paper by Huang and Ding (2011) presents such a proactive approach in a
stochastic problem environment. Specifically, this is done through the combination of
stochastic optimisation and a genetic optimisation algorithm. Nevertheless, the problem
considered by Huang and Ding (2011) uses a cost objective rather than the net present
value. Moreover, solely the duration of activities is assumed to be subjected by stochas-
ticity - the actual cashflows are assumed to remain unaltered.
A maximisation of a project’s NPV under the assumption of stochastic activity dura-
tions has been presented by Sobel et al. (2009), who used a reactive approach with priority
lists to optimise the problem at hand. The use of these reactive strategies is however not
advisable for the problem studied in this chapter because of the significant lead times
needed to reserve the resources needed to execute the project. A more proactive approach
to this problem is presented by Huang and Ding (2011), who also consider the duration
of activities to be time-dependent stochastic variables, rather than solely stochastic. The
solution approach used by Huang and Ding (2011) uses a genetic algorithm in combination
with simulation techniques to find the optimal starting times for specific activities.
8.2.4 Concluding Remarks
The overview of the state of the art in related project management literature revealed that
although attention has increased in recent years, a lot of potential remains in the area of
stochastic project scheduling. Specifically, the maximisation of net present value in projects
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where the cashflows are influenced by systematic stochasticity1 has never been investigated.
Building on works of earlier authors who have identified the major challenges in offshore
construction projects (Graham, 1982; Rothkopf et al., 1974), this research proposes and
tests the performance of novel techniques.
8.3 Problem Definition
This section introduces the components of the problem investigated in this research. First,
a mathematical representation of the scheduling problem is presented in section 8.3.1.
Next, the stochastic influences on this model are discussed in section 8.3.2. Finally, the
problem is illustrated by means of a theoretical example in section 8.3.3.
8.3.1 The Scheduling Problem
The goal of this problem is to find the optimal ‘gate times’ (i.e. the time at which resources
are made available for a specific activity) in order to maximise the net present value (NPV )
of the complete project. These gate times are not only a theoretical representation of the
schedule, but are actually required in order to guarantee the availability of the offshore
construction vessels before the start of the project. The reasons for adopting the net
present value as the objective are the following:
1. Offshore construction projects are highly capital intensive because of the high material
cost and the need to charter large construction vessels. Hence, the objective used should
take into account the magnitude and timing of these financial flows.
2. Due to the conditions in which these projects are executed, the timing and magnitude
of cashflows can be volatile. Using the net present value allows for a more objective
comparison of such volatile scenarios when compared to an optimisation of the total
cost.
3. Linked to the preceding point is the fact that because of the inherent volatility, investors
will require a larger return on investment for the project. Hence, the discount rate is
larger than it would be for other projects. Again, this would mean a large discrepancy
between the total costs incurred and the net present value of the project.
4. Because of the significant length (often multiple years) of offshore construction projects,
it is required to discount both the cash outflows and the cash inflows to get an accurate
image of the profitability of the project.
For projects with the aforementioned properties, there is a decided preference for the
use of net present value as the optimisation objective (Herroelen et al., 1997). Other
1i.e. stochasticity originating from systemic weather influences.
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objectives such as the minimisation of the project lead times are likely to result in reduced
project profits.
Figure 8.1 visualises the various elements of the project which are relevant to the op-
timisation. The project can be seen as a collection of interrelated activities and resources.
The activities are interconnected by precedence relationships and are also linked to the
resources they require to be executed. Within the context of offshore construction these
resources are the construction vessels.
Project
Activities ResourcesUses
Precedence
Duration Distribution
Fixed (Material) Cost
Variable (Operating) Cost
Weather Limitations
Charter Cost / Period
(De-)Mobilisation Cost
Minimal Charter Duration
Minimal Down Duration
Gate Time Usage PatternSimulation
Figure 8.1: Schematic representation of the project model
An activity is defined by its duration (di), its fixed and variable cost (CFi and CVi )
and the weather limitations under which it can operate. The fixed cost associated with
an activity represents the cost of the materials which are used during the activity. For
offshore wind projects, this constitutes (but is not limited to) the turbine itself, as well as its
foundation and scour protection - naturally these are allocated to the respective activities.
The variable cost is the operating cost incurred during the execution of the activity, this
includes the fuel cost of operating the vessels as well as the costs for personnel operating
at sea. However, this does not include the chartering cost of the vessel itself which has to
be paid even when the vessel is temporarily not used but not decommissioned, this cost
is linked to the specific resources. The activity’s weather limitations are expressed in two
dimensions: the maximal wave state and the maximal wind state at which the activity can
be executed. Exceeding these thresholds will cause the activity to be temporarily halted
until weather conditions improve. Note that it is of paramount importance to distinguish
between these two dimensions for offshore operations since different types of activities will
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have a different degree of wind- and wave-sensitivity. For ease of notation this is simplified
in the deterministic model presented below, using the binary ωit parameter to indicate if
the weather threshold for activity i is not exceeded in time period t.
Separate costs are associated with the resources used by the activities (i.e. the in-
stallation vessels): the charter cost per period (ρVr ), the mobilisation and demobilisation
cost (ρCr and ρDr ), as well as the minimal duration of both the chartering (δminup ) and the
downtime (δmindown). The basic cost of a vessel is the daily amount paid as rent, however
at the start of the renting period the operator also has to pay to deploy the vessel at
the desired location (ρCr ). Similarly, costs are also associated with the decommissioning
of these vessels (ρDr ). These costs vary depending on the vessel type but are often equal
to 4 to 8 times the associated dayrate of the vessel (Scho¨nefeld, 2014). Related to these
mobilisation and demobilisation charges are the minimal durations for both chartering and
downtime, which are required by the company which leases the vessels to ensure better
work continuity (Vanhoucke, 2006). The minimal charter duration guarantees that the
vessel will be chartered for a sufficiently long period. Similarly it is undesirable to de-
commission and recommission vessels with only very short downtimes, simply because it
is unlikely that the vessel’s owner can find a client for this small time-frame.
Because of this (de)mobilisation decision, the chartered resources are not simply viewed
as a variable cost that is directly linked to an activity. Once a schedule is constructed,
the demand for a certain vessel can be determined and the periods when the vessel needs
to be chartered can be fixed. An important note here is that regardless of the fact that
the acquisition of these resources has a very long lead time, the contractual agreements
generally allow for a scheduling contingency, meaning that resources will not be deallocated
until the work for which they have been chartered has been completed.
The schedule itself is defined by setting gate times for all activities, these times indicate
when the resources to execute an activity will be made available. Hence, the time at which
an activity can start is the maximum of this gate time and the latest finish time amongst
its predecessors. This principle of gate times is similar to the methodology used by Trietsch
(2006) and Bendavid and Golany (2011) (see section 8.2.2). Practically, this means that
the gate time is directly linked to the fixed cost associated with the activity. Hence, this
fixed cost will always be incurred at precisely the gate time of the activity. The variable
activity costs, as well as the costs associated with chartering vessels will be incurred when
the activity is actually executed.
The simplest representation of the problem studied in this chapter is a deterministic
scheduling problem as described by equations 8.1 until 8.10. The mathematical model be-
low assumes that both the duration of the activities and the weather pattern is completely
deterministic, an assumption which will be relaxed in section 8.3.2. The notation used in
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this scheduling optimisation model is summarised in table 8.1.
maxNPV =
NI∑
i=1
[
−CFi
(1 +ROI)gi −
CVi · (fi − si)
(1 +ROI)fi
]
+
NR∑
r=1
NT∑
t=1
[
−ρVr · urt
(1 +ROI)t −
ρCr · vrt
(1 +ROI)t −
ρDr · wrt
(1 +ROI)t
]
+ pi(1 +ROI)fNI (8.1)
subject to:
si = max
[
gi,max
j∈Pi
(fj)
]
∀i ∈ I (8.2)
fi−1∑
t=si
ωit = di ∀i ∈ I (8.3)
urt =
∑
i|si≤t<fi
ωit ∀r ∈ R ∀t ∈ T (8.4)
%rt ≥ urt ∀r ∈ R ∀t ∈ T (8.5)
%r1 = vr1 ∀r ∈ R (8.6)
%rt = %r(t−1) + vrt − wrt ∀r ∈ R ∀t = 2, ..., NT (8.7)
wrt ≤M ·
1−min
1, t∑
t′=max(1,t−δminup )
vrt′
 ∀r ∈ R ∀t ∈ T (8.8)
vrt ≤M ·
1−min
1, t∑
t′=max(1,t−δmin
down
)
wrt′

 ∀r ∈ R ∀t ∈ T (8.9)
gi, si, fi ∈ N0 %rt, urt, vrt, wrt ∈ N (8.10)
The main decision variable in the optimisation model is the gate time gi, which rep-
resents the time period at which the resources for an activity have been made available.
The NPV-objective is calculated by equation 8.1, which is a function of the various cash-
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Indices
i Activity index: i ∈ I = {1, ..., NI}
r Resource index: r ∈ R = {1, ..., NR}
t Time interval index: t ∈ T = {1, ..., NT}
Decision variables
gi Gate time of activity i
Assisting variables
si Starting time of activity i
fi Finish time of activity i
urt Resource usage of r at time t
vrt Commissioned amount of r at time t
wrt Decommissioned amount of r at time t
%rt Amount of resources r rented in period t
Stochastic parameters
ωit Binary = 1 if suitable weather for act i at t
di Duration of activity i
Fixed parameters
ROI Discount rate per period
CFi Fixed cost of activity i
CVi Variable cost of activity i
ρVr Variable chartering cost for resource r
ρCr Commissioning cost for resource r
ρDr Decommissioning cost for resource r
pi The cashflow associated with the completed project
µir Binary = 1 if act i requires resource r
Pi Set of predecessors of activity i
δminup Minimal renting period required for resources.
δmindown Minimal downtime period required for resources.
M A large number.
Table 8.1: Overview of notation.
flows associated with the project. The fixed cost (CFi ) represents the building materials
required to perform an activity. Since the gate time gi represents the moment in time
when these resources have been made available this is the discount factor for the fixed
cost. As explained earlier, the variable costs (CVi ) are incurred in all time periods as
soon as the activity has actually started. These costs are assumed to be payable upon
completion of the activity. The second part of equation 8.1 represents the costs associated
with the resources (i.e. the chartering of the vessels). This includes the variable operating
costs ρVr incurred when the resource is actually used, as well as the commissioning (ρCr )
and decommissioning (ρDr ) costs associated with the vessel. Finally, the positive cashflow
associated with completing the project is also added to the NPV.
The earliest possible starting time of an activity is either the gate time gi, or the
time period after the finish of its latest predecessor, whichever is greater (equation 8.2).
The activity finishes (fi) as soon as the number of time periods with acceptable weather
conditions since the start of the activity is equal to the duration of the activity di (equation
8.3). In order to calculate the variable operating cost of the resources the variable urt is
introduced. This variable is equal to the resource use for resource r during period t, and
is assigned by considering all active activities during time period t as is shown in equation
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8.4. In order to calculate the commissioning and decommissioning costs correctly, the
variable %rt is introduced. This variable is equal to the available amounts of resource type
r during period t. Naturally, the available amount of resources must always exceed the
amount of resources used (equation 8.5). The evolution of the %rt variable is tracked by
the urt and wrt which track the commissioned and decommissioned resources during each
time period respectively. The correct value for these variables is enforced by equations 8.6
and 8.7. Finally, equations 8.8 and 8.9 guarantee the minimal number of periods for the
(de-)commissioning as explained above.
This model is problem specific in that it only allows a single resource to be associated
with an activity. These resources correspond to the specific installation vessels associated
with offshore construction projects. As a side note, this type of project generally only has
one resource of every type available because of the scarcity of these vessels on the market.
In the next section stochasticity is introduced into the scheduling problem, prior to
presenting a small theoretical example in section 8.3.3 in order to familiarise the reader
with the concepts which have just been introduced.
8.3.2 Stochastic Influences
The optimisation model presented in section 8.3.1 assumed that all model parameters are
deterministic. In reality however, there are significant sources of uncertainty in offshore
construction projects. Traditional stochastic project scheduling (see section 8.2.1) defines
probability distributions for each activity to express this risk.
For offshore construction projects such a model fails to capture the systematic un-
certainty introduced by seasonal weather conditions. Hence, this research considers both
uncertainty inherent to specific activities and the uncertainty introduced due to weather
conditions.
The activity-dependent uncertainty is modelled by defining a triangular distribution
for each of the activity durations, as is conventional in project scheduling literature. For
the weather uncertainty, a novel simulation model is proposed based on recent advances in
weather simulation techniques. The details of this weather simulation model are explained
in detail in section 8.4.2.1.
The implications for the scheduling optimisation model described in section 8.3.1 are
that both the activity durations (di) and the weather conditions (ωit) are now stochastic
variables. Hence, the objective is not to optimise the gate times NPV for a single value
of these parameters, but rather to optimise the expected value of the net present value
(E[NPV ]).
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8.3.3 Example Problem
This section presents a highly simplified example in order to illustrate the basic workings
of the scheduling model. Assume a simple project consisting of two activities: 1 and 2,
which are scheduled in series. The basic properties of these activities can be summarised
as follows:
1 2
Duration Distribution U(9, 11) U(8, 12)
Fixed Cost (CFi ) AC 100 AC 175
Variable Cost (CVi ) AC 5 AC 10
Table 8.2: Example project information
Both these activities depend on the same installation vessel for their execution. This
vessel has a charter cost (ρVr ) of AC 10 per period, and a commissioning (ρCr ) and decom-
missioning (ρDr ) cost of AC 15. For this simple example it is assumed that there are no
minimal periods required for chartering or vessel decommissioning.
The actual duration of both these activities also depends on the weather conditions.
For this theoretical example, a simplified weather model which consists of only two states
- good weather and bad weather - is used. Both activities are only capable of operating
in the good weather conditions and are interrupted if weather conditions are bad. These
weather states can be simulated using Markov chains defined by two transition matrices:
one for the ‘summer’ season, and one for the ‘winter’ season. Furthermore it is assumed
that each of these seasons lasts 15 time periods.
Summer transition matrix
good bad
good 0.9 0.1
bad 0.7 0.3
Winter transition matrix
good bad
good 0.6 0.4
bad 0.5 0.5
Table 8.3: Example weather model
The actual value of the project itself (i.e. the cash inflow received upon project com-
pletion pi) is equal to AC 1,250, and the discount rate per period (ROI) is equal to 1%.
Based on this information two basic strategies are immediately apparent. The first
option is to start all activities as soon as possible. From the point of view of the decision
variables this means that the first gate is set at time 1 (i.e. activity 1 can start immediately)
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Summer Winter Summer
Bad weatherGood weather
act 1 (d = 10)
act 2 (d = 11)
act 1 (d = 10)
act 2 (d = 11)
Schedule 1
Schedule 2
Gate time
1 16 31Time
si fi
1 13
13 31
1 13
31 43
Figure 8.2: Comparison of scheduling approaches for the sample problem.
and the second gate is set at the earliest possible starting time of activity 2. Assuming
that activity 1 has the shortest possible duration of 9 time periods and the weather is
continually favourable. This solution can be noted as: (g1, g2) = (1, 10).
This strategy is likely to result in considerable delays because the second activity is
executed at least partly in the winter period. Even in the best case scenario where there is
not a single period of bad weather during summer and all activity durations are minimal.
Hence, an alternative strategy is to delay the start of the second activity until the end
of the winter period (i.e. g2 = 31). This is likely to reduce the net working time during
the project, but does delay the project’s completion and results in a commissioning and
decommissioning charge to be incurred, inflating the non-discounted cost of the project by
AC30.
Analysing the impact of these strategies requires simulating the execution of the
project. A visual example of a single simulation run of the example problem is shown
in figure 8.2. The simulation procedure has generated a specific duration for the activities
from the uniform distributions in the table above: activity 1 has a duration of 10, and
activity 2 has a duration of 11. Moreover, the simulation procedure has also simulated a
weather pattern which is represented by the light and dark coloured blocks at the bottom
of figure 8.2. A dark coloured block represents a period with bad weather, during which
activity progress is interrupted. These interruptions extend the duration of the activities,
as shown by the additional duration added at the end of activities for both schedules. An
important note here is that making up for delays during the activity progress can only be
done when weather conditions are good. Hence, bad weather conditions after the planned
finish can further extend the duration of the activity as well - as can be seen from the
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duration of the second activity when using the first schedule.
The simulation shown in figure 8.2 indicates that weather conditions cause significant
inflation of the duration of the activities. The effective activity durations are 12 and 18
for the first and second activity respectively when the first schedule is used, and both
activities have a duration of 12 when the second scheduling procedure is used.
The scheduling strategies are represented visually by the ‘gates’ that indicate the ear-
liest starting times of the activities. When comparing the performance of both schedules,
it can be seen that the second schedule has set the gate time for the second activity much
further, at a time when good weather conditions were expected. This has resulted in a
much shorter duration for the second activity, at the cost of inflating the duration of the
complete project. To judge which of these schedules performed best during this simulation,
the net present value of the costs and return of the project have to be analysed in detail,
as is shown in tables 8.4 and 8.5 which show the different components of the net present
value as calculated using equation 8.1.
Cashflow Timing NPV (AC)
Activity 1 fixed cost -100 0 -100.0
Activity 1 variable cost -60 12 -53.2
Activity 2 fixed cost -175 10 -158.4
Activity 2 variable cost -180 30 -133.5
Chartering cost -300 15 -258.4
Mobilisation -15 0 -15.0
Demobilisation -15 30 -11.1
Terminal value 1250 30 927.4
TOTAL 197.7
Table 8.4: NPV calculation for first scheduling strategy
Cashflow Timing NPV (AC)
Activity 1 fixed cost -100 0 -100.0
Activity 1 variable cost -60 12 -53.2
Activity 2 fixed cost -175 29 -131.1
Activity 2 variable cost -120 41 -79.8
Chartering cost -240 15 -206.7
Mobilisation 1 -15 0 -15.0
Mobilisation 2 -15 29 -11.2
Demobilisation 1 -15 12 -13.3
Demobilisation 2 -15 41 -10.0
Terminal value 1250 41 831.3
TOTAL 210.8
Table 8.5: NPV calculation for second scheduling strategy
When comparing the results in detail it can be seen that the first schedule strategy
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results in a considerably higher variable cost for the second activity, as well as a greater
chartering cost, since the total duration during which the vessels are used is longer (30
time periods). The second schedule on the other hand is able to present much lower costs,
but decreases the value of the project by extending its duration, resulting in a lower net
present value of the terminal value of the project.
Naturally, it must not be assumed that the results from a single simulation run are
representative and more simulation runs are needed in order to get accurate estimates of
the relative performance of the different scheduling strategies for this project.
8.4 Solution Approach
This section presents the proposed solution approach for the problem defined in section
8.3. Finding a solution for this problem is a complex problem because of two aspects.
First and foremost the number of possible schedules is very large, as will be discussed in
section 8.4.1 where the solution space is discussed. Secondly, the stochastic nature of the
problem requires simulations in order to correctly evaluate the quality of the schedule (see
section 8.4.2).
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Simulation procedure (4.2)
Optimisation Heuristics (4.4.)
Discrete event simulation (4.2.2.)
Weather model (4.2.1.) Stochastic activity duration
AG-chromosome 
(4.1.1.)
SAT-chromosome 
(4.1.3.)
MAT-chromosome 
(4.1.2.)
MAT-Annealing (4.4.1.) SAT-Annealing (4.4.2.) Dedicated Heuristic (4.4.3.)
E[NPV]
Conversion
Conversion Algorithm (4.2.3)
Wind speedWave height
Figure 8.3: Schematic overview of the solution approach
Figure 8.3 gives a schematic overview of the proposed solution approach, including
references to the sections in which the various elements are discussed. The two main
building blocks of the solution procedure are the optimisation heuristics (section 8.4.4) and
the simulation procedures (section 8.4.2). The optimisation heuristics create schedules for
the construction project, which are expressed as different types of chromosomes depending
on the optimisation heuristic used. These chromosomes are then passed to the simulation
procedure which calculates the expected net present value (E[NPV ]). This information
is then returned to the optimisation heuristic.
Three different optimisation heuristics are proposed in this research: two meta-heuristic
approaches (section 8.4.4.1 and 8.4.4.2) and a dedicated heuristic (section 8.4.4.3). The
chromosome encodings used by these algorithms have been created to reduce the size of the
solution space, and by extension the performance of the solution heuristic, as discussed at
length in section 8.4.1. The simulation model uses discrete event based simulation (section
8.4.2.2), and includes both stochastic activity durations and realistically generated weather
patterns (section 7.3). The weather model itself generates realistically correlated wind and
wave states for every time period.
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8.4.1 Solution Representation
As was stated in section 8.3.1, the operational schedule is defined by a set of gate times
(gi) for each activity i. This variable can have any positive integer value within the time
interval taken into consideration (1, ..., NT ) and represents the moment in time when the
materials needed for the execution of the activity have been made available. The model
assumes that the payment for these materials has to be made at the moment they are
delivered, meaning that the net present value of these outgoing cashflows is based on the
gate times which have been set for these materials.
Based on this principle, several ways of constructing a solution representation (chromo-
some) can be proposed. When constructing such a solution representation it is important
to balance the coverage of the total solution space with the total possible number of so-
lutions. An encoding which is too detailed will increase the computation time needed to
adequately search the solution space beyond practical value. A solution which is too re-
strictive on the other hand may cause severely suboptimal solutions due to the limited set
of solutions which is considered. Sections 8.4.1.1, 8.4.1.2 and 8.4.1.3 present three different
solution encodings at different points in this spectrum. These encodings are then used by
the heuristic solution procedures presented in section 8.4.4.
8.4.1.1 Activity Gate Chromosome
The simplest way of representing a solution is simply to use the gate times for the individual
activities as alleles in the chromosome encoding. Hence, each allele (gi) is an integer gate
time, indicating the specific time period in which the resources for activity i are made
available:
[g1, g2, ..., gNI ] gi ∈ {1, ..., NT} (8.11)
The first schedule of the example presented in section 8.3.3 can be represented by the
following activity gate chromosome: [1, 10]. This implies that the resources for the first
activity are available immediately (g1 = 1), and the resources for the second activity are
available at the start of the 10-th time period (g2 = 10). Practically this implies that
the first activity will be able to start immediately, and the second activity will start at
the 10-th time period, or once the first activity has been completed, whichever is later:
s2 = max(g2, f1).
The disadvantage of this solution representation is the large size of the solution space,
even for problems of limited size. The exact number of possible solutions can be calculated
as NTNI , where NI is the total number of activities and NT is the total number of time
periods considered. Depending on the precedence relations in the project and the manner
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in which the durations of the activities are specified, a subset of these combinations can
be eliminated from the pool of rational solutions. This is done by preventing gate times
from taking values smaller than the earliest possible start of the respective activity.
8.4.1.2 Monthly Activity Type Chromosome
Besides eliminating irrational solutions, the size of the solution space can also be reduced
by using other chromosome definitions. One way of doing this is by taking advantage of
the repetitive nature of offshore projects: many types of activities, and even sequences
of activities are repeated within the same project. Hence, rather than specifying when
specific activities are allowed to start, it is possible to define during which time periods
activity types are allowed to be executed.
The size of the solution space can be reduced even further by aggregating the time
periods into longer intervals. Given that the weather model uses months as climatological
units, and the motivation for allowing or not allowing certain activity types is likely mo-
tivated by expected weather conditions, it makes sense to aggregate the time periods per
month.
The term ‘monthly activity type’ or MAT chromosome will be used to describe this
type of chromosome. The chromosome itself consists of a set of binary variables xjτ , which
signify whether (1) or not (0) activity type j (j ∈ [1, 2, ..., NJ ]) is allowed to be executed
in month τ (τ ∈ [1, 2, ..., Nτ ]). The chromosome can be visualised as a matrix where the
rows represent the activity numbers and the columns represent the time periods (months):
x11 ... x1,Nτ
... xjm ...
xNJ,1 ... xNJ,Nτ
 (8.12)
Again this chromosome can be illustrated using the simple example which has been
defined in section 8.3.3. For this example the ‘summer’ and ‘winter’ seasons can be seen
as the relevant time periods indexed τ = 1, 2, 3. The two activities in the example project
are assumed to be of different types: j = 1, 2. This results in a total of six binary variables
which can be placed in a matrix structure to represent the MAT chromosome encoding:
[
x11 = 1 x12 = 0 x13 = 0
x21 = 0 x22 = 0 x23 = 1
]
(8.13)
It can be noted that the the values of x12 and x13 could also be set to 1 without
impacting the way in which the project is executed. The underlying execution strategies for
both these chromosomes are indeed different. However these differences held no relevance
with regard to the outcome of the project as expressed by the MAT chromosome. Hence,
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the fact that these variables can take different values should simply be seen as an ex aequo
between two different solutions2.
The substantial reduction of the solution space when using the MAT chromosome
encoding, rather than the gate times encoding is already apparent from this small exam-
ple. Using the MAT encoding, the total number of combinations can be calculated as
2NJ ·Nτ , for the example from section 8.3.3 this means that there are a total of 22·3 = 64
possible combinations. Whereas, when using the original chromosome the total number of
combinations was equal to NTNI = 452 = 2, 025.
In order to determine the expected net present value when using a schedule defined by
a MAT -chromosome the activity specific gate times have to be determined (see section
8.3.1). Effectively, the higher-level MAT -chromosome has to be translated into an AG-
chromosome (see section 8.4.1.1) encoding. This is done using an iterative simulation
procedure which is explained in detail in section 8.4.2.3.
8.4.1.3 Seasonal Activity Type Chromosome
A further reduction of the solution space can be obtained by reducing the project schedule
to a combination of two key decisions. The first decision being when to start the project,
and the second decision being how to deal with the weather sensitivity for each activity
type.
Similarly to the MAT -chromosome encoding, this chromosome uses the climatological
periods as they are defined in the weather simulation model (months for the model used
in this research). However, whereas the MAT -chromosome defined a variable for each
occurrence of these time periods (i.e. January of 2015, January of 2016, ...), the encoding
scheme only defines a single variable for each climatological period (i.e. January, February,
...). In effect, the seasonality of the weather pattern is used to decrease the complexity of
the scheduling decision. Hence, this type of chromosome encoding is dubbed a seasonal
activity type (SAT ) chromosome.
The SAT -chromosome is a list of integer variables in the range [0, NP − 1] where NP
is equal to the number of climatological periods used in the weather model, in this case 12
months. This list includes one variable s which indicates the number of months the start
of the project is delayed. This allele can be used to align periodic weather sensitivity of
the project with periods of more favourable weather. A value of s = 0 indicates that the
project starts immediately, whereas a value of s = 3 indicates that the start of the project
is postponed with three months (i.e. assuming the earliest start would be in January, a
value s = 3 will result in the project starting in April).
2One could also argue that any MAT chromosome corresponds to a set of activity gate chromosomes.
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The second part of the SAT -chromosome consists of a variable (dj) for each of the
activity types (j). This variable represents the number of months during which activities of
type j will not be performed to avoid weather related delays. Naturally, the months during
which the execution is halted are the months during which the worst average weather
conditions are expected. Which time periods are the worst on average is determined
using the steady state probability matrices of the weather model (see section 8.4.2.1).
The relative weather quality is simply defined as the average of the wind- and wavestates
during the time period.
This results in the following representation of the project schedule:
[s, d1, d2, ..., dj , ..., dNJ ] , s, dj ∈ [0, ..., NP − 1] (8.14)
By using this encoding, the number of possible schedules in the solution space is further
reduced to (1 + NJ)NP . Again the use of this chromosome can be illustrated using the
example from section 8.3.3. Again assuming that the two activities in the example are of
different types, the following SAT encoding can be used to represent the second schedule
of the example:
[s = 0, d1 = 0, d2 = 1] (8.15)
Equation 8.15 shows that the schedule starts immediately during the first period (s =
0). Also the first activity is allowed to be executed during every time period, whereas the
second activity cannot be executed during the period with the worst weather conditions.
Which period has the best or worst weather or average is determined by using the steady
state probabilities, as described in section 7.3.1. For the simple example the steady state
probability for good weather during the summer season is 87.8%, whereas the probability
for good weather is equal to only 55.6% during the winter season. Hence, it is clear that
the winter season has the worst weather conditions and the second activity type should
be suspended during the winter rather than the summer season.
In order to obtain the specific gate times associated with the schedule represented by
the SAT -chromosome, the SAT -encoding is simply translated into a MAT -chromosome,
after which the procedures used for the latter can be used to determine the activity specific
gate times.
8.4.1.4 Implications of Aggregated Solution Encodings
The first key implication of the aggregated encoding is the significant reduction in the size
of the solution space. This reduction is illustrated in figure 8.4. This example assumes a
project with a five-year timespan using four-hour time periods for the simulation procedure.
Chapter 8 229
It is clear that the chromosome used has an impact of several orders of magnitude regarding
the size of the solution space. Moreover, this impact increases as the size of the project
increases.
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Figure 8.4: Evolution of the size of the solution space when using different chromosomes.
A second side note which has to be made regarding these aggregated encodings is
that these are best applied to projects with primarily serial networks, which ideally also
have sufficiently long activity durations. This type of network is however very typical for
large offshore projects due to the limited availability of construction vessels. While these
encodings can be applied to serial networks, a network with a large amount of merging
paths may cause excessive buffering when the chromosome is translated into an activity
gate encoding.
8.4.2 Simulation Procedure
8.4.2.1 Modelling the Weather
The weather is simulated using the simulation model described in chapter 7.
8.4.2.2 Simulation of AG-chromosome Solutions
The goal of the simulation procedure is to obtain a value for the start and finish times for
every activity based on a AG-chromosome schedule representation (see section 8.4.1.1),
hereby allowing the net present value (NPV ) of the project to be calculated (see section
8.3.1). The simulation procedure itself takes into account two distinct sources of uncer-
tainty: uncertainty with respect to the duration of activities and uncertainty with respect
to the influence of weather conditions.
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Algorithm 7 Simulation Procedure
1: procedure RunSimulation(AG-chromosome, weatherPattern)
2: agenda ← ∅
3: ∀i : agenda ← agenda ∪ {gi}
4: ∀i : releasedi ← False
5: ∀i : ρi ← # predecessorsi
6: while agenda 6= ∅ do
7: e← agenda.pop()
8: ι← e.index()
9: if e.type() = gate then
10: releasedι ← True
11: if ρι = 0 then
12: sι ← e.time()
13: agenda ← agenda ∪ {fι}
14: else if e.type() = finish then
15: for s in successorsι do
16: ρs ← ρs − 1
17: if ρs = 0 and releaseds = True then
18: sι ← e.time()
19: agenda ← agenda ∪ {fs}
20: return {si, fi} ∀i
Algorithm 7 is a pseudocode representation of the discrete-event based simulation
procedure used to evaluate the performance of a specific schedule. The input for the
simulation procedure is an AG-chromosome. Such a chromosome consists of a gate time
gi for each of the activities in the project. The outcome of the simulation procedure is a
starting (si) and finishing time (fi) for each of the activities. This information is sufficient
to calculate the net present value for this specific scenario. Naturally in order to obtain
an estimate of the expected net present value (E[NPV ]) multiple simulations will have to
be performed.
The simulation procedure starts by defining an empty event agenda, and then adds the
gate times (gi) for all the activities as events to the agenda (line 3). For each activity a
boolean variable releasedi is defined which is used to indicate if the gate time of activity i
has already occurred. Another variable ρi is introduced and initialised to track the number
of unfinished predecessors remaining for every activity.
Once these variables have been declared, the procedure starts looping over the events
in the agenda (line 6). At each iteration the next event e is removed from the event agenda.
The variable ι is used to represent the index of the activity to which the event is linked.
Two types of events are considered in the simulation procedure: a gate time of an activity
and the finishing time of an activity.
If the event e is a gate time of an activity (line 9), the releasedι variable is set to
True. This indicates that the activity can start as soon as all its predecessors have
been completed. Next, the procedure tests if there are no remaining predecessors (line
11). If this is the case, the finishing time of the activity can be calculated, taking into
account a randomly drawn activity duration, as well as the simulated weather conditions
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in combination with the operational restrictions of the specific activity. This finishing time
is then added to the agenda as a new event since it may indicate the time at which the
number of predecessors of an activity has to be decreased.
If the event e is a finishing time of an activity (line 14), the algorithm iterates over all
the successors of activity ι, decrementing the number of remaining predecessors (ρs) for
each of these successors. For each successor, the procedure also tests if the total number
of predecessors is now zero. If this is the case and the activity has already been released
the starting and finishing times of the activity can be determined. The finishing time of
the activity is then also added as a new event to the agenda.
8.4.2.3 Chromosome Re-encoding Simulation
As was mentioned in section 8.4.1.2, the higher-level chromosome encodings (MAT and
SAT ) do not directly specify gate times for all individual activities. Nevertheless, simulat-
ing the execution of the project using the procedure described in section 8.4.2.2 requires
explicit gate times to be defined for each activity. Naturally, due to the stochastic nature
of the project it is infeasible to specify gate times which are guaranteed to respect the con-
ditions set by the higher order MAT or SAT chromosomes. Because of this, an iterative
satisficing procedure to set the gate times is proposed. The outline of this procedure is
visualised by figure 8.5.
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Figure 8.5: Iterative Procedure to Set Gate Times
The procedure starts by setting all gate times (gi) at the start of the project (gi = 1).
Next, the precedence relations are used to shift a fraction of these gate times forward
in time based on the release times and shortest possible durations of their predecessors
(assuming no weather delays). This set of gate times is then simulated using the procedure
which was described in detail in section 8.4.2.2. The outcome of this simulation is a set of
starting (si) and finishing times (fi), which are compared with the conditions imposed by
the MAT or SAT chromosome. In case the execution of an activity falls within a period
which does not allow execution of its activity type, the gate time of the activity is shifted
forwards.
Once this has been tested for all the activities, the algorithm verifies if any gates were
shifted since the last simulation run. If this is the case, the forward shift procedure for
all successors is called again, and a new simulation is performed. When no more gate
times have been adjusted after performing a simulation, the restrictions imposed by the
higher-order chromosome are assumed to be satisfied.
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8.4.3 Comparing Solutions
Due to the stochastic nature of the scheduling problem, it is important to verify that
differences in performance between two schedules are statistically significant. This is espe-
cially important when comparing alternatives in a (meta-)heuristic procedure. However,
constructing independent confidence intervals for both solutions is computationally expen-
sive. When using unrelated samples the variance of the difference between two estimators
can be calculated as:
var
[
ˆNPV (s1)− ˆNPV (s2)
]
= var
[
ˆNPV (s1)
]
+ var
[
ˆNPV (s2)
]
(8.16)
Where ˆNPV is an estimator of the NPV for a specific schedule s. Naturally, the
statistical significance of the difference between two solution can be improved by increasing
the number of simulations. However, this increased statistical significance comes at a
considerable computational expense.
Constructing correlated samples by using common random numbers is an alternative
technique which can also increase statistical significance at no increased computational
expense. By comparing the performance difference between two schedules using the same
random estimates for the weather conditions and the activity durations, a strong correla-
tion of the samples can be obtained. Whereas the covariance between the two estimators
could be assumed to be zero in equation 8.16, given the independent samples used, the
covariance will now become strictly positive. This means the variance of the difference
between the two estimates now becomes:
var
[
ˆNPV (s1)− ˆNPV (s2)
]
=
var
[
ˆNPV (s1)
]
+ var
[
ˆNPV (s2)
]
− 2 · cov
[
ˆNPV (s1), ˆNPV (s2)
]
(8.17)
Given that the covariance will always be strictly positive, this will always be a reduction
of the variance of the difference between the two estimators. Hence, this technique enables
a more efficient one-on-one comparison of different schedules, increasing the number of
schedules which can be tested in a given time-frame. The latter being of paramount
importance to the performance of local-search based meta-heuristic procedures since it
allows a larger number of solutions to be investigated in a given time-frame.
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8.4.4 Optimisation Heuristics
Creating optimal schedules is complicated by both the size of the solution space (see sec-
tion 8.4.1), and the need for simulation in order to estimate the NPV associated with a
specific schedule. Especially since these simulations are relatively computationally expen-
sive, enumerative procedures which iterate over all possible schedules are eliminated as
viable solution methods. Moreover, exact solution techniques are also ill-suited due to the
stochastic nature of the problem.
Hence, the scheduling optimisation uses heuristic techniques to make an efficient scan
of the most promising areas of the solution space. In the remainder of this chapter three
different heuristics to solve this problem are proposed and tested. Two of these are local-
search-based meta-heuristics, the first of which uses the MAT -chromosome encoding, and
the second of which uses the higher-level SAT -chromosome encoding. Note that the choice
for local search rather than population based meta-heuristics was made because of the
efficiency gains which are possible when comparing solutions one-on-one using common
random numbers (see section 8.4.3). These efficiency gains can no longer be obtained
when selecting the best solutions out of a large pool of candidates.
Rather than using general purpose techniques on a specific solution encoding, the third
solution technique is a dedicated heuristic which tests the most ‘rational’ choices in the
solution spectrum. The subsequent sections provide more information on the specifics
of the meta-heuristics which are used, after which the performance of these heuristics is
tested in sections 8.5 and 8.7.
8.4.4.1 MAT -chromsome Annealing
The first meta-heuristic is an implementation of the simulated annealing meta-heuristic
(Talbi, 2009), which uses the MAT -chromosome encoding presented in section 8.4.1.2. A
basic outline of the annealing procedure is presented by algorithm 8.
The neighbourhood moves are performed by flipping a random binary value in the
MAT -chromosome from 1 to 0 or vice versa. Next, the iterative procedure (see section
8.4.2.3) is used to create an AG-chromosome which can be used by the simulation proce-
dure which estimates the NPV of the solution.
The meta-heuristic also verifies that infeasible solutions are discarded. This can occur
when a certain solution does not allocate sufficient time to a certain activity type in order
to complete it within the timeframe of the simulation procedure. In case such an infeasible
solution is detected, the solution is discarded and a new neighbourhood move is tested.
As shown in algorithm 8, the heuristic starts by initialising the temperature (t) and
the iteration counter (i). The current best solution is initialised randomly, and the in-
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Algorithm 8 Basic Annealing Procedure
1: procedure Simulated Annealing(problem instance)
2: t← tinitial
3: i← 0
4: solbest ← random init
5: solincu ← solbest
6: while t > tend and i < maxiter do
7: NeighMove(solincu)
8: δ = significantDifference(solbest, solincu)
9: if δ < 0 then
10: solbest ← solincu
11: t← t · cooldown
12: else if δ = 0 then
13: Insignificant difference:
14: solincu ← solbest
15: else if e− δt < r then
16: solbest ← solincu
17: t← t · cooldown
18: else
19: solincu ← solbest
20: i← i+ 1
21: return solbest
cumbent is set to be equal to this initial solution (lines 3 and 4). Next the iterations of
the simulated annealing heuristic start, and continue until the temperature has become
lower than the predefined end temperature (tend) or the maximal number of iterations has
been reached (line 5). During each iteration a random neighbourhood move is performed
on the incumbent solution (line 6). Next, the difference between the best (solbest) and
incumbent solution (solincu) is analysed using the procedure described in section 8.4.3.
This comparison yields one of four outcomes: (i) the solution is better and replaces the
current best solution (line 9), or (ii) there is no significant difference between the current
best and the incumbent and the move is discarded (line 12), or (iii) the solution is sig-
nificantly worse but is still accepted according to a certain random probability expressed
as a function of the current temperature (line 15), or (iv) none of the above is true and
the solution is discarded (line 18). A non-traditional element of this simulated annealing
meta-heuristic is that it discards any moves which do not yield a statistically significant
difference between the current and incumbent solution.
8.4.4.2 SAT -chromsome Annealing
A variation on the simulated annealing procedure presented in section 8.4.4.1 can be
created by using the SAT chromosome rather than the MAT chromosome. The neigh-
bourhood operator for this meta-heuristic increments or decrements a single allele of the
chromosome encoding, naturally taking into account the bounds of the individual alleles
(s, dj ∈ [0, 11]). Similarly to the previous meta-heuristic, infeasible solutions due to too
little available production time are discarded. All other elements of the heuristic remain
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unchanged.
8.4.4.3 Dedicated Heuristics
For problems where evaluating a solution takes a considerable amount of computation
time, dedicated heuristics can provide a valuable alternative. Rather than using a random
approach to explore the solution space, dedicated heuristics use as much problem informa-
tion as possible to explore the most promising regions. This section presents a dedicated
heuristic which takes a subset of the solution space as defined by the SAT -chromosome and
uses a full-factorial approach to explore all solutions therein. This subset can be defined
as the SAT -chromosomes (see equation 8.14) for which the following condition holds:
dj = dk ∀k, j = 1, ..., NJ |j 6= k (8.18)
Equation 8.18 simply states that the number of months during which activity types
are halted because of averse weather conditions is equal across all activity types. This
effectively reduces the SAT -chromosome to the following expression:
[s, d] , s, d ∈ [0, ..., NP − 1] (8.19)
Where d represents the number of months of downtime for adverse weather conditions
for all activities. Hence, the total number of combinations is reduced to NP 2. Given that
the number of seasons distinguished by weather models rarely exceeds the twelve months
of the year. Hence, the computational effort needed to calculate all these combinations is
unlikely to exceed computational limitations, even for realistically sized projects.
8.5 Case Study: the Construction of an Offshore Wind
Farm
The objective of this research is to present tools which can be used for realistically sized
problems which are subjected to substantial weather risks. An example with increasing
relevance in recent years is the construction of offshore wind farms. This section presents
a project consisting of 54 wind turbines which have been installed on the Thorntonbank
off the Belgian coast, having a total capacity of 325 megawatt.
Given that the objective is to optimise the scheduling of the project taking into account
the weather conditions, the activity breakdown structure should be sufficiently detailed to
incorporate all differences in weather sensitivity between activities. Practically this means
that 12 different activity types are distinguished. The properties of these activity types
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Costs in 000 AC ∆-duration (h) Weather restrictions
Activity Type Activity Subtype CFi C
V
i Wave (m) Wind (m/s) Wavest. Windst.
Scour protection Scour protection 64.87 3.17 (20, 24, 28) 1.5 - 5 -
Foundation
Loading 3,192.69 9.72 (5, 6, 8) - 10 - 4
Transport 0.00 9.72 (4, 6, 8) 2 14 7 7
Positioning 0.00 9.72 (2, 4, 5) 1.75 10 6 4
Installation 0.00 9.72 (11, 15, 22) 1.75 9 6 3
Return to port 0.00 9.72 (4, 6, 8) 2 14 7 7
Turbine
Loading 8,779.91 9.72 (9, 10, 12) - 10 - 4
Transport 0.0 0 9.72 (4, 6, 8) 2 14 7 7
Positioning 0.00 9.72 (2, 4, 5) 1.75 10 6 4
Installation 0.00 9.72 (24, 27, 34) 1.75 8 6 2
Return to port 0.00 9.72 (4, 6, 8) 2 14 7 7
Inner array cable Inner array cable 508.84 28.50 (40, 80, 160) 1.75 - 6 -
Table 8.6: Costs, durations and weather restrictions associated with the different activity types.
Costs in 000 AC Renting restrictions in days
Resource ρVr ρCr ρDr min rent period min down period
Stone dump vessel 13.5 600 600 30 90
Jack-up barge 41.445 1000 1000 90 90
Trenching vessel 20.25 900 900 30 90
Table 8.7: Properties of the chartered vessels for offshore windfarm construction.
are listed in table 8.6. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed insight in the
properties of these activities, as well as their interrelations.
In order to construct an offshore wind farm, four basic tasks must be performed. First
and foremost, the place where the foundation will be placed has to be prepared by installing
scour protection (S). This is done by using a stone dumping vessel to place rocks that
prevent ocean current from digging out the monopile foundations out from under the wind
turbine. Secondly, the foundation of the turbine (F ) has to be installed using a jack-up
barge which hammers the foundations into the seabed. Once this has been completed,
the third activity is installing the turbine (T ) itself, including the tower, navette and
blades. Finally the fourth task is to dig a cable (C) into the seabed which connects each
of the turbines to the transformer station. This final installation is done using a specially
S1 S2 S3 S4
F1 F2 F3 F4
T1 T2 T3 T4
C1 C2 C3 C4
Start
Stone dumping vessel
Jack-up barge
Trenching vessel
S5
F5
T5
C5
Figure 8.6: Wind farm project structure
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equipped trenching vessel.
Figure 8.6 presents a high-level overview of the interrelations between the different
activities. Naturally, the order which has been described has to be followed for each
individual turbine: first the scour protection is installed, then the foundation of the turbine
is installed, next the turbine itself is placed on op of the foundation and finally the cables
are installed. However, because of the technical capabilities of the vessels used for these
installations the installing of the foundation and the placement of the turbine are grouped.
The reason for this is that the jack-up barge is capable of transporting three foundations
or three turbines simultaneously. Hence the pattern as is shown by figure 8.6 is created.
A more detailed view is shown by table 8.6, which shows that both the installation of
the foundation and turbine can be split up into more detailed sub-activities: loading the
barge with the materials (incurring a substantial fixed material cost CFi ), transporting
the materials to the installation site, positioning of the barge for the installation, the
installation of the turbine or foundation and the return to shore. There is also an operating
cost associated with each of these activities (CVi ), which represents the variable operating
cost of the vessel and its crew, this is the surplus cost compared to the costs which are
incurred when a chartered vessel is idle. The chain of events also respects the order which
is shown by figure 8.6: first materials for three foundations or three turbines are loaded,
after which these are transported to the site. Next the barge needs to be positioned
for each turbine location after which the associated installation takes place. When all
materials which were transported have been installed the barge returns to the dock for its
next shipment.
Each of these activities has an associated triangular distribution3 which represents the
duration of the associated activity. Table 8.6 also shows the weather restrictions for each
of the activities. It can be seen that the installation of the turbine is most susceptible to
averse weather conditions, followed by the installation of the foundation, placement of the
inner-array cable and the scour protection respectively.
The scheduling procedure as defined in the preceding sections is implemented on the
level of the activity sub-types. The reason for this being the more realistic representation
of weather sensitivity as well as the uncertainty related to each of the sub-types. Hence, 12
activity types are distinguished in the scheduling algorithms used to solve this case study.
Table 8.7 provides more information on the properties of the vessels used to execute
the activities. As indicated in figure 8.6, the scour protection is installed by a stone dump
vessel, the installation of both the foundation and the turbine is done by a general-purpose
jack-up barge, and the installation of the cables on the seabed is done by a trenching vessel.
Each of these vessels has an associated chartering cost ρVr which is expressed per time
3These triangular distributions are defined as: (min, modulo, max).
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period of 4 hours. Moreover a substantial cost is also incurred for the deployment (ρCr )
and decommissioning (ρDr ) of these vessels. Also related to the (de)commissioning of the
vessels are the minimal time periods for both renting and downtime. These limitations are
imposed by the firm which rents out the vessel in order to guarantee that vessel occupancy
rates are satisfactory. The periods during which vessels have to be rented as well as how
often these vessels are (de)commissioned are determined during the simulation procedure
(see section 8.4.2).
8.6 Evaluating Computational Performance
In order to evaluate the performance of the solution techniques proposed in section 8.4, two
benchmarks are proposed in this section. The first is an upper bound on the net present
value, which is based on a best-case scenario execution of the project (section 8.6.1). The
second benchmark is the current deterministic scheduling approach used when scheduling
similar projects (section 8.6.2).
8.6.1 Upper Bound for the NPV
An upper bound for the net present value earned can be calculated by making a number
of assumptions regarding the manner in which the project is executed. Based on these
assumptions the activity starting (si) and finishing (fi) times can be obtained, which can
then be used to make an estimation of the maximal possible value of the project using
equation 8.1.
Assumption 1: All activities have their shortest possible duration. As explained in
section 8.3.2 activities are inherently variable, however for the upper bound it will be
assumed that all activities are executed according to their most optimistic time estimate.
This guarantees a minimal amount of variable costs.
Assumption 2: There are no delays due to weather conditions, i.e. weather conditions
are always sufficiently good for the relevant activities to be executed.
Assumption 3: The project is executed using an as late as possible scheduling strategy
without extending the critical path as defined by the shortest possible durations for all
activities. By doing so all negative cashflows are shifted backwards as much as possible,
whilst earning the positive cashflow at the end of the project as soon as possible.
Note that given the structure of the offshore project studied in this chapter (see section
8.5) these three assumptions guarantee continued use of the resources employed. As such,
both the size and the timing of the cash outflows linked to resources is a best case scenario.
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8.6.2 Deterministic Scheduling
A second benchmark for the performance of the heuristics is the scheduling approach which
assumes a deterministic project. This strategy uses the average durations of the activities
to create a project schedule. However, noting that there may be some disruptions during
the execution of the project the non-critical activities are scheduled as soon as possible (as
opposed to the ALAP schedule used for the upper bound, see section 8.6.1).
The performance of such a schedule can be tested using an AG-chromosome (section
(8.4.1.1). The gate times (gi) for this chromosome are simply set to the starting times
of this deterministic schedule. The performance as expressed by the expected net present
value of the project can then be calculated using the simulation procedure described in
section 8.4.2.
8.7 Computational Experiments
Intensive computational experiments have been carried out to investigate both the impact
of specific strategies as well as the general performance of the different solution heuristics
for the case study outlined in section 8.5, as well as variations on the specific scenario with
increased and decreased project size. Specifically the impact of varying the starting date of
the project as well as the amount of months during which work is interrupted is investigated
in section 8.7.1, and more extensive experiments which compare the performance of the
different algorithms for projects of various sizes are presented in section 8.7.2.
8.7.1 Impact of Project Start and Downtime
This section presents a qualitative analysis of the impact of the two main decisions by
the project manager: when to start the project and how long to interrupt the project in
anticipation of inclement weather. These two decisions form the basis of the dedicated
heuristic algorithm which was presented in section 8.4.4.3. The aim of this section is to
provide insight into the impact these variables can have on the net present value of the
project, based on the case study scenario with 54 wind turbines as presented in section
8.5.
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Figure 8.7: Comparison of the impact of varying strategies on the case study project (NPV in
mio AC).
Naturally, the number of downtime months can only be incremented until the duration
of the project extends beyond the maximal allowable deadline (which was set at five years).
The experiments showed that setting the winter downtime to more than 7 months resulted
in infeasible schedules, hence a total of 96 viable combinations4 have been tested.
The net present value (NPV ) estimate for the various strategies is summarised in
figure 8.7. Looking at the leftmost panel of this figure reveals that the NPV displays a
clear cyclical pattern when the start of the project is varied. More specifically it appears
to be more beneficial to start around the month May, whereas the period surrounding
October seems to be the least attractive. The difference between these two months is
highly significant: starting in the right month can make a 10% difference in the net present
value of the project.
The centre panel reveals a more complex pattern for the number of months the op-
erations are halted during the winter months. The complexity of this pattern is mainly
caused by the degree to which chartering costs can be decreased by not working during the
winter months, taking into account the restrictions on the minimal time periods during
which vessels need to be chartered (see table 8.7). These results do however show that a
detailed analysis of the impact of these decisions on a specific project is worthwhile since
even a one month difference can have very substantial implications on the net present
value of the project. Similarly to the starting month decision, the choice of the number of
downtime months can result in a 10% difference in the project’s net present value.
A more complete picture of the solution space is presented by the surface plot in the
rightmost panel of figure 8.7. This pattern clearly shows that the general patterns which
have been uncovered with regard to the number of downtime months as well as the starting
412 starting months x 8 downtime month possibilities, including zero.
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months remain valid when both variables are subject to variations. Nevertheless, it appears
that in order to find the optimal combination it pays to perform a full factorial analysis,
rather than simply basing the decision on a separate analysis of the starting month and
downtime decision. Based on the separate analysis the optimal starting month would
have been the 10th month (October), and the optimal number of winter downtime months
would be four. However, when looking at the joint analysis it becomes apparent that the
combination of these two decisions is sub-optimal, resulting in an estimated NPV of 607
million AC, whereas starting in February with five months of winter downtime results in an
expected NPV of 626 million AC, an increase in NPV of 3.1%.
8.7.2 Comparison of Algorithm Performance
A second computational experiment was carried out to compare the performance of the
different heuristic strategies for varying project sizes. The dataset used contained projects
of a similar structure to the case study presented in section 8.5 with the number of turbines
to install as the determinant of project size. The number of turbines was varied between
1 and 60, each heuristic being used 20 times to get an accurate reading of the average
relative performance of these heuristics. A total of 4,500 hours of processing time on 2.5
GHz processors was used to conduct these experiments.
Figures 8.8 and 8.9 compare the performance of the solution approaches in absolute
and relative terms respectively. The spread between the upper bound and the solution
heuristics clearly increases as the problem becomes larger and systematic weather influ-
ences become more problematic.
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Figure 8.8: Performance comparison in absolute terms
The solution techniques which use the SAT -chromosome (dedicated search and SAT -
annealing) outperform the other solution approaches, as evidenced by figure 8.9. Specifi-
cally the dedicated search significantly outperforms all other solution methods.
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Figure 8.9: Performance comparison in relative terms: The performance of the heuristics is illus-
trated within the upper and lower bound for the expected net present value, a higher
value representing better performance
Interestingly, the MAT -annealing heuristic performs worse than the deterministic
scheduling approach in the majority of the cases. This clearly shows that the solution
space of this type of problem is too large to be efficiently searched at such a level of detail.
This proves the usefulness of the techniques for aggregating the chromosome encoding
into higher level encodings as proposed in this research. An important factor here being
that these higher-level chromosome encodings still have to be translated into detailed op-
erational guidelines (gate times gi) since these are required beforehand to guarantee the
availability of the installation vessels needed to complete offshore construction projects.
The relative gains from using the SAT -annealing technique rather than deterministic
scheduling techniques is highly substantial for smaller projects. As the size of the projects
increase the relative impact declines before stabilising at an increase 7 to 10% in expected
net present value for projects with 25 turbines or more.
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Figure 8.10: The average properties of the optimal solution provided by the dedicated search
heuristic for varying problem sizes.
Both the SAT -annealing and the dedicated search heuristic show a dip in their relative
performance for project sizes ranging from 35 to 45 turbines. The cause of this dip in
performance can be seen when looking at the properties of the average solution provided
by the dedicated heuristic (figure 8.10), which clearly shows that the properties of the
optimal solution change significantly within this problem size range. This implies that the
increasing size of the project has caused an increased sensitivity to the seasonality of the
weather patterns. For example a project spanning more than a full year will be guaranteed
to be influenced by a period of bad weather, whereas a project of a couple of months can
conceivably be planned around worse time periods. Moreover, as the length of the project
increases the impact of discounting cashflows to calculate the net present value becomes
greater.
8.8 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a novel methodology to optimise scheduling for projects sub-
jected to both inherent and weather-related stochasticity. This methodology consists of
a novel weather model which generates both wave height and wind speed, as well as a
modelling approach for the project itself.
Computational experiments indicate that the best results are obtained when using
dedicated heuristics on a systematically reduced solution space. Hence, future research
should focus on efficient ways of identifying the most interesting areas of the solution space
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for this type of problem. Moreover, future research should extend the analysis to include
other case studies, as well as creating a dataset containing benchmark problems on which
future heuristics can be compared objectively. The discussion of other case studies as well
as climates could also be a valuable extension of this research. For projects where the lead
times for resources are short or non-existent a dynamic scheduling approach may also be
an interesting extension of this research.
9
Weather-Based Maintenance Strategies for
Offshore Wind Farms
This chapter presents a number of novel strategies for the preventive maintenance of
offshore wind farms. These strategies take into account seasonal weather patterns and
their impact on electricity production. By optimising the timing of the maintenance the
losses due to relinquished electricity production can be reduced.
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9.1 Introduction
Whereas chapter 8 studied the influence of weather conditions on the construction of
offshore wind turbines, this chapter leverages the weather model presented in chapter 7 to
optimise the preventive maintenance activities in offshore wind parks.
The operations and maintenance costs of offshore wind turbines represent a significant
fraction of the lifetime cost of offshore wind farms (20 - 35%, Ortegon et al. (2013)).
Specifically, the offshore location of these turbines greatly increases the costs associated
with the maintenance. This is due to the need for specialised vessels and the fact that
the turbines can not always be serviced when weather conditions are unfavourable. The
significance of these costs has fostered a number of publications on this subject in recent
years. A good overview of this literature is presented by Shafiee (2015).
The main purpose of the models presented in this section is to aid decision makers facing
operational go/no-go decisions regarding preventive maintenance. In order to perform
this type of maintenance, the turbine has to be switched off, resulting in lost energy
production. Hence, it is advised to perform this maintenance when the weather conditions
are unfavourable for electricity production (specifically at wind speeds below the rated
speed of the turbine). Nevertheless, determining the right thresholds at which to perform
this maintenance is a complex task due to the inherent uncertainty of weather conditions.
The nature of the maintenance process as well as the settings of the various parameters
in this operational model are based on real case study information. Specifically, a wind
farm in the North Sea off the Belgian coast.
9.2 The Nature of Preventive Wind Farm Maintenance
In his recent review of maintenance logistics literature for offshore wind farms Shafiee
(2015) distinguishes three different levels of decision making. Strategic decisions that
impact the complete life cycle of the wind farm, tactical decisions that are made multiple
times during the lifespan of the wind park, and operational decisions which govern the day
to day operations of the wind farm. The research presented in this chapter is related to
the organisation of maintenance support task within the tactical level, and the scheduling
of maintenance tasks situated in the operational level.
Different types of maintenance are required throughout the life of an offshore turbine.
Tavner (2012) distinguishes two main categories: preventive maintenance and corrective
maintenance. Preventive maintenance can be further categorised as calendar, condition
or weather-based maintenance. Corrective maintenance can in turn be either planned
or unplanned. Several other authors also use a similar categorisation for the mainte-
Chapter 9 249
nance activities (Karyotakis, 2011; Shafiee, 2015). The research in this chapter specifically
aims to decrease the cost associated with weather-based maintenance activities. For the
current generation of offshore wind turbines approximately 80 hours of preventive mainte-
nance is recommended, although this amount is frequently substantially greater in practice
(Van Bussel et al., 2001).
The weather conditions have a dual impact on the maintenance activities. Firstly,
averse weather conditions may prevent maintenance operations altogether for safety rea-
sons. Secondly, the weather conditions during maintenance operations determine the lost
income due to stopping the wind turbine. Typically safety thresholds for maintenance
activities are set at 150 cm wave height and at a wind speed of 12 meters per second
(Maples et al., 2013).
The production output of a wind turbine can be plotted as a function of the wind speed.
For this research, a simplified power output curve as used by Gundegjerde and Halvorsen
(2012) is employed. Figure 9.1 illustrates the curve that is used for the experiment in
section 9.5. Naturally, the nature of this curve depends on the type of turbine.
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Figure 9.1: Turbine power production as a function of the wind speed.
On this curve three important wind speeds are shown. The cut-in wind speed is the
wind speed at which there is sufficient wind to turn the blades of the turbine. Below this
wind speed there is no electricity production. As the wind speed increases, so does the
power production, here approximated by a linear curve. This increase continues until the
rated speed of the turbine is reached, here the power production levels off at its maximum
capacity (6MW for this specific type of turbine). For safety reasons, the turbine is shut
off when the wind speeds exceed the cut-out rate, at which point the power production
falls back to zero.
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9.3 Problem Definition
This section defines the preventive maintenance problem starting from the total cost func-
tion of the optimising actor. To improve readability, the notation in this chapter is based
on a situation with a single turbine. This section starts by analysing the problem un-
der deterministic assumptions in subsection 9.3.1. Next, the assumption of deterministic
weather is relaxed and the more realistic stochastic problem faced by the decision maker
is defined in subsection 9.3.2.
9.3.1 Deterministic Analysis
This research takes the perspective of the actor responsible for performing the preventive
maintenance on a collection of offshore wind turbines. Each of these turbines requires a
predefined number of maintenance shifts per annum. A penalty is associated with non-
completion of required maintenance shifts. Effectively, the actor wishes to minimize the
following total cost (TC) function:
TC = CCtot +MCtot + PCtot (9.1)
Where CCtot signifies the total cost of lost capacity, MCtot the total actual cost for
executing the maintenance and PCtot the total penalty cost for uncompleted maintenance
shifts. These three cost components are explored in detail in the following paragraphs.
The cost of lost capacity is calculated based on the power production of the wind
turbine (see section 9.2 and figure 9.1). This power production is defined by the following
equation:
P (WS) =

0 if WS < WScut-in
Pmax WS−WS
cut-in
WSrated−WScut-in WS
cut-in ≤WS < WSrated
Pmax if WSrated ≤WS < WScut-out
0 if WS ≥WScut-out
(9.2)
Where P is the power production in Megawatt, as a function of the wind speed (WS).
Pmax is the maximal power production of the turbine. For the turbines studied in this
research this is equal to 6MW . As shown on figure 9.1, there is no power production below
the cut-in speed (WScut-in) and above the cut-out speed (WScut-out). Moreover, the power
production reaches its peak at the rated wind speed of the wind turbine (WSrated) beyond
which further increases in wind speed no longer increase the power production.
Using this function, the cost due to lost capacity (CC) can be calculated by multiplying
the power production (P ) by the duration of the standstill (in hours) and the price received
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received per MWh on the electricity market (E). Assuming the turbine is stopped for 8
hours during each of the maintenance shifts, the potential lost capacity cost during shift
t can be calculated as:
CCt(WSt) = P (WSt) · 8h · E (9.3)
The total lost capacity cost (CC) can simply be calculated by summing the lost capacity
cost for the time periods during which maintenance was executed:
CCtot =
|T |∑
t=1
xt · CCt (9.4)
Where xt is a binary variable equal to 1 when the contractor has decided to perform
maintenance, and equal to zero otherwise. The same variable can be used to calculate
the total cost of maintenance (MC), as shown in equation 9.5. Where MCshift is the
maintenance cost for a single shift. Note that this cost is not time dependent.
MCtot =
|T |∑
t=1
xt ·MCshift (9.5)
The third component of the cost represents the penalty for unfinished maintenance.
Given that a total of S maintenance shifts per turbine are contractually required within
the time period under consideration, the total penalty cost can be represented by equation
9.6.
PCtot = max
0,
S − |T |∑
t=1
xt
 · PCshift (9.6)
Using this information and assuming that the observed wind speed is a deterministic
parameter to the model, the maintenance scheduling problem can be defined as a simple
model as described by expressions 9.7 until 9.13.
Minimize:
|T |∑
t=1
[
(CCt +MCshift) · xt
]
+ PCtot (9.7)
subject to:
PCtot ≥
S − |T |∑
t=1
xt
 · PCshift (9.8)
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PCtot ≥ 0 (9.9)
WHmax −WHt +Mαt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T (9.10)
WHt −WHmax +M(1− αt) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T (9.11)
xt + αt < 2 (9.12)
xt, αt ∈ {0, 1} t ∈ T (9.13)
In this linear model, an additional constraint related to the maximal allowable wave
height to conduct maintenance is represented by equations 9.10 until 9.12. These equations
introduce a new binary variable αt which is equal to 1 if the maximal allowable wave height
is exceeded. Equation 9.12 guarantees that maintenance will not be allowed during time
periods where the maximal wave height is exceeded.
This deterministic linear model can provide a useful lower bound for the stochastic
optimisation of the maintenance operations. Moreover, by making the assumption that
the penalty cost per shift exceeds the maximal cost of capacity loss and the cost of main-
tenance itself, the lower bound for the optimal solution of the stochastic procedure can be
determined very easily. This assumption can be noted as follows:
PCshift > CCt(WSrated) +MCshift (9.14)
If this condition is true, the optimal solution is always to perform all the maintenance
during the decision period - insofar as this is not inhibited by excessive wave heights.
Hence, the set of optimal time periods for maintenance T opt can be defined as follows:
T feasible = {t ∈ T : WHt ≤WHmax} (9.15)
∃T opt ⊆ T feasible : |T opt|= S,WSt ≤WSk|t ∈ T opt, k ∈ T feasible \ T opt (9.16)
under this assumption the optimal solution is simply:
xt = 1 ∀t ∈ T opt, xk = 0 ∀k ∈ T \ T opt (9.17)
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9.3.2 Stochastic Extensions
The initial analysis in section 9.3.1 assumed the observed wind speed to be deterministic.
In reality such long term weather predictions are impossible and form the main complicat-
ing factor in this optimisation problem. Operationally, the decision to perform preventive
maintenance is made on a daily basis. Moreover, there are no formal rules in place that
govern this go/no-go decision. Hence, the creation of a tool to optimise this process is one
of the key factors where the preventive maintenance process can be improved.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed maintenance strategies, a sim-
ulation engine is required. The basis of this simulation engine is a weather simulation
that generates realistic wind speeds and wave heights for the annual time horizon of the
preventive maintenance contract. In order to create these weather patterns, the weather
simulation model presented in chapter 7 is used. This model is extended in order to output
specific wind speeds and wave heights, rather than simply a category for these values, as
was sufficient for the experiments in chapter 8. The motivation for this exension is that
this allows for a more detailed view on the cost of lost capacity (see section 9.3.1). In
order to approximate the actual distributions of wind speeds and wave heights as good as
possible, the recently proposed approach proposed by Tang et al. (2015b) was used. Using
this approach, the wind speeds and wave heights are drawn at random from the actual
observations in the training data, given the simulated wind or wave state as presented by
the simulation model from chapter 7.
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Figure 9.2: Outline of the decision making process.
The logic of the stochastic process is outlined in figure 9.2. The two major components
of the process are the simulated weather conditions and the state of the maintenance
operations (model state). The simulation procedure starts by initialising the model state,
i.e. setting the remaining number of time periods equal to the total number of available
time periods in the contract and setting the remaining number of maintenance shifts equal
to the total number of maintenance shifts required. Next, the weather simulation engine is
called and wind speeds as well as wave heights are simulated for the complete time period.
The time period index t is then initialised to 1 and the simulation loop is started. At every
iteration of the loop a go/no-go decision regarding the maintenance operations is made.
At this position in the simulation loop a number of different decision making models can
be inserted in the simulation (see section 9.4). Depending on the nature of the decision the
state of the model is updated. Next, the stopping conditions are tested. The simulation
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halts when the last time period is finished, or when all the necessary maintenance has
been executed. If the stopping conditions are not yet satisfied, the time period counter is
incremented and the loop continues.
9.4 Maintenance Strategies
As described in section 9.3.2 any type of logic can be used to make the go/no-go decision
regarding the maintenance of offshore wind turbines. In this section a number of differ-
ent approaches are presented prior to comparing their performance using computational
experiments in section 9.5.
9.4.1 Static Threshold
The simplest technique which can be employed is a simple static threshold for the wind
speed. The decision maker simply selects a specific wind speed and if the observed wind
speed for the next shift does not exceed this threshold, maintenance is executed. Naturally,
there are two preconditions to this. Firstly, the wave height must not exceed the maximal
allowable wave height (i.e. performing maintenance has to be technically feasible). Sec-
ondly, the total number of maintenance shifts will of course never exceed the number of
contractually required maintenance shifts.
The value of the threshold is optimised by testing a wide range of values on a set
of training data. The value of the threshold is varied in the range [WScut-in,WSrated]
since a lower threshold could never be economically relevant (it does not make sense to
delay maintenance when the turbine has already stopped). A higher threshold is also not
relevant since the output of the wind turbine is already at maximal capacity when the
wind speed is equal to the rated wind speed.
The training procedure for this technique is very simple and uses the number of values
tested as the only parameter. Based on this parameter a number of equidistant points are
selected in the range [WScut-in,WSrated]. Each of these candidate thresholds is tested on
all of the members of the training dataset and the average total cost is reported for each
of the candidate values. The threshold value with the lowest average value is then selected
as the static threshold to be used.
This technique corresponds most closely to the method currently employed by the
scheduler. The key difference being that the technique presented here uses a set of training
data, whereas in practice this value is based on intuition.
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9.4.2 Relative Workload Dependent Threshold
The main drawback to the static threshold approach is that it does not take into account
all information available to the scheduler. Specifically, the information on the amount
of maintenance already completed and the amount of time remaining to perform this
maintenance is neglected. Nevertheless, this information is highly valuable when making
the go/no-go decision.
The relative workload dependent threshold (RWDT ) presented in this section miti-
gates this issue by including these elements in a simple expression, as shown by equation
9.18. This equation contains two parameters that have to be tuned to the specific prob-
lem. These parameters represent the intercept (p1) and the importance of the workload
(p2) respectively. The workload itself is included as the ratio of the total number of shifts
remaining versus the total number of time periods remaining. This ratio is then multiplied
with the second parameter p2 in equation 9.18.
τt = p1 + p2 ·
S −
|T |∑
t=1
xt
|T |−t (9.18)
A wide variety of techniques can be used to tune the two parameters in this decision
model. The simplest of which is a simple full-factorial approach that attempts to cover all
possible combinations of parameter values over a reasonable range. Alternatively, more
advanced heuristic approaches can be used to train this model. Because of the high cost
associated with evaluating the performance of these heuristics, local-search based rather
than memetic algorithms are preferred for this task. The main reason for this is the
advantage these techniques can obtain by using common random numbers to reduce the
number of evaluations needed to determine that a move is significantly better or worse
than another solution (see section 8.4.3).
The tuning method employed in this research starts with a grid search of the most likely
parameter values of the RWDT measure. Once this initial search has been completed, the
best solution is used as a starting point for a simulated annealing heuristic which explores
the neighbourhood of the solution by changing one of the two parameter values of the
RWDT equation. The annealing procedure itself is highly similar to the one described in
section 8.4.4.1.
The grid search for the initial best solution is carried out by varying the p1 value in
the range [0,WSrated], and the p2 value in the range [0, WS
rated
5 ]. In both these ranges 10
equidistant values have been selected, and all possible combinations for these two ranges
are then tested on the complete training dataset. The solution resulting in the lowest total
cost is taken as the initial seed solution for the RWDT parameter optimisation. Where
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Algorithm 9 Simulated Annealing Procedure for RWDT
1: procedure Simulated Annealing(problem instance)
2: t← tinitial
3: i← 0
4: solbest ← best grid search solution
5: solincu ← solbest
6: while t > tend and i < maxiter do
7: NeighMove(solincu)
8: δ = significantDifference(solbest, solincu)
9: if δ < 0 then
10: solbest ← solincu
11: t← t · cooldown
12: else if δ = 0 then
13: Insignificant difference:
14: solincu ← solbest
15: else if e− δt < r then
16: solbest ← solincu
17: t← t · cooldown
18: else
19: solincu ← solbest
20: i← i+ 1
21: return solbest
the grid search is only capable of covering a limited fraction of the solution space, the
simulated annealing heuristic uses a move that is theoretically capable of reaching every
point in the solution space.
During the simulated annealing procedure, a very simple neighbourhood move is used.
This neighbourhood move changes one of the two parameters with equal probability. The
new parameter value is obtained by multiplying the current value with a random draw from
a uniform distribution U [0.5, 1.5]. New solutions are then evaluated based on their being
significantly different from the current best solution, taking common random numbers into
account. Based on extensive parameter tuning, it was found that the following parameters
yielded the best results for the simulated annealing training heuristic.
• tinitial: 10,000
• tend: 10
• cooldown rate: 0.99
These values were obtained by using a set of 250 weather patterns, which are naturally
different from the patterns used in the actual experiments in order to avoid overfitting.
9.4.3 Support Vector Machine
Defining a workload-dependent threshold already includes substantially more information.
However, this approach implicitly assumes a specific nature of the relation between these
inputs and the best possible threshold values. This relation is reflected in the specific form
of equation 9.18.
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An alternative which mitigates this issue is to use supervised learning techniques to
make the go/no-go decision. A support vector machine (SVM) is one of the most fre-
quently employed techniques capable of making a binary classification. This technique was
originally introduced by Cortes and Vapnik (1995). The main objective of these support
vector machines is to find a hyperplane that is capable of separating observations in their
respective classes. The remainder of this chapter assumes a basic knowledge of the work-
ings of support vector machines, the reader who is not familiar with these techniques is
referred to the excellent introductory works by Burges (1998); Mangasarian (2003); Smola
and Scho¨lkopf (2004).
In order to train the support vector machines, the same training data as used with the
other techniques has been used. The ‘correct’ classification of the data points as either
‘go’ (perform maintenance) or ‘no-go’ (don’t perform maintenance) was determined using
the method described in section 9.3.1. The support vector machine is presented with four
input parameters in order to make its decision: the number of maintenance shifts that
still have to be completed, the number of shifts remaining during which this maintenance
can be carried out, the observed wind speed and the observed wave height. Conforming
to standard practice, these value shave been rescaled in the range [0, 1].
The settings of the macro-parameters for the support vector machines is done using a
grid-search methodology employing a 3-fold test set-up to avoid over fitting the training
data. Beyond the basic parameters, the grid search was also used to test the performance
of linear, polynomial and radial basis function kernels.
9.4.4 Artificial Neural Networks
Artificial neural networks (ANN) are an alternative to the support vector machine tech-
nique. As many techniques in this domain, this technique is inspired by biology, specifically
the central nervous system. The technique itself was pioneered in the 1940s by McCulloch
and Pitts (1943), and has experienced a significant surge in popularity in recent years,
with a substantial number of variations and specialised adaptations for specific challenges.
Readers who are unfamiliar with this technique are referred to the excellent introductions
by Picton (2000) and Hastie et al. (2005).
Similarly to the support vector machines, the ANN technique does not require any
explicit assumptions about the underlying nature of the process. Hence, it can be applied
to a wide range of problems. In this research a three-layered perceptron was used, as is
visualised in figure 9.3. This perceptron uses the same four input parameters as presented
to the support vector machine method.
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Figure 9.3: Visual representation of the neural network structure.
The perceptron uses two 64-neuron layers and one single neuron layer as the output
layer. The former two layers both use a rectifier activation function, which allow for faster
and more effective training than traditional sigmoid functions. A 50% drop-out for the
interconnections was used in order to prevent overfitting, in combination with a 3-fold
test design similar to the one used by the support vector machine training procedure.
The performance of the neural network was evaluated using a binary cross-entropy loss
function (De Boer et al., 2005), and root-mean-square propagation was used to optimise
the network’s performance (Tieleman and Hinton, 2012).
9.5 Computational Experiments
The performance of the different solution methods has been evaluated by means of com-
putational experiments. These experiments are based on real life data, gathered from a
wind turbine park off the Belgian coast. The specific parameters derived from this case
are summarised in section 9.5.1. Next, the training of the different solution techniques is
discussed in section 9.5.2. Finally, the performance of the methods is compared in section
9.5.3.
9.5.1 Parameters
The computational experiments presented in this section are based on real information
from a wind turbine park off the Belgian coast in the North Sea. Based on information
received from professionals, the parameters have been set at the appropriate levels for the
maintenance scheduling problem faced by this specific company. Naturally, several of these
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parameters can be significantly different for wind parks in other regions or parks that use
other technology. An overview of these parameters is presented in table 9.1.
Parameter Value
Pmax 6MW
WScut-in 3.5m/s
WSrated 14m/s
WScut-out 25m/s
E 101.29EUR/MWh
WHmax 150cm
S 10/turbine
|T | 365
MCshift 1, 000.0
PCshift 7, 500.0
Table 9.1: Parameter values
The wind turbine park consists of 60 wind turbines in total, and five of these wind
turbines can be serviced simultaneously during any given time period since there are five
crews available. Note that the actual costs have been changed, but the order of magnitude
of these costs remains correct.
9.5.2 Training
In order to train the parameters of the three proposed solution approaches (see section
9.4), 250 weather patterns have been used. Each of these weather patterns describes the
weather during a complete year (365 days), which is equal to the time horizon during which
the preventive maintenance has to be executed. Hence, the training data set consists of
a total of 91, 250 go/no-go decisions. Naturally, the same training data is used for all the
solution methods in order to provide a fair comparison of the performance of the different
techniques. The values reported here are of course specific to the nature of the wind park,
as well as the meteorological conditions. Hence, for other scenarios this training should be
repeated since they are likely to yield significantly different results.
9.5.2.1 Static Threshold
The training results for the static threshold technique are visualised in figure 9.4. A clear-
cut optimum can be defined for this technique; setting the threshold at a wind speed of
6.75m/s.
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Figure 9.4: Training results for the static threshold technique.
9.5.2.2 Relative Workload Dependent Threshold
The RWDT has been trained using the method outlined in section 9.4.2. Using this
technique the best parameter values for equation 9.18 have been identified as 4.67 for p1,
and 1.24 for p2 respectively.
9.5.2.3 Support Vector Machine
The grid-search training procedure for the support vector machine identified the second
degree polynomial kernel as the most effective for the specific setting investigated in this
computational experiment.
9.5.2.4 Neural Network
The 3-fold approach to training the neural network indicated that the model started over-
fitting after approximately 80 epochs. Hence, this threshold has been used to train the
network described in section 9.4.4 using the complete set of training data.
9.5.3 Computational Results
The performance of the different solution techniques is tested on a dataset containing
2,500 weather patterns, each representing a full year of weather data. Hence a total
of 912,500 go/no-go decisions have to be made. The optimal solution for each of these
scenarios can easily be calculated based on the logic explained in section 9.3.1. This
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deterministic optimum can then be used as a lower bound for the stochastic optimisation.
The time required to make individual go/no-go decisions is negligible for each of the
solution techniques, and are therefore not reported.
Figure 9.5 shows the average total cost for each of the solution techniques. It is imme-
diately apparent that the simple static threshold performs remarkably well. Nevertheless,
taking into account the relative workload remaining (RWDT ) does succeed in making a
significant improvement upon the static method. Both machine learning techniques per-
form roughly on-par with the static threshold method. The under par performance of the
machine learning techniques indicate that at least in their current form they are unable
to capture the inherent logic that is used by the RWDT . However, it is possible that by
experimenting further with other kernels, network structures and other meta-parameters
the performance of these techniques can be improved substantially.
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Figure 9.5: Comparison of the average total costs when using different solution techniques.
An important note here is that the actual static threshold used in practice is set based
on intuition rather than extensive simulations. Hence, it is likely that the performance of
the threshold used in practice is considerably worse than the performance reported here
(see figure 9.4, which shows a steep increase in average cost even for minor deviations from
this optimal value.)
Figure 9.6 gives insight in the cost components when using the different approaches.
As described in section 9.3.1, the total costs are a combination of the lost capacity cost
(CCtot), the direct cost of maintenance (MCtot) and the penalty costs (PCtot).
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Figure 9.6: Detailed look at the composition of the costs when using different solution techniques.
The lower bound does not include any penalty cost, since this solution is based on
a deterministic analysis and under full information it is never advisable not to execute
maintenance. A key observation when comparing the different solution techniques is that
the RWDT includes a substantially smaller fraction of penalty costs when compared to
other solutions. This is another indication that the technique is to be preferred over the
static threshold technique, since a solution with a lower penalty cost should be preferred
over a solution with a higher penalty cost, even when total costs are identical. Moreover,
the results also show that both SVM and ANN solution techniques result in substantially
larger penalty cost fractions when compared to the other solution techniques.
Figure 9.7 shows the standard deviation of the total cost for the different solution
techniques. This graph shows that the inherent variability of the outcomes is not inflated
by using a static threshold. The variability of the results increases slightly when moving to
a RWDT decision technique, and even further when moving to SVM or ANN methods.
Nevertheless, it appears that this increase in variability is rather limited.
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Figure 9.7: Comparison of the standard deviation of the outcomes for the different solution tech-
niques.
9.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a new methodology for the optimisation of preventive mainte-
nance of offshore wind turbines. Using computational experiments, the merits of a number
of different techniques to govern the go/no-go decision have been analysed. These experi-
ments tested the performance of a simple static threshold, a workload-dependent threshold
as well as support vector machines and artificial neural networks.
The results of these experiments indicate that using a workload-dependent threshold
can significantly improve the profitability of the preventive maintenance activities. More-
over, for the specific case study analysed in this chapter the static threshold performed
remarkably well. The more advanced machine learning techniques were unable to provide
convincing results for this specific problem.
This study has also opened a number of interesting avenues for future research. Firstly,
using this approach in another operational setting with more volatile weather conditions
could lead to another solution technique being preferred. Secondly, this model could also be
adjusted for use in tactical rather than operational decision making. Specifically, deciding
on the capacity and availability of maintenance crews.
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9.A Overview of Notation
Table 9.2 presents an overview of the most important notation used in this chapter.
Variable/Parameter Description
τ Wind threshold for maintenance operations
t Index of the time periods
T Set of time periods considered
|T | Total number of time periods considered
TC Total cost associated with maintenance
CC Cost of lost capacity due to stopping turbines for maintenance
MC Direct costs associated with the maintenance activities
PC Penalty cost incurred for not completed maintenance shifts
P Power production (in MW)
Pmax Maximal power production of a turbine
WS Wind speed
WSt Observed wind speed in time period t
WScut-in Wind turbine cut-in wind speed
WSrated Wind turbine rated wind speed
WScut-out Wind turbine cut-out wind speed
WH Wave height
WHt Observed wave height at time period t
WHmax Maximal allowable wave height for maintenance operations
E Electricity price
S Number of required maintenance shifts in the time period
αt Binary variable =1 if WHt exceeds WHmax
Table 9.2: Overview of notation
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10
Conclusions and Future Research Avenues
This dissertation has extended two sub-domains of operations research that were but
sparsely considered in pre-existing literature. The first part of this dissertation has pre-
sented a number of novel techniques to deal with the adoption of incentive contracts in
a project-based context. The focus of this research has been the quantifiable aspects of
these contracts. These aspects were analysed from the perspective of both the owner and
the contractor hired to execute the project. This includes the optimisation of the con-
tract design, as well as the optimisation of project schedules and improvements for project
control.
The second part of this dissertation investigated how the scheduling of weather sensi-
tive projects could be improved by making use of recent advances in weather modelling
techniques, as well as the improved availability of weather data. This was specifically
applied to offshore projects which are highly sensitive to wind speeds and wave heights
during construction and maintenance operations.
This chapter presents an overview of the key findings of this research, as well as the
potential avenues for future research that were uncovered by this research.
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10.1 Research Summary
10.1.1 Part I: A Quantitative Analysis of Incentive Contracts for
Projects
In chapter 2, an overview of pre-existing literature on incentive contracting has been pre-
sented. This review uncovered a large body of literature, but few publications that were
able to provide prescriptive and quantitative guidance to either the owner or contractor.
Rather, the majority of literature remains rather qualitative and case-based. The identifi-
cation of this research opportunity was the motivation for the first part of this dissertation.
Further investigation revealed significant opportunities for cross fertilisation of litera-
ture on incentive contracting and the more quantitatively oriented areas of project man-
agement research, such as project scheduling and project control. These domains were
able to provide a solid foundation on which prescriptive models for incentivised projects
could be based.
Chapter 3 presented a novel high-level model of the relationship between the project
owner and contractor, as visualised in figure 10.1. This model consists of three compo-
nents: the contract model, the trade-off model and the evaluation model. The contract
model is a generalisation of the majority of incentive contracts that have been analysed in
the literature (as was investigated in chapter 2). This model can represent linear, piecewise
linear as well as quadratic pay-off equations, as well as lump sum awards related to specific
project deadlines. The trade-off model is the second component of this novel methodology.
This component builds on existing project management literature, specifically the quan-
tification of the trade-offs faced in a project scheduling. This pre-existing research was
extended in order to create a four-dimensional trade-off capable of representing the dy-
namic of a project underlying an incentive agreement. The nature of this trade-off is based
on a set of six basic axioms that describe the relationship between these four dimensions:
project cost, duration, scope and the effort invested by the contractor. Contractor effort in
this context comprises any action taken by the contractor to improve the performance of
the project (in terms of cost, duration or scope) to which (s)he is not contractually obliged
and which cannot be directly monitored by the owner of the project. Finally, the third
component of the model proposed in this chapter is the evaluation model which translates
the outcome of a project into a financial valuation for both the owner and contractor.
The prosed model is then used to investigate the contract design problem from the per-
spective of the project owner. The latter having two objectives: firstly, the maximisation
of his/her profits, and secondly, the alignment of the contractor’s pay-offs with his/her
own preferences. Such an alignment effectively limits the risk of agency conflicts where
it is in the contractor’s best interest to act against the desires of the project owner. As
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Figure 10.1: Strategic model of the contract design problem.
such, a contract can only be considered objectively better than another contact when it
dominates the other contract on both dimensions.
An extensive computational experiment was set up in order to provide prescriptive
guidelines to project owners when selecting incentive contracts for specific environments.
The performance of various sets of contracts being evaluated based on (i) the distance to
the global Pareto frontier as calculated by the average Hausdorff distance, (ii) the overall
spread of the solutions and (iii) the number of elements in the set of solutions. Based
on these experiments a number of specific guidelines for contract design from the owner’s
perspective can be made, which are summarised the table below.
Experiment
Uni-Dimensional Multi-Dimensional
Contract type
Non-linear and Piecewise contract outperform linear contracts. More dimensions improve performance.
Avoid transfer of all risk to one party. Duration > Scope > Cost.
Preferred types are robust to imposed restrictions. Avoid contract components transferring risk to a single party.
Skewness persists within contract types.
Environment
Strong variation of impact across environment parameters. More incentivised dimensions improves robustness.
Duration and scope contracts are more volatile. Preferred multidimensional types are more robust.
Preferred types are more robust. Including certain components increases sensitivity.
Where the goal of chapter 3 was to provide general guidance regarding the design
of contracts, The aim of the 4-th chapter was to create a dedicated optimization method
which is capable of constructing robust contracts for a given project. This research question
also takes the the project owner’s perspective, but moves towards a more operational
application area. This is done by designing optimization techniques that provide answers
to specific cases, rather than providing broad managerial guidelines. Specifically, a parallel
multi-objective scatter search meta-heuristic has been developed to optimise the contract
structure.
This multi-objective scatter search uses strongly problem-specific elements to enforce
the diversity of the population, in order to evolve towards a better set of contracts for
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the project owner to take into consideration. The actual selection of a specific contract of
course being dependent on the specific risk-preferences of the project owner. Again using
extensive computational experiments, the added value of this optimisation approach when
compared to the brute-force approach taken in chapter 3, as well as the results obtained
when using commercial solver software is proven.
Next, the perspective of the contractor was analysed in greater detail (chapter 5). The
goal of this chapter was to analyse how the scheduling of a project subjected to a given
incentive contract can be optimized. To this end, the traditional multi-mode scheduling
approach was extended to include the four-dimensional trade-off modelled in chapter 3.
Moreover, this meant moving from a trade-off on the level of the complete project to
a trade-off on the level of specific activities, since this is the level where the key decisions
of the contractor are situated. The scheduling problem itself was then modelled using
mixed integer programming, and implemented using Gurobi’s optimisation framework.
Computational experiments prove that the proposed formulation compares favourably to
heuristic optimisation models, even for larger project instances.
Another key task of the contractor that succeeds the scheduling phase is monitoring
the manner in which the project is being executed. The key goal of chapter 6 was to adjust
existing project control techniques in order to enhance the relevance of the signals they
produce for an incentivized project context. This is especially important since the profit
margin of the contractor, and hereby also the objective of the contractor, are inextricably
linked to the incentive structure of the projects.
Chapter 6 introduced the concept of ‘earned incentive management’, which is a tech-
nique based on the traditional earned value and earned schedule methodology. The key
difference being that this novel methodology actively monitors the accrual of the incentive
amounts rather than the incurred cost. By using this methodology, two key issues can
be avoided. Firstly, the separate impact of the cost and duration dimensions can be cor-
rectly weighted, eliminating the need for dimension-specific metrics. Secondly, the EIM
methodology is capable of monitoring non-increasing and irregular accrual of incentives
throughout the project, resulting in more effective project control.
The advantages of the proposed control technique have been tested using a computa-
tional experiment which simulated the control performance on 4,200 projects with varying
size and contract structures. The results of these experiments showed that the EIM tech-
nique significantly outperforms conventional EVM/ES methods, and should therefore be
preferred in projects where cost and time incentives play a significant role.
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10.1.2 Part II: Schedule Optimisation for Weather-Sensitive Projects
The second part of this dissertation investigated the usefulness of novel weather simulation
techniques for managing weather-sensitive offshore projects. The motivation for this re-
search was provided by the substantial advances in weather simulation techniques as well
as the high capital intensity of such projects, making their optimisation highly relevant
from an economical perspective.
Chapter 7 presented a novel weather simulation model, specifically tailored to offshore
projects sensitive to both wind and wave conditions. The novelty of this model lies in it
being designed for operational rather than meteorological objectives. As such, the model
is capable of simulating weather using operationally relevant time intervals, and for the
complete duration of long term projects.
The capabilities of this model were leveraged in chapter 8, where the scheduling of
offshore construction projects was investigated. Specifically, the construction of offshore
wind turbines has been investigated. The scheduling of projects was optimised by design-
ing a number of novel chromosome encodings that represent different levels of abstraction
in the scheduling of offshore construction projects. These encodings were optimised using
meta-heuristic as well as dedicated solution techniques. Computational experiments indi-
cate that the best results are obtained when using dedicated heuristics on a systematically
reduced solution space.
Next, chapter 9 extended pre-existing literature on the maintenance of offshore wind
turbines by considering the operational go/no-go decision regarding preventive mainte-
nance. The key consideration here being that preventive maintenance is best executed
at times when wind speeds, and therefore energy production, are low. Again leveraging
the capabilities of the weather simulation model presented in section 7, several strategies
for taking this decision have been compared in a computational experiment. Specifically
the performance of a static threshold, a workload dependent threshold, support vector
machines and an artificial neural networks were compared. The results indicate that using
a workload dependent threshold to take this decision can significantly improve the quality
of decision making, reducing the gap with the lower bound.
10.2 Future Research Avenues
10.2.1 Part I: A Quantitative Analysis of Incentive Contracts for
Projects
There still remain a substantial amount of challenges regarding the design and implications
of incentive contracts for projects. The following research topics could provide interesting
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insights and extend the current state of the art.
10.2.1.1 Data Collection
Current literature includes a large number of cases but there could be substantial value
in the creation of a larger database of incentive contracts as well as the nature of the
projects to which they have been applied. As of now, the available information is either
solely on the type of contract employed, or on the nature of the project. Combining this
information could provide valuable insights in the actual impact these contracts have on
project performance.
10.2.1.2 Stochastic Project Models
Due to the inherent complexity of the subject matter, the research in this dissertation
has focussed on deterministic problem formulations. Nevertheless, project environments
are frequently subjected to substantial amounts of stochasticity. Hence, there could be
substantial academic and practical value to an analysis which is capable of realistically
modelling the uncertainty associated with this four-dimensional trade-off and the implica-
tions of this uncertainty for the performance of incentive contracts.
10.2.1.3 Resource Constrained Scheduling
The scheduling methodology proposed in this research could be extended by including
resource constraints on top of the four-dimensional trade-offs. By doing so it is unlikely
that the problem could still be solved to optimality. Nevertheless, the resource constrained
project scheduling problem is a classic staple of operational research, with a high degree
of relevance in practice. As such, this is certain to be a valuable extension of this research.
10.2.2 Part II: Schedule Optimisation for Weather-Sensitive Projects
10.2.2.1 Extending to Other Types of Weather Dependencies
The chapters in the second part of this dissertation have added to the literature combining
weather modelling with operational decision making. However, the cross section between
these two research domains still contains a lot of virgin territory. One possible avenue for
future research could be the exploration of projects that are susceptible to different types
of weather conditions such as precipitation or temperature.
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10.2.2.2 Datasets of Benchmark Problems
Another possible extension of this research is the creation of a dataset of benchmark
problems of varying type and structure. These benchmark problems could provide a more
in-depth knowledge of the performance of various abstraction levels used when optimising
the scheduling for weather-sensitive projects.
10.2.2.3 Case Studies in Other Industries
The research in the paper has been applied to offshore wind turbines in particular. Ex-
tending this type of research to other industries could uncover specific issues associated
with various industries. In the long term such a body of research could result in a better
knowledge of the most adequate techniques to address specific operational challenges. In
extremis such research could lead to a formal classification system for these problems, as is
already in place for various problems in operational research, such as machine scheduling.
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